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
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
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MORAL FREEDOM

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
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MORAL FREEDOM

RECONCILED WITH

CAUSATION.



9

MORAL FREEDOM

RECONCILED WITH

CAUSATION,

BY THE ANALYSIS OF THE PROCESS OF SELF-
DETERMINATION.

THE MORAL BASIS OF SOCIAL SCIENCE.

WITH A POSTSCRIPT ON CO-OPERATION.

BY

HENRY TRAVIS, M.D.

LONDON :

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FREE WILL AND CAUSATION.

CHAPTER I.

The Writer's Experience.—The Necessitarian Views.—Opponents Unconvinced.—Facts Examined.—Importance of the Subject.

THE solution of the great problem of Free Will is the result of many years of study of the subject. The writer has felt deeply interested in it ever since his attention was first directed to it. Up to the age of about twenty, he, like all who have not made a particular study of mental science, had never very attentively considered the subject of free will. He consequently had grown up in the ordinary vague popular idea, that we make our own opinions, feelings, and volitions, (that these, in fact, are free mental *acts*,) and that we form our own character, and that, consequently, it is "our own fault" if these are not what they ought to be.

When he first heard the necessitarian opinion stated and maintained, he, of course, felt confident that it could not be correct. But by reading, and still more by arguing with himself, he became convinced that the doctrine was correct—that our

feelings, convictions, and volitions are "formed for us and not by us." He was convinced of this by asking himself whether, when he decided between two opposite motives, his decision was not determined by the stronger of the two. He was then deeply engaged in his professional studies. But this question became one of absorbing interest to him. He asked himself—"If he neglected his studies "in order to investigate this subject, *why* did he do "so?" The necessitarian reply was—because the desire to investigate this subject was at the time stronger than the desire to attend to his other studies. But could he not lay aside his "philosophical" inquiries, and attend to his more immediate duties, if he chose? Certainly, he could. But if he chose, *why* did he choose? What was choosing? Only, in this case, another word for *willing*. And if he willed to lay aside his "philosophical" investigations, and to attend to his other studies, *why* did he so will? To say that he so willed because he chose so to will, was only saying in other words that he so willed because he so willed. The cause really was, that his motive so to will was at the time the strongest motive. If it were not so, he would not, and could not, so will. And when it is so, he *must* so will. And *why* was this the strongest motive? Because his present external circumstances and constitutional qualities and states caused it to be so.

If, on the other hand, he laid aside for a time his more pressing studies, and directed his attention to "philosophical" questions, he did so because at the time the motive to do so had become the stronger motive, owing to some change of external circum-

stances, or to some temporary constitutional change, occasioned by being fatigued by other studies, or by some other sufficient cause.

Thus, whatever he willed to do, the motive so to will was at the time the strongest motive. And it was so on account of causes which he did not and could not control.

If the explanations which are contained in these pages could then have been given to him, he would have been enabled to see the fallacy of this reasoning, and he would have been saved years of erroneous thought, and years of investigation for the correction of that erroneous thought. And how much thought and discussion,—how much expenditure of life and of valuable time by others, would also have been saved, if these explanations had been in possession of the public years ago! How much useless and worse than useless speaking, writing, and printing,—and how much misleading of popular opinion. And how much good might have been effected by the same amount of mental and physical work, rightly and wisely applied for the public benefit.

But there were at that time only the old and ineffectual, because in many respects erroneous, libertarian arguments, to be opposed to the necessitarian fallacies; and consequently the writer remained in his belief of the necessitarian doctrines for many years. And as these views have been held by many of the most able and excellent men who have studied the subject, including many of the most eminent cotemporary psychologists, he was not in bad company.

But all necessitarians must feel themselves baffled when they find that, obvious as their views appear to

themselves, there is a very large section of eminent psychologists who cannot be brought to agree with them. This was strongly felt by the writer; and he attributed it to the want of correct knowledge of the subject in the libertarians, and to prejudices of early education. He felt assured that if the subject were made plain to them, they must be satisfied of the truth of the necessitarian views. And he considered that the *onus* of making it plain devolved upon the necessitarians. And feeling deeply the immense practical importance of correct views upon the subject, and having given up his profession, he devoted a great deal of time to the careful examination of every argument in favour of the libertarian views, in hopes of being able to show clearly the truth of the necessitarian doctrine.

But, although he carefully attended to every objection to the necessitarian views, and, as he thought, fully replied to every libertarian argument, the confirmed libertarians with whom he discussed the subject were still unconvinced. They could not admit that man had no power in the formation of his volition, because they *felt* that they were agents in willing—that when one of two opposing motives prevailed over the other, *they* determined which motive should prevail. They governed the motive: the motive did not govern them. This feeling and idea seemed to be the great obstacle to their acceptance of the necessitarian analysis. But they were unable to give any satisfactory explanation of the mental facts of the subject.

The writer therefore set himself to ascertain those facts, firmly believing that the libertarians were in

error. He asked himself—What is there in willing which to our introspective observation has the appearance of *agency*—"effort," "nisus," as the libertarians call it? What do we *do* in willing? What *is* willing?

The reply to this was—that willing, or volition, is the mental fact which is the immediate mental antecedent of action. When we *will*, we immediately *act*. We cannot *act*, voluntarily, unless we *will* to act. And if we will to act, the act follows of necessity—unless we are paralysed, or in some other way physically incapacitated.

But what *is* willing? What do we *do* mentally in willing? This was the core of the question. And by persistently examining this point, over and over again, during days and weeks, the truth respecting it was discovered. And this led to the solving, step by step, of the great problem respecting Free Will and Necessity, through the correcting of the errors and the supplying of the deficiencies of psychology, which alone had caused the subject to appear mysterious and inscrutable.

What this solution is, and, to some extent, the immense importance to mankind of correct knowledge of the subject, the following pages are intended to explain.

The libertarian who feels the high importance of the subject, (though none have yet *fully* appreciated its importance,) and who views with deep regret the wide spread of the necessitarian opinions which has taken place during recent times, and which is still going on; but who feels himself powerless to check this progress of mistaken and in his opinion most mischievous views, (and really mistaken and mis-

chievous to a very great extent,) will welcome with joy the means of thoroughly refuting the errors of the necessitarian doctrine.

Hitherto the wisest policy of the zealous libertarian has been that of silence. For in the discussion of the subject, the necessitarian arguments have appeared to very many persons to be by far the most forcible. And when the attention of those who previously held the popular libertarian views was directed to the consideration of those arguments, there was always much danger that these believers in man's moral liberty would become necessitarians, rather than that they would be confirmed in their previous confident but not well grounded opinions.

Therefore the most prudent libertarians have endeavoured to avoid the public discussion of the subject; and even the most confident have not always been secure, themselves, from conversion to the necessitarian views.

The means are here given to enable the libertarians to meet triumphantly the erroneous arguments of the necessitarians whenever an opportunity occurs, and to become the assailants, and the invincible assailants, of necessitarianism.

And to the necessitarians this work will give no less satisfaction. For it will confirm what is true in their views, and will enable them to separate the false from the true, and to exchange views which are partly true and partly false, partly beneficial and partly injurious, for views which are wholly true, and which will be purely and in the highest degree beneficial.

The reader will very probably regard at first with incredulity the statement that a problem has been

solved, which has hitherto baffled all the endeavours which have been made to settle it. Men have been required to receive two doctrines of momentous import to the moralist and the theologian, but which have appeared to be irreconcilable with each other—the doctrine of man's Moral Freedom, and that of Supreme Over-ruling Causation. To reject either doctrine has appeared to be a dangerous error. And yet to accept both has seemed impossible, to those who were unable to believe what appeared to them inconsistent. Can it be, it will be said, that this subject, so long involved in such deep mystery, is now made plain? The writer has no doubt that it is so. A little item of knowledge, which, though it requires what perhaps may at first seem a good deal of explanation, is extremely plain and simple when explained, dispels the mystery. The profoundly thinking Herschel has remarked, that "obscurities which appeared impenetrable in science have been suddenly dispelled, and the most barren and unpromising fields of inquiry converted, as if by inspiration, into rich and inexhaustible springs of knowledge and power, by a simple change of our point of view, or by merely bringing to bear on them some principle which it never before occurred to try." It is in this manner that the subject before us has been elucidated.

CHAPTER II.

Importance of the Knowledge of the Subject.—Effects of this Knowledge.

As a matter of mere curiosity every thoughtful person will be much interested to know the solution of a problem which has been discussed for ages by the most acute “philosophers” and divines, without success in arriving at a really satisfactory conclusion, that is, at a reconciliation of all opinions upon the subject; and which has often been pronounced to be inscrutable to human reason. But it is not merely a matter of curiosity which is involved in this problem; it is a question of immense practical importance to every individual of the human family.

The knowledge by means of which this problem is solved, is, indeed, of inestimable value; for it will, in due time, be the means of elevating mankind and promoting human happiness to an extent which never could be realised through any other addition to the knowledge of society, without this, or through any increase of merely material acquirements.

No other knowledge and no extent of *material* acquirements could ever enable mankind to attain the effectual *moral* improvement which must be attained before man can experience the full extent of happiness of which he is capable. Before man can be happy in

a very high degree, his moral and religious nature must be highly developed; and before his moral and religious nature can really be highly developed, he must become a truly intelligent being. And man can never become a truly intelligent being until he has acquired a knowledge of Human Nature, Mental and Moral—until the fundamental errors respecting his mental constitution which have hitherto prevailed are corrected. Of other knowledge and of material means, abundantly sufficient has already been acquired, when man shall have attained the intelligence and goodness which are requisite to enable and induce him to make a really good use of them. Of material means far more than sufficient has already been obtained to satisfy the reasonable wants of the population of the world, if those means were wisely applied; and no limits can be defined to the capabilities already possessed of increasing the productive powers of society. But if every individual were highly educated in other knowledge, no matter of what kind, or of how many kinds, and if all the reasonable material wants of every individual were fully supplied, so long as man remained uninformed and in error respecting Human Nature, his intellectual and moral education would still be very incomplete, and consequently his happiness would be very imperfect. There would still remain the same hitherto mysterious and overwhelming Cause, continually in operation, to prevent his attainment of those high qualities which he is capable of acquiring, and which are requisite for his full happiness.

This hitherto mysterious Cause has been the influence of Erroneous Fundamental Ideas respecting

Human Nature—erroneous suppositions, which have naturally arisen in the absence of correct knowledge upon the subject; which knowledge alone could enable man to emancipate himself from those errors and from their pernicious influences.

It is because these erroneous suppositions were *natural* to man in the earlier stages of his existence, through which he has hitherto been passing, before he had acquired the information which was requisite to correct them, and because while he retained these erroneous ideas he must of necessity, though unconsciously, experience their deteriorating and misleading influences, that man has been so justly considered to be “bad by *nature*.” But when these errors shall have been superseded by correct views, and when, consequently, a generation shall have arisen possessing the power to *prevent* the renewal of these errors in succeeding generations, the natural or original badness of man will be corrected, by his deliverance from these errors and their consequences. And not only will man by becoming thus enlightened be delivered from an overwhelming Cause of moral and material Evil, but at the same time he will be placed under the influence of new and correct ideas which will have a most powerful beneficial influence upon him—which, in fact, will be to him a most powerful ever-present Cause of moral and material Good.

The children of a generation thus *re-generated*, being influenced from their birth by parents and friends whose treatment, and instruction, and example, will be guided by this knowledge, will experience its humanising effects from *without* from the commencement of their lives, and from *within* from the earliest

age at which they are able to acquire it themselves. And indeed the original constitution of these children will be an improved constitution.

In fact there are no other means through which, in any approximate degree, so much good could be effected, as will arise from the understanding of this subject by the population. All the gold of Australia and California is mere dross in comparative value when weighed in the balance against the knowledge of man's Mental and Moral Nature, and when the results which will arise from it are considered—estimated they cannot be. Millions of money expended for the most benevolent and beneficent purposes, even in the foundation and endowment of Institutions for Gratuitous Education, as Education now is ; of Almshouses ; in giving Pensions to the Needy and Aged, &c. &c., would be productive of far less benefit. For through this knowledge, all need for such charities and palliatives of the effects of ignorance will in due time be removed.

Nor would any multiplication of books upon any other subject, nor any increase of man's knowledge upon other subjects, be one millionth part so useful to mankind as this information will prove to be. But, of course, time must be allowed for the diffusion of this knowledge throughout society, and for the gradual development of the modifications, in the intelligence, the good feelings, and the general practices of mankind, which, in due time, will naturally be produced through its influence, and through the ability which it will give to investigate successfully the Causes of Good and Evil to man. But, still, the time which will be required for the production of much good will not be by any means so long as in the absence of this know-

ledge it naturally appears likely to be. But, of course, this will require explanation.

Among the first effects of this knowledge will be the increase of gentle and kindly feelings in all considerate persons, through reflection upon the *Causes* of whatever is unpleasant to them in others, and upon the means by which moral and intellectual improvement may be effectually promoted. It is of immense importance to every human being that he himself and every one with whom he comes into communication, should be kind, considerate, and just, in disposition, in feelings, and in conduct; and it is still more important that all should be *intelligently* kind, considerate, and just. And it is very obvious that there is now, and has always hitherto been in society, much need of improvement in these respects. Even the best are far from being so kind and just as it is desirable that all should be; and the amount of unkindness and injustice prevailing in society in general, in various forms and degrees, is very sad to contemplate, when we consider how much happiness which might be is thus prevented, and how much unhappiness is produced instead. Even in those who are the most strongly disposed to be kind and just at all times, this disposition is constantly counteracted by erroneous ideas of the *deserts* of others, and of what is really due from one human being to another; and in those who are less so disposed, the tendency to be unkind and unjust is constantly excited and strengthened, as in fact it is to a great extent produced, through the influence of the same erroneous ideas. In fact, man can never be truly kind and just towards his fellow-man until he is enabled to be *intelligently* so,—that is, until the errors

which now prevail as to the deserts of individuals are superseded by correct views upon this subject. And the knowledge which will enable man to be intelligently kind and just to his fellow-beings, will have a very powerful effect upon him to influence him to be so.

Ideas have an immense influence in determining the feelings and conduct and the development of the character; and it has been abundantly proved by experience that no mere precepts, and in fact no other means which man has been able to devise, can be effectual for the right regulation of man's feelings and conduct and the well-forming of his character, in opposition to the counteracting influences of the erroneous fundamental ideas respecting man's nature which have hitherto pervaded society, and the injurious external conditions emanating from those ideas. Past experience has abundantly proved that while these erroneous ideas prevail, man cannot be effectually taught to "love his fellow-man" and to "do to others in all things as he would have others to do to him" even by the most persevering and impressive inculcation of precepts to do so. The exhortations may be listened to most reverentially, and the excellence of the precepts may be fully acknowledged, but they are *not* practically and consistently obeyed. And for this simple reason, (simple when it is understood, but previously unsuspected and mysterious,) that the influence of these precepts is counteracted most powerfully by a combination of erroneous ideas respecting the deserts of human beings, and by many ever-present opposing external influences, of which those ideas are the source and the perpetuating cause.

But it is not alone by promoting kindness and

justice that the knowledge which will dispel these erroneous ideas will have a most beneficent influence to improve man's character, to amend his practices, and to increase his happiness. This knowledge will produce most beneficial effects upon the feelings, conduct, and character in other respects also; and moreover it will open to man's acquirement a new Science, which will enable him to well educate the young, really and thoroughly, and not nominally only and very partially and imperfectly, which has been all that even the most competent educators have hitherto been able to accomplish.

This Science will be the Science of the Prevention of Evil and of the Production of Good to Mankind, and the full extent of the benefits which it will be the means of producing, we, who have known man only in the absence of that knowledge, and subject in consequence to endless deteriorating influences, from within and from without, cannot even imagine.

CHAPTER III.

The Controversy respecting Free Will and Necessity.—Two Questions Involved.—Two Truths Involved.—Liberty and Necessity.—Power and Causation.—Causation.—Self-Determination.—Denial of Causation.—Denial of Self-Determination.—Qualifications of Necessitarian Inferences.—Effects of the two-fold Knowledge.—Benefits of Knowledge of Self-Determination.—Benefits of Knowledge of Causation—Qualifications of both Doctrines.—A True Analysis of Self-Determination can alone elucidate the Subject.

THE knowledge which will enable man rightly to estimate human deserts—to understand how far his fellow-beings have *merit* or are *deserving* of *praise* or reward for their good qualities, &c., and how far they have *demerit* and are *deserving* of *blame* and punishment for their bad qualities, &c., and which will also open to his attainment the Science of the Causes of moral Good and Evil, and through them of physical Good and Evil to Mankind, is the knowledge which has been the subject of the controversy respecting *Free Will* and *Necessity*.

Upon this subject there have hitherto been two opposite opinions, or doctrines—the *Libertarian* and the *Necessitarian*.

The *Libertarian* doctrine is the vague, popular, partly correct and partly erroneous opinion, consisting fundamentally of the idea that man has a Free Will and is *not* subject to Causation in the formation of his

Volitions,—an opinion which has hitherto been almost universally received by those who have never particularly studied the subject, and which has also been maintained by a large proportion of those who have studied it.

The *Necessitarian* doctrine is the opposite opinion, and is also a vague, partly correct and partly erroneous opinion. It consists fundamentally of the idea that man is subject to Causation in the formation of his volitions and in every other respect, and that consequently he has *no* Free Will—*no* Power of Self-determination:—an opinion which has of late years become more and more general, as the subject has been more and more generally studied.

It has been supposed that the controversy respecting Free Will and Necessity has reference to one question only. Thus Mr. Mill, in his "System of Logic," (b. vi., c. ii.,) says—"The question whether the law of causality applies in the same strict sense to human actions as to other phenomena, is the celebrated controversy respecting the Freedom of the Will." (In the word "actions," in this statement, are included volitions, as appears from the context.) And it has been supposed that the *Necessitarian* doctrine, at its foundation, is simply the affirmation that the law of Causality does so apply; and that the *Libertarian* doctrine, at its foundation, is simply the denial of this, or, as Mr. Mill says in continuation, is the maintaining "that the will is not determined, like other phenomena, by antecedents, but determines itself."

This is not a very fair statement of the *Libertarian* view. The intelligent *Libertarian* would scarcely

suppose that the "phenomenon," "will," that is, the volition, determines itself. For it is obvious that for the volition to determine itself, it must have taken place before it has taken place. The Libertarian psychologist would scarcely maintain that "the will" differs from "other phenomena" so much as this, in the manner in which it is produced. But still it is supposed that the fundamental part of the Libertarian doctrine consists simply of the denial that the law of Causation extends to the formation of man's volitions—it is supposed that the assertion that "man has a free will," is only the statement in other words of this denial. Thus we find Sir William Hamilton, in his examination of this subject, endeavouring to elucidate it by means of a multitude of "speculations" about "uncaused volitions," and "motiveless volitions," and "the inconceivability of an infinite non-commencement," and the "inconceivability of an absolute commencement," &c. &c.—as if the *Causation* of volitions were the only question at issue. And throughout this great controversy, so far as it has been purely "philosophical," this has been supposed to be the one fundamental question to be decided.

But there is another fundamental question involved in the controversy—a question which is also of immense importance. This question, which, although it is closely connected with the first, is really distinct from it, has been so intermixed and identified with the first, that the two have been made to appear to be but one. But this second question has always formed a part of the controversy, although it has been so disguised under the mystification produced by its being identified with the other, that the fact that it is

a distinct question has been hidden from view. This second question is—

Whether or not man possesses a Power of Self-determination—that is, a Free Will.

Both Libertarians and Necessitarians have hitherto been ignorant of the nature of Self-determination; and, owing to this want of knowledge, both parties have supposed that a power of Self-determination, or a Free-will, is, or, if there were such a Power, must be, the ability to determine our volitions *independently of Causation*. It has been owing to this supposition that the two questions at issue have appeared to be but one—the question relative to Causation. And, consequently, the Libertarians have always felt themselves compelled to deny that man in the formation of his volitions is subject to Causation. If they had known what the process of Self-determination is, they would have seen the error of this denial.

On the other hand, the Necessitarians have not only argued that man has not an *independent* power of Self-determination; they have insisted also that he has no power of Self-determination at all—in the true sense of the term *power*. They have insisted that his volitions are formed “*for him and not by him.*” Thus we find Mr. Mill concluding the chapter in which he states, at the beginning, that the question at issue between the Libertarians and the Necessitarians is the Causation of volitions, by hoping that “*with the “ corrections and explanations now given, the doctrine of the causation of human volitions by motives, “ and of motives by the desirable objects offered to us, “ combined with our particular susceptibilities of desire, “ may be considered as sufficiently established for the*

“ purposes of this treatise : ” — in which remarks, as indeed in the chapter generally, it is not only asserted that the law of Causality applies to the formation of our volitions, but also that our volitions are formed “ for us and not by us.”

(I shall have occasion afterwards to remark upon Mr. Mill’s corrections and explanations, and upon other parts of his psychological writings; selecting more especially the works of this distinguished author for comment, because in them the Necessitarian doctrine may be considered as set forth in accordance with the most advanced views upon the subject, and because the errors and defects which I shall have occasion to notice may be pointed out most usefully in the writings of one who is so well known and so remarkable for accuracy of thought. I have too much sympathy with many of Mr. Mill’s views, and too much admiration of his generous and noble sentiments, to dissent from him upon any points otherwise than with the most respectful feelings.)

Thus, then, there are *two* fundamental questions involved in the controversy respecting “ the freedom of the will : ” —

1st. Whether the Law of *Causation* extends to the formation of man’s volitions : —

2nd. Whether man has a power of Self-determination.

And the correct answer to *both* of these questions is the affirmative.

1st. The Law of Causation *does* extend to the formation of man’s volitions.

2nd. Man *has* a power of Self-determination.

Here are two Truths. And in the fundamental

part of the *Necessitarian* doctrine the first is asserted and the second is denied. And in the fundamental part of the *Libertarian* doctrine, the second is asserted and the first is denied.

Consequently, in the fundamental part of each doctrine there is an affirmative, which is true ; and a negative, which is erroneous.

And thus we see the reason why neither doctrine could ever destroy the other, and why neither could ever be completely established. Neither doctrine could destroy the other, because there was a truth in both ; and neither could be completely established, because there was an error in both.

But the knowledge was wanting which alone could make this perceptible and intelligible—namely, the knowledge of the process of Self-determination.

We see also, in this two-fold nature of the fundamental part of each doctrine, the reason why each doctrine is both beneficial and injurious in its effects : each being beneficial so far as it is true, and injurious so far as it is erroneous. The advocates of each doctrine have insisted very strongly upon the importance and the beneficial nature of their own views, and upon the evil nature of the opposite views. But the blindness of both parties to the evil consequences of their own views, and to the importance and the beneficial nature of the opposite views, has been very remarkable.

We shall find that for the construction of a thoroughly true and a purely beneficial doctrine respecting man's mental power in relation to the formation of his volitions, it is requisite that the two truths which have been mentioned should be combined

with each other. Each of these truths, if not combined with the other, is productive, to some extent, of injurious effects; but when each is combined, as each has hitherto been, with the *negation* of the other, these injurious effects are greatly increased.

Liberty and Necessity.

With respect to *Liberty* and *Necessity*, there has been much misconception; arising from the confounding with each other of the two fundamental questions in this controversy. It has been supposed that to be *caused* to do an act is to be *necessitated* or *compelled* to do it—is to be deprived of *moral liberty* in relation to it. But this is a mistake. Every act which we do, we are *caused* to do; but we are not *necessitated* to do every act which we do. We are necessitated in those acts only which we are *compelled* to do—which we “*cannot help*” doing. And with respect to acts which we do *not* do, we are in all cases *caused* not to do what we do not do; but we are *necessitated* in those cases only in which we have not *power* to do the act which we do not do, or in which we are deprived of our *liberty* by outward obstacles from which we have not power to extricate ourselves. It is the possession of *power*, including the absence of overwhelming obstacles, which constitutes *Liberty*; the being without power, or having our power overcome by obstacles which to us are invincible, which constitutes *Necessitation*, *compulsion*, *coercion*. When, speaking of an act which we have done, we say “*I could not help it*”—“*I was compelled to do it,*” we mean, either that we had no power to refrain from doing it, or that we had not

sufficient power to have refrained from doing it, if we had exerted to the utmost what power we had. If we say that we could not *do* the act, we mean that we had not sufficient power, or that we were coerced by external obstacles which to us were invincible. In the ordinary proceedings of life we distinguish clearly enough between acts which we were *compelled* to do and acts which we were not *compelled* to do. And we feel that there is a real distinction between the two kinds of acts. And this distinction is not destroyed by the fact that we are *caused* to do every act which we do.

Thus the question whether we have *Power*, and the question whether in the exercise of our power we are subject to *Causation*, are two different questions. And our moral liberty, or free will, depends, not upon the presence or the absence of *Causation* in the process of the formation of our volitions, but upon our possession or non-possession of a *Power of Self-determination*. If we have *no* Power of Self-determination, we have no moral liberty. If we *have* a Power of Self-determination, we *have* moral liberty, *so far as that Power extends*, and in all cases in which our Power is not overwhelmed in such a manner that we could not by our utmost efforts exert it effectually.

But a Power of Self-determination must be more than a "*capability of feeling* a desire" strong enough to conquer our character. Such a capability is not a *power* at all. It is only a susceptibility. And *desires* do not conquer *characters*. They conquer other desires. All our desires are equally manifestations of qualities or capabilities; and all our qualities or capabilities are equally parts of our character. A Power of Self-determination must be a power to

augment the strength of our right desires so as to cause them to preponderate over our wrong desires—a Power, in the true sense of the term, by the exercise of which we can determine the formation of our volitions—so that they may be formed (not “for us and not by us,” but) *by* us as well as for us. The fact that we are subject to Causation in the exercise of this Power is no more incompatible with our having it, than the same fact is incompatible with our having power to produce any physical result.

In relation to causation, Mr. Mill attaches great importance to the distinction between the idea that “events *must* follow their causes,” and the idea that “events *always do* follow their causes.” It seems to me that this distinction is unimportant—that it matters very little indeed, practically, if at all, whether we say, or suppose, that every event for which there is a sufficient cause *must* occur, or that every event for which there is a sufficient cause *always does* occur; or whether we say that for every event which occurs there *must* have been a sufficient cause; or that for every event which occurs there *always has been* a sufficient cause. It appears to me that the distinction which is really essential is that between freedom and necessity, as explained above:—that it is not merely a speculative distinction between two different views of causation, but a real distinction between the having of *power* and liberty, and the not having of *power* and liberty, in relation to a given act, or to the production of a given result.

Importance of the fact of Causation, and of the Knowledge of it.

Upon the universality of Causation all Science is dependent. If there were any portion of Nature to

which causation did not extend, there could not be in that portion of Nature any certainty, any regularity, any Divinely-established order of events. In that portion of Nature all would be anarchy and confusion. Occurrences would take place without any cause ; and means for the production of results could never be depended upon. Consequently, if man were not in every respect, notwithstanding his Power of Self-determination, subject to Causation, there could not be any Science of Education, nor any Science of Legislation, nor any general Science of Human affairs. And man alone, of all created things, would be excluded from the Order of Nature, and would be left to be regulated in his proceedings by himself alone.

Yet this is the predicament in which man is supposed to be placed according to the old *Libertarian* doctrine, through the denial of the extension of causation to the formation of human volitions.

As illustrating the fact that the old libertarian idea is felt to be a prevention to the scientific investigation of the means to educate man and to regulate the proceedings of societies in the best manner, it may be remarked, that at the meeting of the Social Science Association in London in 1862, Mr. R. Monckton Milnes, now Lord Houghton, in his address as president of the section on Social Economy, observed, that he preferred the title "Social Economy" to "Social Science," because "there enters into this question "an element which is almost contradictory to strict "scientific principle—the element of human liberty, "the free will of mankind."

Importance of the fact that Man has a Power of Self-determination, and of the Knowledge of that Fact.

On the other hand, man, without a Power of Self-determination, would be mentally and morally helpless. He would be in all respects *necessitated*:—that is, all his volitions would be determined by causes over which he had no control; and therefore all his acts, and all the consequences of his acts, would be produced by causes over which he had no control. He might still act *voluntarily*:—that is, his *acts* would still be produced by his volitions. But as his volitions would be produced by Causes over which he had no control, (“for him, and not by him,”) even his voluntary acts would be effects which in reality he had no agency in producing. For acts are the inevitable sequences of the volitions which are their immediate mental antecedents; and it is only by having power in the formation of our volitions, that we can have power in the determination of our acts.

This is the predicament in which man is supposed to be placed according to the *Necessitarian* doctrine—through the denial of the fact that he possesses a Power of Self-determination.

Evil Effects, upon Man's Ideas, and Feelings, and Conduct, of the Ignorance and Denial of Causation in relation to Human Volitions, &c.

1. It is obvious, upon a little consideration of the subject, that if, with the advocates of the old *Libertarian* doctrine, we attribute the determination of man's conduct and the development of his character to himself alone, or if we do not fully take into consideration the effects of *Causes* upon him,—that is, the effects of

past and present external influences, and of the ideas which he is or has been caused to acquire, and of constitutional qualities and states, we shall over-estimate both his merits and his demerits, and we shall be induced to blame him and to treat him unkindly and to punish him for what displeases us in him, much more than can really be just; and we shall imagine that this treatment of him is just.

2. And we shall be unable to perceive the *effects*, upon others and upon ourselves, of our unkindness and unconscious injustice; although the objects of our treatment will feel instinctively that it is unjust, and although it actually is productive of very injurious effects upon the feelings and the development of the character both of those who are the agents in such proceedings and of those who are their objects.

3. And we shall be blind to the real Causes of that for which we blame and punish, and of the other effects which are manifested in the ideas, feelings, conduct, and character, of individuals, and of classes, societies, &c. And we shall be unable even to have any intelligent idea of such Causes, and to make any intelligent endeavours to ascertain them, or to investigate the Causes of Moral Evil and Good to men.

4. And in reference to ourselves, the consequences will be similar. We shall over-blame ourselves when we think that we deserve blame, and shall be quite unable to understand the causes of our mistakes or misdeeds.

5. And with respect to the source of what appears to us to be deserving of *praise*, we shall be equally ignorant and mistaken, in reference both to others and to ourselves. We shall attribute more *merit* than is

justly due, and shall thus excite and encourage foolish and offensive pride and self-glorification, instead of the modest and unassuming estimate of self which is alone consistent with a truly intelligent character.

6. At the same time we must be intellectually in a mist and a muddle of ideas as to the Causes of Moral Good and Evil :—having some vague, but necessarily very inconsistent notions about moral Causes and Effects, but having none but the most confused ideas respecting the real “why and because” of the moral Effects which we perceive.

7. And with respect to punishment, if the Laws of Causation did not extend to the formation of human volitions, however *just* it might be to punish man for his misdeeds, &c., there could not be any *utility* in punishment, or in the consciousness of liability to punishment; because, in that case, neither the one nor the other could have any *effect* upon man, for his amendment or for the prevention of future misdeeds.

8. It may also be remarked that if man willed independently, he must will independently of motives; and there could not be any *merit* or *demerit* in such willing, any more than there could be in willing if he were *compelled* to will by causes over which, and over their operation, he had “no control.”

Evil Effects of the Ignorance and Denial of the fact that Man has a Power of Self-determination, and of the Want of Knowledge of the Process of Self-determination.

1. If we suppose that man's volitions are produced, and consequently that his conduct is determined, by causes which are altogether independent of his own

agency—"for him and not by him," we cannot, consistently with this opinion, expect any one to exert himself in any way in the regulation of his volitions and conduct. And we cannot, intelligently, adopt any means to promote the development of the Power of Self-determination—a part of Education which is of immense importance. And we can never intelligently exert our own Power of Self-determination, the very existence of which we are ignorant of and deny. We shall still exert this Power, because we do so instinctively; but the tendency to exert it will necessarily be counteracted, and our exertion of it will be weakened, by the influence of the idea that we do not possess such a power. Thus we must be deprived of the stimulus to self-exertion which arises from the knowledge that we *have* a Power of Self-determination, and that it is our duty to exert it, and that it is for our good that we should do so; and we shall be caused to palliate and excuse what is wrong to an extent which must be extremely injurious.

2. Even the Libertarian, while he has no clear idea of the nature of Self-determination, can only exert his Power of Self-control blindly and instinctively, so far as relates to his actual exertion of that Power.

3. Again, from the supposition that man has no Power of Self-determination, it follows, as a consequence which cannot consistently be evaded, that man cannot be a morally responsible being—that he cannot have *merit* or *demerit*, and cannot deserve *praise* or *blame*, or reward or punishment. Nor, if this supposition were correct, could there be any *duties*, nor any virtue or vice, in the ordinary and proper sense of

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2. It has also been asserted that man may still *deserve* punishment and reward consistently with the fundamental Necessitarian opinion—that it may still be *just* to punish and to reward. But, again, to maintain this, the meaning of the term *just* must be altered, and the word *just* must be supposed to mean no more than useful or expedient, and must thus be deprived of an essential part of its signification. Mr. J. S. Mill, in his “Utilitarianism,” and in his “Examination of Sir William Hamilton’s ‘Philosophy,’” chap. xxvi., “On the Freedom of the Will,” advocates this view of *justice*, &c., but the arguments which he and others make use of for this purpose will never satisfy either the Libertarian or the consistent Necessitarian. It is useless to endeavour by modifying the meanings of words, to reconcile the inferences from the negative fundamental part of the Necessitarian doctrine with opinions which involve as an essential part of them the belief that man possesses a Power of Self-determination.

Thus it appears that the suppositions which constitute the *negative* fundamental parts of the Necessitarian and of the Libertarian doctrines are extremely injurious in many ways in their effects upon man.

Effects of the Two-fold Knowledge.

If, on the other hand, we examine into the effects of the knowledge of the truths which constitute the *affirmative* fundamental part of those doctrines, we shall find that those effects are in many ways extremely beneficial. But we shall also find that it is requisite that each of those truths should be viewed in combination with the other, in order that the effects of

each may be duly qualified and that they may not be so exaggerated as to become injurious. And, consequently, we shall find that, for the construction of a purely beneficial doctrine or view of man's moral liberty, it is requisite that the knowledge that man possesses a power of self-determination should be united with the knowledge that the laws of causation extend to the process of self-determination, as well as to every other process in Nature.

Beneficial effects of the Knowledge that man has a Power of Self-determination.

From the knowledge that man has a Power of Self-determination it follows—

That each individual, to the extent to which he has had this power in the past, during the successive stages of his life, and to the extent to which he has it at the present time, is a *morally responsible* being in reference to the past and the present ;—that, to that extent, he has *merit* and *deserves praise* and reward when his opinions, feelings, qualities, and conduct are such as it is desirable that they should be ; and that, to the same extent, he has *demerit* and *deserves blame* and punishment when his qualities, &c., are *not* such as it is desirable that they should be.

These inferences, in conjunction with the knowledge from which they are derived, are highly beneficial and humanising ; for they supply a very useful stimulus to self-exertion, and enable us to encourage self-exertion in others. And they also promote the increase of approving and loving feelings towards others on account of their good attainments and conduct, and of rational self-approving feelings towards ourselves

when we feel that we are deserving of such feelings. And they are also favourable to the due excitement and manifestation of proper and beneficial feelings of disapprobation towards others and towards ourselves when there is a fitting occasion for such feelings.

But to prevent the injurious exaggerations of the consequences of the knowledge that man has a Power of Self-determination, which were pointed out when the effects of the denial that the laws of Causation extend to human volitions were described, it is requisite that the fact that the laws of Causation *do* extend to the process of Self-determination, and to the formation of man's volitions, and to all that he is and does, should be kept in view ; and that the nature of the Power of Self-determination, and its extent and its limits, should be understood ; and that, in estimating the merits and demerits of individuals, the effects of those organic and external causes in relation to which the individual had no choice or power, should always be duly considered. But when, as in the old Libertarian ideas, there is no knowledge of the nature of Self-determination, and it is denied that there are any such considerations to be thought of, the consequences, as we have seen, are extremely injurious.

Beneficial effects of the Knowledge that the Laws of Causation extend to the formation of Volitions.

From the knowledge that the Laws of Causation extend to the formation of volitions, &c., it follows—

That, whatever may be the qualities, the opinions, the feelings, the conduct, of young or old, they are *Effects*, for the production of which there must have been sufficient *Causes*. And by the investigation of

these causes it will be found that they consist, to a very great extent, of constitutional qualities and of external circumstances, in the choice or determination of which, and in relation to the Laws of their mutual effects upon each other, the individual has not, and has not had, any power or control.

These inferences, in conjunction with the knowledge from which they are derived, are highly beneficial, and are conducive to the attainment of the most valuable knowledge—the knowledge of the Causes of Good and Evil, moral and physical. And, so long as there is not sufficient wisdom in society to enable it to *prevent* the production of bad characters, opinions, feelings, and conduct, these views and this knowledge will have a very powerful influence to make us forgiving and kind and properly considerate towards those whose misfortune it must be, far more than their fault—if it is their fault at all—that they are otherwise than it is desirable that they should be.

And, again, these views and this knowledge will influence us powerfully to feel good-will towards offenders, and will also have a very powerful influence to prevent all harshness and vindictiveness in punishing them, if we are compelled to have recourse to punishments through our own ignorance and through the ignorance of society as to the means by which all occasion for punishments may be *prevented*.

And at the same time we shall be led by these views and this knowledge, to observe and investigate Causes and Effects in relation to Moral Good and Evil with the attention which is due to a subject of such immense importance ; and thus to ascertain that punishments are the clumsy and ineffectual expedients

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of ignorance ; and that, although they are indispensable to ignorance, and are to some extent useful to remedy, though very partially, the consequences of the Causes of Evil which are perpetuated through ignorance, they are in themselves very powerful Causes of Evil, and will be superseded by effective means to *prevent* Evil and to produce Good, when men shall be so wise as to know those means.

So far the knowledge that the Laws of Causation extend to the formation of man's volitions, and to all that he is and does, is extremely beneficial in its effects. But to prevent the injurious exaggerations of these consequences which were pointed out when the effects of the denial that man has a power of Self-determination were described, it is requisite that the fact that man has a Power of Self-determination should be kept in view, and also that the nature and the extent and limits of that Power should be understood. And when, as in the fundamental part of the Necessitarian doctrine, this fact is not merely lost sight of, but is denied, and when there is no knowledge of the Power of Self-determination, the consequences, as we have seen, are extremely injurious.

Qualifications of the Necessitarian and the Libertarian Doctrines.

In consequence of the attention which each party in the controversy respecting "the freedom of the will" has been required to give to the representations of its opponents, some of the partisans of each opinion have been induced to endeavour, by qualifying their doctrine, to reconcile it with the most obvious parts of the opposite views. In these endeavours

each party has tried to accommodate the admission of a portion of the affirmative part of the opposite doctrine, to the denial of that affirmative part as a general truth. Thus the *Necessitarian* has endeavoured to show that man's freedom may be admitted while his *Power* of Self-determination is denied ; and the *Libertarian* has endeavoured to reconcile the admission of the influences of external circumstances over man, with the denial of the extension of the Laws of Causation to the formation of his Volitions.

Qualifications of the fundamental part of the Necessitarian Doctrine.

The qualifications of the fundamental part of the Necessitarian doctrine may be divided into three classes. The complete Necessitarian doctrine is the doctrine of Fatalism, which holds, as a consequence of the Universality of Causation, that all that man is and does, and all that happens to him, is determined independently of himself.

1st Qualification.—But even the Fatalist is compelled to qualify this doctrine to some extent in his practice. To act consistently in accordance with this doctrine, man would be obliged to refrain from all interference with events, and to wait, for instance, to have his clothes put on to him and his food put into his mouth, and eaten, “independently of himself.” Consequently in the practice of even the most extreme Necessitarians, there is a degree of qualification of the Necessitarian view.

2nd Qualification.—The next degree of qualification of this doctrine is that which it receives from those Necessitarians who cannot help seeing and

admitting that, notwithstanding the universality of Causation, many events and results are dependent upon man's agency; but who maintain that, as the determination of man's feelings, convictions, volitions, and acts, and the formation of his character, are dependent upon Causation, these must be altogether independent of his agency, and beyond his control. This is the kind of Necessitarianism which the late Mr. Owen did so much to popularise.

3rd Qualification.—Again, the fundamental part of the Necessitarian doctrine is still further qualified by those who cannot help perceiving that, notwithstanding the Universality of Causation, the formation of man's *character* is very much dependent upon his own agency, and that therefore, as his volitions and consequently his acts are very much dependent upon his character, his volitions and his acts are thus indirectly dependent upon his own agency; but who still agree with the Necessitarians of the preceding class, in maintaining that man's *volitions*, in the immediate process of their formation, are formed "for him and not by him." This is the qualification of the Necessitarian doctrine by means of which Mr. Mill has supposed that that doctrine can be reconciled with man's "feeling of moral freedom." Mr. Mill, in the chapter of his "System of Logic" from which quotations have already been made, says,

"If we examine closely we shall find that this "feeling of our being able to modify our *character*, if *we wish*, is itself the feeling of moral freedom which "we are conscious of. A person feels morally free "who feels that his habits or his temptations are not "his masters, but he theirs: who, even in yielding to

“them, knows that he could resist; that, were he desirous of altogether throwing them off, there would not be required for that purpose a stronger desire than he knows himself to be capable of feeling.”

But to be able to modify our character, without having power to determine our volitions, is only to have power to perform the *acts* which are requisite to produce the result; and this is only what is commonly called freedom to *act*, to which the Necessitarian doctrine even in its less qualified form is not opposed. But to be able to “resist and master temptations” is to have *power* to determine the formation of our volitions, that is, to have a *Power of Self-determination*. In purport, therefore, Mr. Mill in the above remarks admits that man may have a Power of Self-determination. But this is not really his meaning. For it appears from the latter part of the quotation, as well as from other parts of the same chapter, that what Mr. Mill calls being able to resist and master temptations, is only being “capable of *feeling*” a desire sufficiently strong for the purpose. The moral freedom which consists in being capable of *feeling* a desire which is sufficiently strong to overpower temptations, is that kind of moral freedom in which the exercise of the power of Self-determination is superseded, through the predominance of the higher elements of character over the lower. This is the highest kind of moral freedom—“the glorious freedom of the children of God,” of which St. Paul speaks,—the freedom which all who are not excessively malformed will be enabled to attain by means of a really good education. But there is a lower kind of

moral freedom, the possession of which, during the progress of education, is requisite for the attainment of the well-developed character which is the source of the higher moral freedom. This preliminary moral freedom consists in the possession of a *Power of Self-determination*, by the exercise of which we are enabled to resist and master temptations, in the true sense of those expressions. And it is the denial of this kind of moral freedom which constitutes the negative fundamental part of the Necessitarian doctrine, and to which Mr. Mill adheres through all his apparent concessions to the Libertarian views. And this denial is not to be justified or explained away by any modifications of the terms which are made use of, or by employing the language of free will in maintaining it.

The analysis of the process of Self-determination will show that man *has* a *Power of Self-determination*, in the true sense of the term power, and consequently that the negative fundamental part of the Necessitarian doctrine must be given up.

*Qualifications of the Fundamental part of the
Libertarian Doctrine.*

The most considerate and intelligent recipients and maintainers of the old Libertarian views do not assert that man has an *independent* Power of Self-determination; but they say that he has "a *Power*" of *Self-determination*. Thus the late most excellent and deeply-lamented Prince Consort, in one of his admirable speeches, which he delivered at the Educational Conference, in June, 1855, observed that "*man is endowed with a power of self-determination.*"

He did not say, incautiously and incorrectly, that man has an "*independent* Power of Self-determination." His views were too carefully matured to allow of his making that assertion. This statement of the fundamental part of the doctrine of Free Will by him may be taken as the expression of the most advanced opinion of those who now maintain the old Libertarian idea. For, as Earl Granville said in the House of Lords, in February, 1861, when speaking of the Prince Consort after his decease, "His "Royal Highness, although a man of strong will and "strong character, was never exceeded by any person, "in any position, not only in his willingness, but in "his anxiety, to hear every possible objection that "could be raised to his own views, in order that he "might arrive at a really sound conclusion on the "matter in hand."

This, then, is the view of the most intelligent Libertarians of our day—"that man is endowed with a *power* of *Self-determination*;" and this view would be a correct view, if the ideas of those who assert it did not involve more than is expressed by their words, and if the nature of Self-determination were understood. Perhaps no one who has considered the subject with due care would now deliberately assert that man has an *independent* Power of Self-determination—that he is *not* influenced by motives in the formation of his volitions; and that his motives are *not* to a considerable extent produced by his constitution and external circumstances, as these are at the time when his motives arise; and that the qualities and condition of his constitution at any particular time are *not* to a considerable extent the

result of many antecedent influences which he did not and could not make or select; and that the external circumstances by which he is influenced at any particular time are *not* in many respects decided for him independently of his own agency or choice. But still it would be supposed by all who now assert that man has a Power of Self-determination, that to some extent he is *not* subject to Causation—that his “Power of Self-determination” is a power by the exercise of which he is able to some extent to rise above Causation, and that without power to rise above Causation, man could not be a Free Agent, in the true sense of the term—that is, morally, and not merely physically, free.

Thus, in the most carefully matured views of the Libertarians the negative fundamental part of the old Libertarian doctrine is retained, although the terms in which it is asserted are modified, and although absolute independence is not insisted upon. But in the assertion that man has power to rise, at least to some extent, above Causation, there is an ingredient of truth; for the Power of Self-determination is a Power to rise above the influence of *some* Causes, or of some influences which would become Causes of volition if they were not opposed; and which, even when they are overcome, are still to some extent Causes, inasmuch as they Cause the exertion of power which is requisite to subdue them. But in all this, man is still subject to Causation; for there must be a Cause for his exerting his power of self-determination, and for his exerting it as he does exert it; and there must have been Causes by means of which he acquired that power and the amount of it which he

possesses. No events—no changes of any kind, can occur, and no results can be produced, independently of Causation. All is subject to Law. And man can never be more than a subordinate agent in the production of events and results. To suppose that he can be more than this, is to imagine that he can be a *First Cause*.

If man is ever to acquire the power to well educate the young or to well govern human affairs, it must be by acquiring a knowledge of the Causes and Means by which the desired results are to be produced, according to the Unchanging and Universal Laws to which all natural processes are subjected. That he has never yet had this power is not owing to any hindrance in the nature of things, through which his attainment of this power must be absolutely and for ever an impossibility. It has been solely owing to his not having yet acquired the requisite knowledge. And he never could make any substantial progress in the acquisition of this knowledge so long as he did not understand,

1st, That man, in the formation of his feelings, convictions, volitions, conduct, and character, and in every other respect, is subject to *Supreme Causation* ;

2nd, That, nevertheless, man has a *Power of Self-determination* :—

And so long as he did not also know sufficient of man's mental constitution to understand the nature of this Power of Self-determination, or how it is exercised and developed.

Thus we see that each of the two doctrines under consideration consists fundamentally of two parts—a primary part, which is affirmative and is true ; and a

secondary part, which is negative and is *not* true, but which is supposed to be a necessary inference from the primary part; and that the primary affirmative part of each of these fundamental ideas is denied in the secondary, negative, and supposed inferential part of the other. And that it has been supposed that each of the two affirmatives is necessarily and logically incompatible with the other. And we see also that, although the most considerate Libertarians and Necessitarians have qualified their statements of the fundamental negative part of their respective doctrines, the affirmative fundamental part of each doctrine is still denied by the advocates of the opposite fundamental idea.

- And if we might judge of the truth or error of opinions by their favourable or unfavourable effects upon the thoughts, feelings, conduct, and character of those who hold them, we have abundant reason for concluding that the affirmative fundamental part of each doctrine is true, and that the negative fundamental part of each is false. And if the affirmative fundamental part of each doctrine is true, the negative fundamental part of each *must be* false; because the negative of each is the denial of the affirmative of the other.

But before this can be plainly seen to be the case, the nature of Self-determination must be ascertained. And the Libertarian must thus be enabled to perceive that there is no part of the process of Self-determination which is exempt from Causation; and the Necessitarian must also be enabled to see that there *is* Self-determination, notwithstanding the truth of the assertion that man's volitions, in common with all

other events and results in nature, are produced in accordance with unchanging Laws of Causation.

By no other means than by the analysis of the process of Self-determination could this be ascertained.

And it has been solely because neither Libertarians nor Necessitarians have been able to analyse this process, that this great subject has remained in litigation up to this time.

And we shall see that this inability to analyse the process of Self-determination has been owing to fundamental misconceptions and confusion of ideas relative to mental facts, in the presence of which the correct analysis of mental processes was impossible.

CHAPTER IV.

The Arguments which have been used in the Controversy.

BEFORE proceeding to the psychological division of our subject, it will be well to notice some of the most prominent of the arguments which have been used in the controversy respecting Free Will and Necessity. In the endeavours which have been made to solve this hitherto difficult and intricate problem, it is curious to observe, in the course of the long and obstinate controversy which there has been respecting it, how each party have always found themselves unable to confute their opponents completely, that is, by reconciling the opinions of all upon the different points which were at issue between them. And, with the clue which we have now obtained, it is curious to observe how the arguments of each party have been powerful or weak as they were directed against the negative or the affirmative part of the doctrine to which they were opposed. It will be found that the arguments of each party have been powerful in maintaining the affirmative portion of the doctrine which they were employed to support, and in opposing the negative part of that against which they were advanced ; and weak in opposing the affirmative part of the doctrine against which they were advanced, and in maintaining the negative portion of that in support of which they

were employed. Sir William Hamilton remarked that "the champions of the opposite doctrines are at once "resistless in assault, and impotent in defence." But it was in assaulting the *negative* portion of the doctrine which they opposed, that each party were resistless; and in defending the *negative* part of their own doctrine, that they were impotent. They were weak in assaulting the *affirmative* part of the doctrine which they opposed; and strong in defending the *affirmative* part of their own doctrine.

And it is curious to observe how intimately the affirmative and the negative parts of each doctrine have been commingled, so that it has been made to appear that the negation of the affirmative part of one doctrine, was necessarily involved in the affirmative part of the opposite doctrine:—an entanglement which could never have been unravelled by any other means than by the analysis of the process of Self-determination.

The Libertarian party could never be induced by any means to give up the *affirmative* part of their doctrine; and they could never be enabled by any other means than by this analysis to perceive that their fundamental affirmation was not incompatible with the affirmative fundamental part of the Necessitarian doctrine.

And the Necessitarians could never be induced to give up *their* fundamental *affirmation*; and they could never be enabled by any other means than by the same analysis, to perceive that the existence and exercise of a Power of Self-determination is no more incompatible with their fundamental affirmation, than the existence and exercise of any other Power, bodily

or mental—the power to walk, the power to speak, or the power to attend to any particular subject of thought or of observation. We cannot walk, we cannot speak, or perform any act whatever, bodily or mental, without there being a sufficient Cause and sufficient means for our doing as we do. But we have not the less on that account the *Power* to perform the acts which we do perform, and to produce the results which we produce by means of our acts. And there is no reason why it should be otherwise with respect to the exercise of our Power of Self-determination.

But, as we have seen, each party in the controversy had constructed their fundamental principle in such a manner, that there could not be any reconciliation between the two doctrines. To reconcile them it was requisite that the negative fundamental part of each doctrine should be withdrawn; and this fundamental negation was supposed to be involved in the fundamental affirmative part of the doctrine, and to be identical with it.

And it was impossible that either doctrine could be established so long as it included its negative fundamental part, which was the denial of a Truth; and it was equally impossible that either could be refuted so long as it retained its affirmative fundamental part, which was the affirmation of a Truth.

Neither party appear to have suspected that it was possible to unite the two fundamental affirmations, and by so doing to obtain a doctrine which would be entirely true, and which would unite all that is beneficial in both of the opposing doctrines, and exclude all that is injurious in them. And that, as we have seen, the affirmative fundamental part of one

doctrine was requisite to be united with the affirmative fundamental part of the other, in order duly to qualify the inferences from each fundamental affirmation, and to prevent their injurious exaggeration. And that, in fact, the fundamental affirmation of each doctrine requires to be combined with that of the other, in order that either may be fully comprehended.

In the controversy which there has been upon this great problem, sometimes *logic* has been appealed to, and sometimes *psychology*. But the logic, when it has been employed against either fundamental affirmation, having been based upon false data, has been worse than useless ; and the psychology, having been inaccurate and incomplete, has been ineffectual.

1. In opposition to the affirmative part of the Libertarian doctrine, the Necessitarians have argued, that as all events and results are produced by Causes, the formation of man's volitions must be produced by Causes, and, *therefore*, man cannot have a Power of Self-determination. But supposing that it is true that Causation extends even to the formation of all man's volitions, there is, as has just been remarked, no logical connection between this truth and the exercise of a power of Self-determination, by which it can be shown that the one is incompatible with the other. If man possesses *bodily* powers, and is able to exert them, notwithstanding his subjection to causation in their exercise, why may he not possess and exercise *mental* powers also, notwithstanding his subjection to causation in their exercise? Why may not the exercise of a Power of Self-determination be one of the causes or antecedents, and the deciding one, by means of which volitions are produced—not always,

but in some cases? The analysis of the process of Self-determination shows that there are many cases in which volitions are produced by means of the exercise of a Power of Self-determination, as one of the causes, or a part of the cause, and the deciding part-cause, of the volitions which occur. But it also shows that the exercise of the Power of Self-determination is itself an effect—that it is not a Cause without a Cause. Neither is *its* Cause a Cause without a Cause.

2. It has been asserted by Libertarians, in support of their idea that man is *independent* in the formation of his volitions, that man is himself the cause of his volitions. But this is denied by the Necessitarians, and they add, that if man did cause his volitions, he must himself be caused to cause them as he does, and that to suppose that he is not so, is to imagine that he can be a First Cause. In reply to this, the Libertarians have appealed to psychology, and have said that they were *conscious* that they caused or determined their volitions. But they have not been able to give any definite account of this consciousness, and their idea of the nature of man's agency in the forming of his volitions has been quite erroneous. But to the assertion of consciousness of agency in the determination of volitions, the Necessitarians have replied, that *they* had no such consciousness; and they have endeavoured to show by psychological analysis that, in every case, the strongest motive is the cause of the volition; and that certain antecedents are the cause of the motives and of their relative strength; and that certain previous antecedents are the causes of those antecedents, &c.; and that there

is no Self-determination in the process, except, according to some, that which takes place remotely and indirectly, through man's power over the formation of his character.

3. Another argument of the Libertarians has been, that man is *conscious* that he is a morally responsible being, and *therefore* he *must* have a Power of Self-determination; for if he had not this power, he could not be morally responsible. But it is a mistake to suppose that man can be *conscious* that he is a morally responsible being. We cannot have an introspective perception that we are morally responsible; and being "conscious," as the word is here used, means having an introspective perception. It is only of actual mental facts that we can be conscious. We may have a *conviction* that we are morally responsible, and we may be conscious that we have this conviction; but we cannot perceive introspectively that this conviction is a true one. The truth or error of this belief is not a mental fact. And the proposition that we are morally responsible beings, is not a primary or fundamental proposition. Its truth or error depends upon the truth or error of the proposition which in this argument is made to be the inference. We are morally responsible because we have a power of self-determination; and to argue that we have a power of self-determination because we are morally responsible, is manifestly a vicious mode of reasoning.

4. Again, Libertarians have said that they are conscious that in precisely similar circumstances they could act or not act in either of two opposite ways; in other words, that, all the circumstances which precede the volition being precisely similar, they

could *will* in either of two opposite ways. This is an idea, the truth or error of which can only be ascertained clearly by a correct analysis of the process of Self-determination. If it were true, the Affirmative fundamental part of the Necessitarian doctrine would be false. The Necessitarians have not been able to convince the Libertarians that it is not true, because they have not been able to show them the full analysis of the process of the formation of volitions, except in cases in which there really is not any exercise of the power of self-determination. But neither have the Libertarians been able to show, by an analysis of the process of self-determination, what the mental action is, of which they are really, though in a very vague manner, conscious ; and therefore they have not been able to supply the deficiencies of the Necessitarian view of the subject. If they could have done so, they would at the same time have corrected their own mistake. For they would have seen that there always is a sufficient Cause for every change which takes place, even in the process of self-determination, and that two different volitions could not occur, *all* the antecedent circumstances being precisely similar.

5. Again,—each party have insisted strongly upon the injurious nature of the doctrine which they opposed, as proof of the erroneousness of that doctrine. But as both doctrines have been equally liable to the same objection, this argument has been futile, except to show that there must be some error in both doctrines. And, as was before remarked, it is curious to observe how blind each party have been to the injurious effects of their own doctrine, and to the beneficial effects of the doctrine which they opposed ;

and how clear-sighted they have been with reference to the beneficial effects of their own doctrine, and with respect to the injurious effects of the other.

Thus the subject has appeared to be involved in inscrutable mystery ; and although many of the controversialists on both sides have been thoroughly certain that their own view of the subject was correct, and have wondered at the inability of their opponents to agree with them, and have attributed this inability to some inexplicable mental defect or obliquity, and to want of knowledge of the facts of the subject, the most circumspect—those who have examined *both* sides of the different points at issue the most carefully and dispassionately, have been content to “give it up” as beyond human comprehension. It has indeed been a riddle which no one has been able to solve. Inexplicable, apparently, while unsolved ; but which, when solved, will be found to be so simple that a child may understand it.

In the meantime, as we have seen, each party in the controversy have yielded to some extent to their opponents, and each doctrine has been qualified to some extent by the most considerate of its adherents. But the want of a psychological analysis of the process of Self-determination has prevented the full recognition of the Libertarian Truth by the Necessitarians (which would have destroyed *Necessitarianism*) ; and the same Cause has prevented the recognition of the truth of the affirmative fundamental part of the Necessitarian doctrine by the Libertarians, which would have converted the erroneous old doctrine of Libertarianism into a new and correct Libertarian doctrine.

It has been asserted that enough is known for all practical purposes when it is understood by the Necessitarians that man has the indirect power of Self-determination which has been admitted by the advocates of the qualified Necessitarian doctrine, and when it is allowed by the Libertarians that man is to a considerable extent influenced by constitutional and external conditions, as is now allowed by all considerate Libertarians. But those who have supposed that this is sufficient for all practical uses, have judged without possessing the knowledge of the subject which must be acquired before an intelligent opinion can be formed respecting it. The truth is, as has already been stated, that the Necessitarian, in denying that man has a power to determine the formation of his volitions in the immediate process of their formation, is in error upon a point the knowledge of which is of very great practical importance, in one direction ; and the Libertarian, in denying the presence of Supreme causation in man's exercise of his Power of Self-determination, is also in error upon a point, the knowledge of which is of very great practical importance in another direction. And, as has already been intimated, until *both* these points are correctly understood in conjunction with each other, there cannot be any Science of Education, any Science of Government ; nor can there be any "*Social Science*," of which those two sciences are most essential departments ; and consequently there cannot be any really wise and successful regulation of the business of life—any wise regulation of the feelings and conduct of societies or of individuals.

These preliminary remarks will have sufficiently

prepared the reader to enter upon the psychological examination of the subject with the interest and attention of which it is deserving—with the belief that it is no merely curious subject of metaphysical speculation ; but that it is a subject of plain matter-of-fact, and one which is of incalculable practical importance.

CHAPTER V.

Mental Science as a popular Study.—The four Fundamental Errors of Psychological Views and Language.—The Third Error explained.—The First and Second Errors explained.—Definitions of “the Mind” by modern Psychologists.

It is sometimes remarked, when a popular explanation of this subject is spoken of, that it is unreasonable to expect that all persons should become profound metaphysicians, and that therefore the knowledge of the subject before us must always be confined to the more educated portion of society who are competent to understand it. This, like all errors, is a judgment formed without knowledge. There is no need whatever for every one to become a profound “metaphysician” in order to understand this subject. It is simply a knowledge of some fundamental points of Mental Science (which is not metaphysics) which is required. And when Mental Science shall be made as simple as it will be when the errors in language and views which have hitherto made it complicated and puzzling, are corrected, there will be no more difficulty in enabling all intelligent persons of the present generation who wish to understand the subject, and every one who grows up in the midst of a more enlightened generation, to acquire correct views

upon this point, and upon all other essential points of that science, and to express those views rationally, than there has been in causing every one to acquire the vague and incorrect ideas of mental facts and modes of describing those facts, which have hitherto universally prevailed. When children acquire erroneous ideas and language and practices, it is not on account of any natural preference for such ideas and language and practices that they do so; but it is because the ideas and language and practices of those by whom they are influenced are erroneous. Really intelligent persons are requisite to enable the young to acquire a really intelligent character. And when such persons only shall influence the young, the acquiring of intelligent ideas, language, and practices by the young will be as certain a result, as the reverse is when the young are from their birth under influences of the opposite description. All, even the most illiterate, are now taught by the common language and practices of society to have some ideas respecting several fundamental points of Mental Science, and most conspicuously with respect to the Power of "Free-Will" or Self-determination in man. And it will be quite as easy to enable every one to acquire correct views upon those points, when those upon whom the young depend for instruction have themselves acquired correct views, as it now is to cause them to acquire erroneous ideas, or to remain in ignorance; or as it now is to teach every child to read and write, accomplishments which were formerly confined to a select few. And these correct ideas will be acquired with far less labour than is now requisite for learning to read and write. In fact, they will appear to "come

naturally." In short, to give, and to receive, or acquire, an education which will be infinitely better, physically, intellectually, morally, and practically, than the best that could possibly be given to any, or obtained by any, during past times, will be, when a really enlightened generation of adults has arisen, no labour, but a most delightful and interesting pastime, both to the educators and to those who are receiving and acquiring the education. And the key to this—the knowledge without which it is utterly impracticable, and in the absence of which the idea of it appears to be visionary in the extreme, but *with* which it will be a mere matter of course, is the knowledge of what man can do and of what he cannot do in determining the formation of his volitions. Of course this knowledge is not all which is now deficient; but it will lead in due time to the attainment of all else which is deficient, and which, without this knowledge, could never by any possibility be attained. And it is indispensable also for the wise application of other knowledge, which has been acquired without it; and will lead to that application. And it may be remarked that only so much knowledge as will be *sufficient* for practical purposes will be requisite to enable man to enter intelligently upon a right course and to make some preparatory progress in that course. This preliminary sufficiency of knowledge having been obtained, all else that is requisite will follow in the natural course of progress. But there can never be any *effectual* improvement so long as man has not yet begun to advance in the right direction.

We will now proceed to consider and correct the errors of views and of language respecting mental facts

which have prevented the attainment of correct ideas respecting volition and Self-determination.

The Four Fundamental Errors of Psychological Views and Language.

The process of Self-determination can never be understood while mental facts are viewed and described in the confused and erroneous manner in which they have hitherto been misrepresented in writings on psychology. Before volition and Self-determination can be understood, the more elementary mental facts must be clearly and accurately described. And before these elementary mental facts can be described accurately and clearly, the four following fundamental errors, which are conspicuous in all writings upon psychology, must be corrected.

1st. The error of supposing that there is a distinct percipient being within the living human organism—or of describing mental facts in such a manner as to imply this idea.

2nd. The error of supposing that mental facts are states or movements of a being or substance of any kind—immaterial or material,—or of describing them as such.

3rd. The error of confounding with each other, *entities*, *attributes*, and *facts*; or of so describing mental facts as to appear to confound these three very different objects of thought with each other.

4th. The error of confounding mental affections with mental acts.

The want of clear and correct ideas, and the presence of vague and erroneous ideas, upon these four points, have been the cause of the difficulty which has

been experienced in obtaining a right understanding of volition and Self-determination. These fundamental errors of views and of language so falsify every idea of mental operations and every attempted description of those operations, that until they are corrected, psychology must continue in an extremely unsatisfactory state, notwithstanding every other addition which can be made to the immense amount of very valuable knowledge which has been obtained in various divisions of that science. At the present day it is only in language that the three first errors, so conspicuous in the psychological writings of previous times, are retained by the great majority of the most eminent psychologists. Upon these points therefore it is only now requisite that the descriptions of mental facts should be made to correspond with the facts themselves, as they are understood by these authors, in order to introduce accuracy, so far, into psychological writings. But so long as the fourth fundamental error is not corrected—so long as the distinction between mental affections and mental acts is not distinctly perceived and kept in view—psychology must inevitably continue in a very unsatisfactory state, especially with reference to the knowledge of mental *powers*. For as power, properly viewed, is the ability to perform *acts*, or to produce results by means of acts, it is obvious that so long as we suppose that mental affections are mental acts, and while we do not clearly perceive the distinction between these two kinds of mental facts, we must be unable to obtain correct views with respect to mental *powers*. The distinction between mental affections and mental acts is so

obvious when it is pointed out, that one feels surprised that it should not have been clearly ascertained long ago, especially when one observes how minutely and with how much ability every mental fact and process has been examined. But in the processes in which mental acts occur, these acts are so intimately connected with mental affections, and mingled with them, and dependent upon them, and impossible without them, that it was very natural that those who were conscious of mental action in their mental operations should identify the mental acts with the mental affections; and that those who attended more particularly to the mental affections, which constitute by far the largest and most conspicuous portion of our active mental processes, should fail to detect the element of mental action by which those processes are distinguished from simple mental affections, or from successions of these affections which occur independently of mental action.

In considering the four fundamental errors which have been named, it will be most convenient to begin with the *third*. We shall then come to the examination of the *first*, and, with it, of the *second*. And when these have been sufficiently considered, the various points to be elucidated preparatory to the correction of the *fourth* error will come under our notice, including the explanation of mental *affections* as distinguished from mental *acts*, and a condensed description of the Nervous System, and of the dependence of mental facts upon it. We shall then be prepared to understand the nature of mental *acts*, and to correct the fourth fundamental error. And

we shall thus be enabled to trace the process of Self-determination.

The Third Fundamental Error.

In the study of psychology there are three very different objects of thought to be attended to.

1st. The *being* who thinks and feels.

2nd. The mental *attributes* of this being.

3rd. The mental *facts*—thoughts, feelings, &c.

To confound these three different objects of thought with each other—to confound mental *facts* with mental *attributes*, and either of these with actual *beings*, or *things*, is so palpably erroneous, that one would suppose, if one had not evidence to the contrary, that such mistakes could never be made by intelligent persons who desired to be accurate in thought and expression. And yet, in the ordinary language of psychology this confusion has been and is still of constant occurrence. And, as confused language is indicative of confused ideas, we may fairly conclude that, (although many of those who make use of such language would not defend it as accurate,) whenever such language is made use of, the thoughts which it is employed to express are more or less indefinite and incorrect. And as no one who wishes to write or speak clearly would intentionally make use of language which is incorrect, it may be expected that errors of this kind will disappear as the consciousness that they are errors becomes more distinct and general.

No one can deliberately suppose that mental *attributes* or mental *facts* are *beings* or *things*; or can fail after due consideration to perceive the distinction between mental *attributes* and mental *facts*—between

the *faculties* of thought and feeling, &c., and the *actual* thoughts and feelings, &c. Yet how constantly in writings on psychology are mental facts called "states" or "acts" of *will* or of *the will*, of *consciousness* or of *the consciousness*, of reason or of *the reason*, of *the understanding*, of *the intellect*, &c. &c.! And how constantly are consciousness, will, intellect, &c., spoken of in other ways as if they performed various mental operations; or represented in some other manner as entities or things—as when ideas are said to be presented to "the consciousness"—or to be present in "consciousness"—or when objects are said to be "represented in consciousness," or to "traverse the consciousness," &c. &c. However much such misrepresentations of mental facts may have usage in their favour, the language of psychology can never be suitable for scientific description so long as they are considered as allowable figures of speech.

The use of the same term, as the name of a mental *fact* and of a mental *faculty*, (as consciousness, will, thought, sight, benevolence, veneration, and many others,) is another defect of psychological language, which is very frequently productive, and indicative, of confusion of ideas. It is very often impossible for a reader to know in which of the two senses the word which is used is to be understood; and it is also very often evident that those who use it have no clear idea upon the point. This defect, as well as the others, will no doubt be remedied by some means, (either by modifying the terms employed, or by distinctly stating the sense in which the term is used whenever this can be doubtful,) when accuracy of thought shall have produced a due attention to accuracy in expressing

that thought. It will not then be considered allowable to speak and write upon psychological subjects in a loose and inaccurate manner, which would be considered ridiculous if it were adopted in speaking or writing of the facts of the material world. There is already much improvement to be observed in the language of modern psychologists upon the points which we are now considering. This is a natural consequence of more correct views upon these points. And the frequent improprieties of language which still occur, upon these points, are to be attributed to the habits of inaccurate expression which have been acquired in the course of education, through the use of the ordinary forms of speech which we have inherited from our predecessors, and through reading the works of psychologists whose writings abound in such improprieties. Every English student of mental science reads attentively some of the writings of Locke, Reid, Stewart, Brown, &c. &c. In these writings the four fundamental errors which have been named are very conspicuous; and, while we fully concede to these authors all the merits to which they are justly entitled, and fully acknowledge the obligations of the present generation to them, it must be confessed that their writings are in many respects extremely misleading to those who seek for information in them, and can only now be read as exhibiting mental science in an extremely defective state of development upon many points. And, indeed, this is the present state of mental science as exhibited in the writings of the most advanced psychologists even of our day; for writings in which any of the four fundamental errors occur, whatever other merits

they may have, must need very important corrections.

There is a misuse of terms, closely allied to the confounding with each other of things, attributes, and facts, upon which it is requisite to remark. It is the application of the term *thing* to attributes and to facts. Mr. J. S. Mill considers this use of the word "thing" in his "Logic" (b. i., c. iii.), and he decides in favour of this practice. But in this decision I cannot agree with him. To me the use of the word "thing" in reference to attributes or to facts appears extremely objectionable, especially in writings in which strict accuracy is to be desired. And it is not less objectionable to reverse the misapplication of terms, and to call, for instance, the human body "a vast complication of physical *facts*," as Mr. J. S. Mill does ("Logic," b. iii., c. vii., s. 3). To confound facts and things with each other in this manner may be allowable in "metaphysics" and "philosophy," but in matter-of-fact psychological description it surely ought to be strictly avoided.

Mr. Mill says that attributes exist, and feelings exist; and he therefore thinks we may be allowed to call them things. But attributes do not exist as *things*; and feelings do not *exist* at all (unless we adopt Dr. Brown's idea, to be remarked upon presently)—they occur. They are *facts*, not existences. It is quite true, as Mr. Mill says, that the words "existences," "substances," "objects," "beings," "entities," "essences," cannot with propriety be applied to attributes or to facts. But the word "*things*" is equally inappropriate. And if we are to express our thoughts upon these subjects correctly, some contrivances of

language must be adopted to avoid this use of the word. In many cases the expression "objects of thought" may be used; and some means may always be found of superseding the use of the word "thing" where it cannot be correctly employed.

Whenever psychological views and language are what they ought to be, there will not be any confounding of things, attributes, and facts, with each other, even in appearance. And there will never be any personifications either of mental attributes or of mental facts; nor any indistinctness as to which of the two objects of thought is meant when mental attributes or mental facts are spoken of. Our thoughts are so intimately connected with the words in which we express them, that we can scarcely think correctly when we express our thoughts in loose and inaccurate language.

In publishing new editions of writings on psychology by living authors, it will become requisite that those authors should correct their works wherever deviations from fundamental accuracy of views or of language occur. By this the value of these writings will be greatly increased. The works of preceding psychologists will remain as they are, and will show to succeeding generations how ridiculously mental facts were viewed and described while the four fundamental errors prevailed, and the great extent of very valuable information which was acquired respecting those facts during that period, notwithstanding the misconceptions which falsified fundamentally the ideas, and consequently the language, of those who then investigated mental facts. While at the same time they will show how powerfully the acquirement of

correct views upon some very important parts of that science was obstructed by those fundamental misconceptions.

First and Second Fundamental Errors.

The impersonation of the aggregate of the mental faculties, termed "the mind," must not be confounded with the Soul, as it has very commonly been. The supposed entity called "the mind" is imagined to be a distinct percipient being within the *living* organism. The separation of Body and Soul is believed to take place at *death*. The supposition respecting "the mind" has reference to a matter of *Science*, which may be verified or disproved by the observation of facts. The belief in the separate existence of the Soul after the termination of our present life, has reference to a subject of *Faith*, and cannot be verified by the experience of living men. And if it could be verified experimentally, it would cease, when it had been so verified, to be an article of belief, and would pass out of the domain of Faith into the region of knowledge.

Upon this point Archbishop Whately, who does not confound "the mind" with the Soul, says, in his "Lessons on Mind," page 2—

"Whether the human Soul is capable of being in
 "an active state without a Body at all, and what is
 "the nature of the connection of Soul and Body—
 "these are questions on which Scripture gives us no
 "information, and which are quite beyond the reach
 "of human reason. When we consider that it has
 "long been a question among natural philosophers
 "whether those three powerful agents, Heat, Light,

“ and Electricity, are substances, or are merely certain conditions of substances, it does seem a most presumptuous and hopeless task to speculate, (as some have done,) and to pronounce decidedly, concerning the substance of the Soul, and to pretend to prove that it is, or that it is not, a material substance, or an immaterial substance, or not a substance at all.”

Upon this same point, also, Dr. Gall, in his work, “*Sur l’Origine des Qualités Morales et des Facultés Intellectuelles de l’Homme, et sur les Conditions de leur Manifestation*,” (Paris, 1825,) vol. i., p. 190, says,

“ We must not seek to explain the union of the Soul and the Body, nor their reciprocal influence, nor how this influence takes place;—whether by the immediate action of the Deity, or by an ethereal fluid, or by a Divine emanation. Whether Souls are united to Bodies at an earlier or at a later period; whether they are endowed with different qualities in each individual, or are entirely similar in all; whatever may be the decision of theologians or metaphysicians upon this subject, my principle, that the manifestation of our moral qualities and of our intellectual faculties can take place only by means of the organism, remains immovable.”

In our present life, the *living* organism, Body and Soul together, constitutes *one* being, with bodily and mental attributes. And the aggregate of the mental attributes is “the mind;” that is, the mind is an aggregate of *attributes*, and is not an *entity* distinct from the living organism. It is an inadvertence to call the different parts of the *living* organism, *material* organs. The fact that the organism is *living* may be considered as evidence that it is *not* purely material.

But this is a subject of "speculation" for the "metaphysician." As mere students of mental science we must be content to confess our ignorance respecting the ultimate nature of things.

We have no evidence whatever that there is a distinct percipient entity within the living organism. All the arguments of metaphysicians in favour of the supposition are based upon very imperfect and erroneous views of the facts of the subject. It cannot reasonably be supposed that if we were distinct beings within our organism, there would be any uncertainty upon the subject. We should naturally distinguish ourselves from the organism in which we were enclosed, as readily as we now distinguish ourselves from our clothes or our bed, or from a room or carriage in which we are sitting. This one remark is sufficient to show that there is no real foundation for the old metaphysical supposition.

The arguments derived from our consciousness of personal identity are quite deceptive. For although *as individuals* we are the same living organised beings through life, we are no more the same in our mental qualities at two distant periods, than we are the same in our physical constitution. And even if we lose our susceptibility of consciousness entirely, we are still, while we continue to live, considered to be the same persons. Evidently, while we live in our present form, each of us is one being, and not two which are distinct from each other.

It is impossible to have clear and accurate ideas of mental facts so long as it is supposed that there is a distinct percipient entity within the organism, and that mental affections and mental operations—sen-

sations, thoughts, emotions, volitions, perceiving, attending, reasoning, &c. &c., are *states* or *movements* of this distinct percipient entity. Thoughts, feelings, &c., cannot be *states* or *movements* of any *being* or *substance* of any kind.

The supposition that mental facts are states or movements of a distinct percipient being within the living organism, seems to have arisen from a desire to explain mental facts further than they can be explained, instead of being satisfied with the knowledge of them which is to be obtained by observing them as they really are, and which is quite sufficient for all practical purposes. If feelings and thoughts and mental operations had been observed in a matter-of-fact manner, the supposition that they are states or movements of a distinct entity within the organism would have been seen to be quite as little in accordance with their real nature, as the materialist idea that they are states or movements of the organism itself or of some parts of it. "Metaphysicians" and "philosophers" imagined that mental facts could be explained by this hypothesis. But instead of furnishing an explanation of those facts, it has been the means of confirming ideas respecting them which are fundamentally erroneous, and which have been powerful impediments to the acquirement of correct views of mental operations. In consequence of this supposition, the percipient being became involved in mystery, and the absurdity of supposing mental facts to be states or movements of a being or substance, was hidden in the mist of confused ideas in which the whole subject became obscured.

It is one peculiar characteristic of mental facts that

they are *consequent* upon modifications of the substance of the percipient being. These *modifications* are the states or movements of this being. But mental facts are entirely unlike any such modifications. The materiality or immateriality of the substance of which the percipient being is formed, does not alter the case. Feelings and thoughts and reasonings, &c., are immaterial *facts*, quite unlike any imaginable modifications or movements of any imaginable substance or being.

Mr. Stewart (in his "Active and Moral Powers of Man," book iii., chap. vi.) ridicules Mr. Hume for speaking of "that little agitation of the brain which we call thought." But his own idea that thought is a state or a movement of a spiritual percipient *being* or *substance* is quite as worthy of ridicule.

As an instance of the excessively imaginative ideas respecting mental facts which sensible men in other respects have adopted in consequence of the metaphysical impersonation of the aggregate of the mental faculties, let us see what Dr. Thomas Brown, a very distinguished psychologist of his day, and a most acute observer of mental facts, says of the nature of feelings and thoughts. In the ninth of his Lectures on the "Philosophy" of the "Human Mind," he says—

"The mind is one *substance*, capable of existing "in a variety of states, according as it is variously "affected, and *constituting* in these different states all "the complex phenomena of thought and feeling."

And in another Lecture (the 16th) he says—

"All the feelings and thoughts of the mind are "only the mind itself existing in certain states"!

One would scarcely think it possible that an acute

and highly intelligent man, carefully considering mental facts, could be led into such a fundamental misconception respecting them, by "metaphysical," or any other, "speculations," as to suppose that a feeling or a thought is a *substance*, of any kind, existing in a particular state. And surely, if those who listened respectfully to the lectures of the learned professor had not been mystified by "metaphysics," they would never have accepted ideas so inconsistent with the obvious nature of mental facts, as true and profound descriptions of thoughts and feelings. A moment's matter-of-fact examination of the supposition must satisfy any plain-thinking man, that neither a feeling, (as, for instance, joy or sorrow, or hope or fear,) nor a thought of any kind, can reasonably be considered to be a *substance* existing in a particular state—whether that substance be supposed to be matter or spirit.

Happily, in our day the obstacle to the clear elucidation of mental facts which was interposed by the fundamental error of supposing that the being who thinks and feels, &c., is something which is distinct from the living organism, is rapidly disappearing; that supposition having been discarded by the majority of the most eminent cotemporary psychologists. By these the aggregate either of man's mental *faculties*, or of his *thoughts, feelings, &c.*, is called his mind. It matters not in which of these two senses the term "mind" is understood, so long as the meaning which is attached to it is distinctly known, and if the word is always used in strict conformity with this meaning. It is to be regretted that this consistent use of the term has not yet been adopted by those who no longer

attach to it its old signification. But no doubt this consistency will follow in due time.

The present position of the correct view respecting "the mind," as a respectable and respected opinion, which is daily gaining increased ascendancy over the old metaphysical supposition, has not been attained without a long and severe contest with those who had adopted the metaphysical idea. It was long imagined, through the error of confounding "the mind" with the Soul, that to deny the existence of a distinct percipient being within the *living* organism, was to reject one of the most cherished religious beliefs. And, as a natural consequence of this idea, the scientific opinion was opposed with a great deal of bitterness, though with very little matter-of-fact reasoning. Bitterness, manifested in various ways, is the only resource of those who are unable to maintain their convictions by an appeal to facts, when those convictions are assailed. When we know that we have palpable facts upon our side with which to maintain our views, we can encounter differences of opinion with good temper, and can take pleasure in endeavouring to correct the errors of those who differ from us. It is a great mistake to confound the doctrines of Religion, of which Faith is the support, with our views upon matters of Science, which views are worthless when they are not in accordance with Facts.

Before proceeding to the next division of our subject, it will be useful to place before the reader the definitions of "the mind," or "mind," which have been given in the works of several authors of note in recent times.

Definitions of the Mind by modern Psychologists.

Dr. Laycock, Lecturer on Medical Psychology in the University of Edinburgh, says, in his very valuable work on "Mind and Brain"—

"To the practical psychologist it is the man, in his twofold constitution, who is conscious; not the mind as apart from the man."—Vol. i., p. 55.

"When the organism has a knowledge of the ends aimed at."—Vol. ii., p. 39.

"When the organism feels a desire to act, and is at the same time conscious of the act."—Vol. ii., p. 38.

Mr. Bain, Professor of Logic in the University of Aberdeen, in his profound work on psychology, says,

"Mind is comprised under three heads—Emotion, Volition, and Intellect."—*On the Emotions and Will*, p. 3.

"The operations and appearances which constitute Mind are indicated by such terms as Feeling, Thought, Memory, Reason, Consciousness, Will, Passions, Taste."—*On the Senses and the Intellect*, p. 1.

"The definition of Mind aspires to comprehend in a few words, by some apt generalisation, the whole kindred of mental facts, and to exclude everything of a foreign character."—*Ibid.*

"The proper meaning of self can be nothing more than my corporeal existence, coupled with my sensations, thoughts, emotions, and volitions, supposing the classification exhaustive, and the sum of these in the past, present, and future."—*Emotions and Will*, p. 554.

"I am not able to concede the existence of an inscrutable entity in the depths of one's being, to

“which the name ‘I’ is to be distinctly applied, and
 “not consisting of any bodily organ or function, or
 “any one mental phenomenon that can be specified.
 “We might as well talk of a mineral as different from
 “the sum of all its assignable properties.”—*Ibid.*

Mr. Fraser, Professor of Logic and Metaphysics in the University of Edinburgh, in his “Rational Philosophy” (1858), page 122, says—

“Observation and experiment prove the important
 “fact, that the conscious life on earth of every indi-
 “vidual is dependent on his organism and its history.”

Mr. Herbert Spencer classes the “Phenomena of Mind” among the “infinitely varied actions going
 “on in living bodies;” and considers that “no definite
 “separation can be effected between the phenomena
 “of mind and those of vitality in general;” that
 “Bodily and mental life are divisions of life in gene-
 “ral, being related to each other as species, of which
 “life in general is the genus.”—*Principles of Psychology*, pp. 350—352.

He also says that “the *ego* is at each moment
 “nothing else than the state of consciousness present
 “at that moment.”—*Ibid.*, p. 618.

This, as the “states of consciousness” cannot be supposed to be an *entity*, must be understood as meaning that the *ego*—that is, “the mind,” is the aggregate of the mental affections of the living organised human being.

Mr. J. Lockhart Clarke also considers that the aggregate either of the mental faculties or of the mental facts is “the mind” of the living organised human being. He speaks of the mental faculties and mental facts as if they constituted an *entity*, but this

must be attributed to the defects of psychological language. His words are—

“Those faculties which together, and only together, “constitute his conscious self as a personal being.”

And again,

“That combination of active feeling and intelligence which constitutes his personality.”—*On Volition, Psychologically and Physiologically Considered. In the Medical Critic and Psychological Journal*, vol. ii., pp. 209, 210; and vol. iii., p. 16. 1863.

Mr. Dunn, in his “Physiological Psychology,” p. 5, says:—

“It is no longer a subject of dispute that the “doctrines of Mind rest essentially on the basis of “our physiological composition—that they form part “of the physiology of man. For, however it may be “attempted to separate intellectual and moral from “animal and corporeal man, and however we may “reason about our intellectual and moral nature “apart from our bodily and animal constitution, it is “never to be forgotten that they are united in this “life, forming one and a composite system of mutual “dependence and reciprocal action. From the first “moment that the primitive cell-germ of a human “organism comes into being and is launched upon “the ocean of time and space, it may literally be said, “that the entire individual is present, that an organised entity exists, fitted for a human destiny; and “that from the same moment matter and mind, body “and soul, are never for an instant separated. Their “union constitutes the essential mode of our present “existence.”

At page 7 of the same work, this author defines

mind as "the functional *powers* of the living brain."

Mr. G. H. Lewes, in his very useful and talented popular work on "The Physiology of Common Life," (vol. ii., pp. 4, 5, and p. 344), says:—

"By the term mind we do not designate the intellectual operations only. . . . The word mind has a broader and deeper signification. It includes all sensation, all volition, all thought."

"Mind is the psychical aspect of life—it is as much the sum total of the whole sensitive organism, as life is the sum total of the whole vital organism."

The same author, in his "Biographical History of Philosophy" (library edition, p. 633), speaks of the doctrine "that the mind consists of a plurality of functions, and consequently must have a plurality of organs," as a "conception systematised by Gall, and which has passed into general acceptance."

Mr. Charles Bray, in his "Philosophy of Necessity," (2nd edition, p. 130,) says,

"The aggregate of all man's Sensations, whether proceeding from external or from internal impressions, we denominate his mind."

Although the term "sensation" has been employed in the comprehensive sense in which it is here used, and although Dr. Gall, at page 86 of the volume quoted above, uses it in this manner, it is not now generally applied by psychologists to emotions and to thoughts.

Mr. Samuel Bailey, whose valuable writings upon psychology and kindred subjects are well known, says, in his "Letters on the Philosophy of the Human Mind" (1st series, p. 10),

“I would most emphatically press upon your attention that it is the human being, the man, who perceives and remembers, and thinks, and feels, and reasons, and wills; not something distinct and apart from him.”

Dr. Spurzheim says:—

“The expression ‘mind’ designates the Class of Faculties. I divide it into two Orders—into Feelings, and Intellect.”—*Physiognomical System*, (1815,) p. 293.

Mr. George Combe says—

“Looking at the facts presented to us by observation, the most obvious inference seems to be, that the mind consists of an aggregate of powers.”—*System of Phrenology*, 2nd edition, (1825,) p. 51.

Dr. F. D. V. Broussais says:—

“L’esprit humain est l’ensemble des facultés mentales de l’homme.” (“The human mind is the aggregate of the mental faculties of the man.”)—*Cours de Phrenologie*, 3me Leçon., p. 82.

I do not remember to have met with any passage in Mr. J. S. Mill’s writings, in which he clearly and decidedly asserts either that he considers “the mind” to be a distinct entity within the living organism, or that he does not. Sometimes he writes as if he believed that “the mind” is a distinct entity; but he frequently appears to be in doubt upon this point; and sometimes he uses expressions which are inconsistent with this belief. Thus he says in his “Logic,” (b. vi., c. iv., s. 1,) “If the word mind means anything, it means *that which feels*.” But he soon after (b. vi., c. iv., s. 3,) speaks of beliefs, conceptions, &c., as “*constituents of the mind*.” And as we may call the

person who thinks, &c., a "mind," we may say that "the mind" is "that which thinks," without asserting that it is a distinct entity within the organism. In Mr. Mill's lately published work "On Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy," I find the same impossibility of discovering a distinct statement upon this point. I find much that is incompatible with the idea of a distinct entity; and much that appears to express a belief in such an entity. In pages 215 and 216 the series of sensations and other feelings which we experience is spoken of as the *subject* of sensation; the meaning of which must be, that the mental *facts* are "the mind." The words are, "The thread of "consciousness which I apprehend the sensation as a "part of, is the *subject* of the sensation." But it is also said that mind is *something* to which we refer our sensations and other feelings—"We have no conception of either Subject or Object, either Mind or "Matter, except as something to which we refer our "sensations and whatever other feelings we are conscious of." The meaning of this must be that "the mind" is an *entity*—that is, that the *being* who perceives, &c., (either the organised being, or a distinct "*something*" within the organism,) is the mind.

It will be a subject of congratulation to all who are interested in mental science when the language of psychology has been made correct and plain, so that at least the meaning of those who employ it may be plainly and correctly expressed. But before this could be effected in a complete and satisfactory manner, it was requisite that not only the first fundamental error, but the three others also, should

be corrected. The opposition by which the correction of the *first* was obstructed in the earlier stages of the modern revolution of opinion among psychologists upon this point, having been overcome, there will now be no difficulty in obtaining acceptance for the correction of the other three. And when these have been rectified, the correction of the language of psychology will follow as a natural consequence.

Condillac said that "science is only a well-constructed language;" but before we can have a well-constructed language we must have an assemblage of correct views. Ill-constructed language may make correct ideas unintelligible to others; but no contrivances of language can give accuracy or distinctness to ideas which are inaccurate or ill-defined.

It is interesting to remark, as illustrative of the progress of physiological views of psychology, that Mr. Stewart, who, in the Introduction to his early work on the "Philosophy of the Human Mind," published in 1792, speaks of "the mind" as "a being distinct from the body, and not liable to be impaired by the loss or mutilation of any of its organs"—says, in book iii., chap. iv., of his work "On the Philosophy of the Active and Moral Powers of Man," published in 1828, that "the dependence of our intellectual operations at present on our own corporeal organs, cannot be disputed."

CHAPTER VI.

Mental Affections in General.—Sensations.—Thoughts.—
Emotions.—Volitions.

WE now come to the consideration of the fourth fundamental error of psychologists—the error of confounding with each other mental *Affections* and mental *Acts*. This will involve, in the first place, the examination of mental *Affections*—their nature, the immediate means through which they are produced, (the nervous system and the organism in general,) and the cause of their apparent effects upon the organism. And when these points have been sufficiently considered, we shall be prepared to examine into the nature of mental *Acts*, so as to arrive at a clear perception of the distinction between these mental facts and mental affections. We shall then be prepared to examine and to understand the process of Self-determination.

Mental affections are of three classes—Sensations, Thoughts, and Emotions. Volitions will be found to be included among the last. I apply the term mental "*affections*," to these mental facts, because we do not *do* them; we have or experience them. By "metaphysicians" and "philosophers" they are very frequently called acts of "the mind," or of "the consciousness,"

&c. &c., designations which are in every way erroneous. For they are not *acts* at all. No plain matter-of-fact person would talk of *doing* a sensation, a thought, or an emotion; and the impropriety of calling them acts of "the *mind*," or of "the *consciousness*," &c., has already been sufficiently noticed.

And I call them mental affections, rather than mental "states," because the term states is expressive rather of a modification of some thing or object, than of an immaterial fact; and rather of what is of some little duration, than of a fact which is so transitory as a single feeling or thought.

1. *Sensations* are the kind of mental affections which we experience when we see, or hear, or touch, or taste, or smell. Seeing, hearing, touching, (or feeling by touch,) tasting, or smelling, is having the particular kind of sensations which are familiarly known by those names. These mental affections are also called external perceptions. The peculiar general characteristic of sensations is, that they are immediately, or very closely, preceded by the excitement, by external means, of external organs which are called organs of sense. Besides the kinds of sensations which have been named, there are muscular sensations, which are produced by the effects of resistance, weight, &c., upon the muscles and skin.

If we are to have definite and correct ideas of mental facts, sensations must never be confounded with thoughts or with emotions, as they sometimes are.

I do not here refer to those vague feelings which are so indistinct as scarcely to come under the denomination of feelings. These rudimentary mental affections, though extremely important and interesting

as vital processes, and as intermediate facts between what is mental and what is purely organic, it is not requisite here to examine particularly. In them there is no *perception*. By the term Sensation I mean those peculiar mental affections which involve the recognition, or supposed recognition, of external objects and facts, or of modifications of our own organs by which some of the cerebro-spinal nerves are primarily affected—that is, sensational perceptions. It appears to me that feelings which are less distinct than these cannot with propriety be called *Sensations*.

2. *Thoughts*, or *Ideas*, (I use the two words as synonymous,) are mental affections which are not very closely preceded by excitements of an organ or organs of sense by external means, as Sensations are. The organic excitements by means of which Sensation is produced, may be the means through which Thought is subsequently excited; but we may also have thoughts without their being immediately or closely preceded by sensational excitements, or by sensation. Thoughts cannot be confounded with sensations if we are at all precise in observing this difference between these two different kinds of mental affections. No one who observes mental facts at all attentively and clearly would suppose that seeing or hearing is thinking, or would be ignorant that there is a particular distinction between thoughts and sensations. Yet there have been psychologists who have considered that all our mental affections are sensations, or, at least, have applied the term “sensation” to them all. This is a perversion of language and confusion of ideas.

In France, Condillac and his disciples, (the

"sensational school,") confounded thought with sensation; and M. Destutt de Tracy gave to this error the form of an axiom, in his celebrated expression, "*Penser c'est sentir*." But these psychologists were so far right, that thinking and feeling, although they are not the same, are both mental *affections*. As has already been remarked, we do not *do* thoughts, any more than we *do* sensations. Many of our English psychologists, also, among whom Dr. Thomas Brown is one of the most conspicuous, have applied the term feeling to thoughts as well as to sensations, on account of the similarity in this respect between these two kinds of mental facts.

3. *Emotion* is very different from Sensation and from Thought. It is that peculiar kind of mental affection which we experience when we like or dislike, hope or fear, are joyful or sorrowful, feel desire or inclination, &c. Desires and Inclinations are sometimes considered as different from Emotions; but it is in that to which they have reference that they differ. In the kind of mental elements of which they are composed, the Desires and other Emotions are alike.

If we attentively notice our Emotions, it must be very plain to us that they are very different from Sensations. Emotion is sometimes occasioned by the states of our organs unaccompanied by any actual perceptive sensations, or thoughts,—as when we are joyous or sad owing to good or bad health, &c. But in most cases they are intimately connected with sensation or with thought. And they do not precede the sensation or the thought with which they are connected; but they follow it. Thus, the sight of different objects excites different Emotions, of liking,

disliking, desiring, fearing, sorrow, &c. &c. And some thoughts excite joy; some, sorrow; some, hope; some, fear; some, desire; &c. &c. In fact, Emotion, in the great majority of cases, consists of a thought and of a peculiar feeling intimately connected with that thought. For instance, when we feel desire we must have the thought of that which we desire; and when we feel an inclination to do an act, we must have the thought of the act which we feel inclined to do. But with these thoughts the peculiar feeling must be connected before we can feel the desire or the inclination.

And it is also to be observed that Emotion is intimately connected with bodily movements, as antecedent to those movements. Every kind of Emotion has a peculiar bodily expression which attends it; so that Emotion is manifested externally by the countenance and by attitude, and sometimes even by violent bodily movements; as in excessive joy, sorrow, terror, &c. &c.

There are various feelings, as those of hunger, thirst, fatigue, &c., which are partly emotional and partly sensational; but which it is not requisite to examine particularly here.

Thus we have three very different kinds of mental affections—Sensations, Thoughts, and Emotions. And those mental affections are very intimately connected with each other.

4. *Volitions*.—Having obtained a knowledge of these facts, we have acquired the requisite preparation for understanding what Volition is. Volition, in fact, is a peculiar kind of Emotion, in the wide sense of the term Emotion which has been explained. Volition is

a compound mental affection, consisting, as other distinct Emotions consist, of an element of thought and an emotional element. In this respect it is precisely similar to Inclination. Inclination is a *wish* or *desire* to act. Volition is a *decision* or *determination* to act. The thought-element of Inclination is expressed by saying "I should *like*" to do so and so. The thought-element of Volition is expressed by saying "I *will* do" so and so. The emotional element of Inclination is similar to the same element of Volition. In Inclination the emotional element varies in strength or intensity. There are slight Inclinations; and there are very strong Inclinations. The Inclination, if its strength is increased beyond a certain point, becomes converted into, or superseded by, a Volition.

We have seen that Emotion is followed by bodily movements, and sometimes by violent bodily movements. In some cases, when we have a very strong Inclination we are excited to make incipient movements towards doing the act we have in view. When we have a Volition, we *do* the act; and the movements which follow the Volition are more or less decided and forcible in proportion as the Volition is more or less strong.

Thus Volition is that peculiar kind of mental affection, involving thought and emotion, which is always followed by the act, whether it be a bodily or a mental act. Bodily *acts* are bodily movements preceded and apparently produced by Volitions. What mental acts are we shall see presently. Bodily *acts*, strictly speaking, are not merely movements; they are intentional, that is to say voluntary, movements.

Thus Volition is a mental *affection*, and is *not* a

mental *act*. "Willing" is *having* a Volition; it is not *doing* a Volition. And Volition is not a *simple* mental fact, as it has been supposed to be, (by Dr. Reid, Mr. Stewart, and others of the same "school,") but it is a compound of two elements.

All this is extremely simple when it is clearly pointed out, apart from metaphysical and philosophical mystifications, and when the facts of the subject are carefully observed.

It will be useful to notice that Volitions, considered in relation to the process of their production, are of three kinds.

1st. There are *Spontaneous* Volitions. These are Volitions in which the decision to act is produced without deliberation; as, for instance, when we take up our pen when we are about to write, and the pen is before us, and no selection is requisite.

2nd. There are *Deliberative* Volitions. These are Volitions in which the decision to act is arrived at after consideration; as when we select one object or course of action out of two or more which are presented for our choice, but without having occasion to make any mental effort to overcome a wrong motive.

3rd. There are *Self-determinate* Volitions. These are Volitions in which the decision is arrived at by a mental process by means of which we cause one out of two or more opposing motives to become the decidedly preponderating motive, and by means of which process we thus determine what the Volition shall be.

In all actual Volitions we must have an Idea of what we are about to do—the thought-element of the Volition. But there are many movements which we make without having any idea or distinct thought

of what we are doing. These are involuntary or instinctive movements. They were called by Dr. Hartley automatic; and he distinguished them into "originally" (or naturally) automatic, and secondarily (or acquired) automatic. How voluntary and involuntary movements are produced will be considered after the description of the nervous system has been given.

CHAPTER VII.

Preliminary Remarks on the Dependence of Mental Facts upon Organism.—The Nervous System in general.—The Centres of the Cerebro-spinal Nervous System in the Head.—The Spinal Cord.—Outer Terminations of Cerebro-spinal Nerves.—Nerves of Cerebro-spinal System.—The Sympathetic System.

THE next step of our preparation for the satisfactory understanding of the mental process of Self-determination, and of mental science in general, through the correction of the fourth fundamental error of psychological views and language, must be to take a general view of the means through which mental affections, and the apparent dependence of bodily movements upon those immaterial facts, are produced; that is to say, of the nervous system and of the organism of which that system is such an important part.

Mental facts can never be thoroughly studied without combining with the observation of those facts, (by the peculiar introspective method of observation by means of which alone those facts can be studied,) the knowledge to some extent of the nervous system also, and of the organism in general, and of the connection between mental facts and the modifications of different parts of that system and of other parts of the organism. Sometimes the modifications of the organism evidently precede the mental facts, and are the means

through which those facts are produced. Sometimes they succeed the mental facts, and appear to be caused by those facts ; but in reality they are caused by the same organic modifications which produce the mental facts which they succeed. When this is not understood, what is commonly considered "the action of Mind upon Body, and of Body upon Mind" is quite incomprehensible.

To suppose, as "metaphysicians" have supposed, that psychology can be thoroughly studied without combining with the observation of mental facts that of the organism upon whose modifications they are in all cases dependent, is to set out with a fundamentally erroneous conception. Mr. Stewart in his in many respects admirable "Dissertation," in speaking of Locke, mentions with approval that "in his 'Essay' "not a single passage occurs savouring of the anatomical theatre." And Sir William Hamilton, in his "Lectures on Metaphysics" (vol. i., p. 383), shows distinctly how very little the "metaphysician" has appreciated the importance of physiology in connection with psychology. For he says,

"The philosopher" (meaning the psychologist) "requires for his discoveries no preliminary apparatus of instruments or materials. . . . That most important and interesting of all studies, of which man himself is the object, has no need of anything external. It is only necessary that the observer enter into his inner self, in order to find there all he stands in need of, or, rather, it is only by doing this that he can hope to find anything at all."

This, as has been said, is a fundamental misconception. In order to study mental facts thoroughly we

must study them physiologically, that is to say, in conjunction with organism, and with the changes which that organism undergoes in health and in disease, and at different periods of life, &c., by which our mental powers and susceptibilities and mental affections are so constantly modified. It is true that the study of many of our mental processes, and of some simple mental facts, purely as mental facts, is independent of physiology; but mental science as a whole can never be studied in a satisfactory manner apart from the observation of the connection of mental facts with organism.

In the same university in which the opinions which have just been quoted were enunciated, not only is mental science now taught in a totally different spirit by that distinguished psychologist, Dr. Laycock, but the professors of "Moral Philosophy" and of "Logic and Metaphysics," also, introduce Physiology in connection with the peculiar subjects of their lectures. Much progress in this respect has been made and is making. That Volition and Self-determination have been studied for centuries without success in arriving at correct views of them, is owing in a great measure to their having been studied "metaphysically" and "philosophically," instead of being studied in connection with physiology and in a matter-of-fact manner.

Dr. Carpenter, in his "Physiology," 5th edition, p. 618, at the commencement of his examination of the physiological psychology of volition, says,

"We have now to inquire into the mode in which "volition operates in determining the course of "thought and the regulation of conduct; a problem "of extreme difficulty, the entire solution of which

“may not lie within the sphere of man’s present capacity. The chief subject of embarrassment, however, is rather the nature and source of *the will* itself, than the conditions of its operation.”

It is evident from these remarks that this eminent physiologist and psychologist was painfully conscious of the obscurity in which the subject is involved when studied metaphysically. He therefore “dismisses” the metaphysical inquiry as “requiring a much more laboured discussion than could be appropriately bestowed upon it” in his work. The study of “the will” is indeed embarrassing if we imagine that it is an *entity*, or even if we suppose that it is a power belonging to a distinct entity within the organism;—so long, in fact, as we are misled in our investigations of mental facts, by the four fundamental errors, or even by the *fourth* only.

The study of the Nervous System in all its details is not requisite for our present purpose. A general idea of it is all that is required. And what will be given here will be rather an enumeration of its most important parts, than a description of them; which enumeration will be simplified as much as possible.

The Nervous System in General.

The first important point to be noticed in reference to the Nervous System is, that it consists of the three following divisions:—

1st. Of *Centres*, or *Ganglia*. (In the brain, spinal cord, &c.)

2nd. Of *Terminal Nervous Expansions*. (In the outer organs of sense, &c.)

3rd. Of *Nerves* and *Nerve-fibres*, connecting the

Centres with the *Terminal Expansions* and with each other.

THE ENTIRE NERVOUS SYSTEM is composed of two great divisions,

1. The *Cerebro-Spinal System*.
2. The *Sympathetic System*.

THE CEREBRO-SPINAL NERVOUS SYSTEM consists of

1st. The *Brain* and the *Spinal Cord*, which are made up of a series of *Ganglia*, or *Centres*, intimately connected with each other by means of *nerve-fibres*.

2nd. The *Nerves*, which are continuous with those organs, and which ramify throughout the organism.

3rd. The *Nervous Expansions* in which the outer extremities of the nerves terminate.

THE SYMPATHETIC NERVOUS SYSTEM consists also of *Ganglia*, and of *Nerves*, and of minute ramifications and expansions of these nerves in the organs to which they are distributed.

These are situated chiefly upon and in the organs contained in the Chest and Abdomen; but they also ramify throughout the organism, being especially distributed to the blood vessels, and are intimately connected with the Cerebro-spinal System and intermingled with it.

THE TISSUES of which these *Nervous Systems* are composed are of two kinds—*Vesicular* and *Fibrous*.

The *Vesicular Nervous Tissue* is composed of *nerve-cells* and *granules*, and is of a greyish colour.

The *Fibrous Nervous Tissue* is composed of fibres or minute tubes, and is white.

The Fibres of the Sympathetic Nerves are of a gelatinous consistence, and of a greyish colour.

Of the *Vesicular Tissue* are formed the nervous Centres (which are also called "ganglia"); and there is some of this tissue in the terminal expansions of the nerves in the external organs of sense.

The *Centres* (or *Ganglia*) are collections or masses of vesicular tissue, of various sizes, to and from which nervous excitement is communicated, and by the immediate instrumentality of which mental manifestations, and vital and motor excitements are produced.

Of the *Fibrous Nervous Tissue* are formed the Nerves, and also the Commissures of the Brain and Spinal Cord,—that is, the uniting parts by means of which the centres which are situated in those organs are connected with each other.

THE CENTRES OF THE CEREBRO-SPINAL NERVOUS SYSTEM IN THE HEAD.

The *Brain*, or *Encephalon*, (that which is in the head,) is double; that is, it has a right half and a left half, as is the case, for instance, in the face and head.

There are three great divisions of the Brain—the *Cerebrum*; the *Cerebellum*; and the *Medulla Oblongata*.

The *Cerebrum*, or Brain proper, is much the largest part.

The *Cerebellum*, or little Brain, is the next in size. In man it is situated under the back part of the cerebrum.

The *Medulla Oblongata* is the continuation of the *Spinal Cord* in the head. It is situated under the *Cerebellum* and *Cerebrum*, towards the hinder part.

In the adult man the average weights of these organs are—

	OZS.	DRA.
Cerebrum - - - -	43	15 $\frac{3}{4}$
Cerebellum - - - -	5	4
Medulla Oblongata - -	0	15 $\frac{3}{4}$
<hr/>		
The Entire Brain - -	50	31 $\frac{1}{2}$

These organs are composed of a series of *Centres* connected with each other by nervous tissue.

The two halves of the *Brain* are united to each other by many commissures.

The outer part of the *Cerebrum* is formed chiefly of Vesicular Tissue.

This outer part of the *Cerebrum* is convoluted, or folded together, in a peculiar manner, so that the surface of the convolutions are much more extensive than the general outline of the *Cerebrum*.

The two halves of the *Cerebrum* are called the *Cerebral Hemispheres*; and the vesicular portion of the convolutions constitutes the *Hemispherical Ganglia*. —the *Great Cerebral Centres*.

It is by means of excitements of these *Centres* that *Thought* and perceptive consciousness are produced in man.

In the under part of the *Cerebrum*, and in the *Cerebellum*, and in the *Medulla Oblongata*, are a series of centres, of sensation, and of emotion, and of motion—which may be called the smaller encephalic *Centres*.

These *Centres* are—

1st. In the *Medulla Oblongata*, the centres of Hearing, Respiration, and Taste.

2nd. In the *Cerebellum*, the vesicular tissue of the two lateral lobes and of the median lobe.

3rd. In the base of the *Cerebrum*, in a series proceeding forwards from the *Medulla Oblongata*,

1. The *Optic Centres*.
2. The *Thalami*.
3. The *Corpora Striata*.
4. The *Olfactory Centres*.

These Centres are connected with each other, and with the Hemispherical Centres above, and with the Spinal Cord below, by fibrous tissue, by means of which, nervous excitement is communicated to each Centre from the others, and from each Centre to the others.

All these Centres, with one exception, are double :—one of each being on the right side, and the other on the left ; and each being united to its fellow by fibrous nervous tissue. The exception is the middle lobe of the *Cerebellum*.

Our knowledge of the Centres of Sensation, Emotion, and Motion, is still incomplete ; but the minor details of the anatomy of the Brain are much too extensive to be noticed here. It is sufficient for our present purpose to know the general points which have been enumerated.

It is extremely interesting and instructive to trace the development of the different parts of the brain through the gradations of the animal organisms, from the least intelligent, up to man, the highest. For instance, in the lowest species of fish the cerebral hemispheres are merely rudimentary, and the other

encephalic centres—the centres of Sensation, Emotion, and Motion,—constitute, with their commissures, &c. almost the whole of the brain. And as the intelligence of the different classes of animals increases, the cerebral hemispheres become more and more developed—more complex in structure, and in the number of their lobes and convolutions, until in man they attain their highest expansion.

THE SPINAL CORD.

The *Spinal Cord* extends down the back, situated in a canal in the Vertebral Column.

It is continuous with the Medulla Oblongata, and through it with the rest of the Brain.

It is formed of Vesicular tissue within, and of Fibrous tissue externally.

It is a series of Centres, connected with each other and with the Centres within the *Medulla Oblongata*, the *Cerebellum*, and the *Cerebrum*, and through these with the *Cerebral Hemispheres*.

With these Centres the central extremities of the Spinal nerves are connected.

THE TERMINAL EXPANSIONS OF THE CEREBRO-SPINAL NERVES.

The *Terminal Expansions* of the Cerebro-spinal Nerves are of two kinds—Sensational and Motor.

The Sensational terminal expansions of these nerves are in the Eyes, the Nose, the Mouth, the Ears, the Skin, and the lining membranes of various organs.

The terminations of the Motor nerves are in the muscular fibres of the muscles of the limbs and other organs.

THE NERVES.

Nerves are white and generally cylindrical threads or cords, formed of nerve fibres or tubes, enveloped in a sheath of connective tissue.

Some of them are thicker than others, and their size diminishes as they divide and subdivide in their distributions in the various organs.

The trunks and branches of the Nerves are situated chiefly in the interstices between the muscles, &c., and generally accompany the chief arteries and veins of the limbs.

The Nerves terminate outwardly, as before stated, in very minute subdivisions which are distributed in the organs.

They terminate inwardly in their Centres.

The Nerves connected with each central part of the Spinal Cord are those which are distributed to the external parts which are the nearest to that portion of the cord.

There are two sets of nerves; nerves of Sensation, or "*Sensory*" Nerves; and nerves of Motion, or "*Motor*" Nerves.

The *Sensory* Nerves are those which terminate outwardly in the nervous expansions of the external organs of sense, in the skin, and in the internal surfaces of organs; and which extend from those parts to the centres of sensation in the brain and spinal cord; and by means of which nervous excitement is communicated from external parts to the Centres.

These are called also "*Afferent*" nerves; that is, nerves which communicate excitement to the Centres from the outer organs.

The *Motor* nerves are those of which the extremities are distributed to muscles; and which extend from the centres to the muscles; and by means of which, nervous excitement is communicated from the centres to the muscular fibres.

These are called also "*Efferent*" nerves; that is, nerves by means of which excitement is communicated *from* the Centres to the outer organs.

In most cases the Afferent and the Efferent nerve-fibres form together one nerve. In the Spinal Nerves, (those which are united with the spinal cord,) it is so. But at a short distance from the Spinal Cord, these nerves become divided into two parts, which are called their roots,—one of which is united with the front part of the Cord, and the other with its hinder part; the anterior division containing the Motor fibres; the posterior, the Sensory fibres.

The functions of the Sensory and those of the Motor nerves arise partly from the differences of their outer distribution, and partly from the differences of their internal terminations. Those nerves which are distributed to muscles cannot communicate nervous excitement from the outer organs of sense to the centres; and those which are distributed to outer organs of sense cannot communicate nervous excitement to or from the muscles. But it has been suggested, and shown, that the motor nerves are the means through which muscular sensations,—(those of weight, resistance, fatigue, &c.,) are excited, and that thus they have a sensory as well as a motor function; and that muscular contractions may be produced by means of sensory nerves—the contractions of the muscular fibres which surround the hair follicles being so

produced.—See Mr. Lewes's "Physiology of Common Life," vol. ii., c. viii., an extremely valuable contribution to the popularising of a department of knowledge which is of very great practical importance to all persons.

THE SYMPATHETIC NERVOUS SYSTEM.

The *Sympathetic Nervous System*, as already stated, is more particularly in local connection with the Viscera of the Chest and Abdomen, with the Lungs, the Heart, the Stomach, &c. &c.

It also communicates very extensively and very intimately with the Cerebro-spinal Nerves, and with the Brain and Spinal Cord.

It has Centres, and collections of Centres, and nervous cords and fibres, as the Cerebro-spinal system has.

The chief Centres of this system are large collections of Ganglia situated amidst the abdominal viscera and near the base of the heart.

There is also a series of smaller Sympathetic Ganglia along the front of the Vertebral Column, on each side, which have nervous communications with the larger Sympathetic Centres and with the spinal nerves near to the vertebral column.

And in the Head there are many small ganglia of this system, which have numerous communications with the Cerebral Nerves, and are connected with the series of Sympathetic Ganglia which are in front of the vertebræ of the neck.

The Nerves of this System are distributed very abundantly to the Heart, the Lungs, and the Digestive

Organs and other Viscera of the Abdomen, and to the blood vessels.

The Sympathetic Nervous System is evidently, to a great extent, the means through which the organic functions are performed.

It also appears to be, to a great extent, the means through which *Emotions* are produced.

The general description which has now been given of the Nervous System will be sufficient to make intelligible the means through which mental facts are produced, and through which also is produced the close connection between those facts and bodily movements and other bodily modifications. For a minute detail of the various parts of the nervous system and of its physiology, works particularly devoted to the subject must be consulted. To the general reader Mr. Lewes's popular work on the "Physiology of Common Life," which contains many very useful and interesting illustrations, may be strongly recommended. The professional student, also, will find many important points of the physiology of the nervous system discussed in a very able and pleasing manner in this work.

CHAPTER VIII.

Dependence of Mental Facts upon the Organism.

FROM the enumeration which has now been given of the chief parts of the nervous system it will be perceived that every part of the organism is in connection by means of nerves with a Cerebro-spinal Axis, which is composed of a series of Ganglia or Centres, and that the means are thus provided for the communication of nervous excitement *to* every part from the Centres, and *from* every part to the Centres.

By means of the Spinal nerves all the organs to which those nerves are distributed are connected with the Spinal Cord, and through it with the Smaller Encephalic Centres, and through these with the Great Cerebral or Hemispherical Centres.

In like manner all those organs which are supplied with nerves from the Brain are in communication with the Smaller Encephalic Centres, and through these with the Hemispherical Centres above, and with the Spinal Cord below.

And the Sympathetic System is so intermixed with the Cerebro-spinal, that affections of one system are communicated to the other as readily as affections of parts of either system are communicated to other parts of the same system.

Now bodily movements are produced by the communication of nervous excitement from Centres to efferent nerves, and from these to the muscular fibres of the organs by means of which the bodily movements are performed.

And thoughts are produced by excitements of the cerebral hemispheres; and volitions and distinct external perceptions and emotions, by excitements of these hemispheres also, in conjunction with excitements of sensational and emotional centres, and of afferent nerves, and of the outer organs of sensation and emotion from which the excitement is communicated to these nerves.

The precise nature of these various organic excitements we are unable to ascertain; nor, so far as we can see, would the knowledge of it be of any practical use. But by comparative and human anatomy—by observing the effects of various kinds of mutilation of the nervous centres and nerves in animals, and the effects of accidental injuries of those organs in man, and by examining after death the organs of those who have been diseased during life in their mental and motor functions, sufficient knowledge of the structure and functions of the nervous system has been obtained, to make it evident that all mental affections and bodily movements are dependent upon various kinds and combinations of excitements of various parts of the nervous system.

When movements or any other bodily effects appear to be produced by the action of a “mind” upon the organism, or by sensations, by thoughts, by emotions, by volitions, it is not by the action of a “mind” that the effects are produced—nor is it by

the sensations or the thoughts, &c. There is no such fact as the action upon the organism of any distinct percipient being within it, nor is there any such fact as the influence of any mental affection upon the organism. What really occurs, when mental affections appear to produce effects upon the organism, is, that the excitements of the nervous system which produce the mental affections, produce also the effects upon the organism. When there was very little knowledge of the anatomy and physiology and pathology of the nervous system, these effects were naturally supposed to be caused by the mental affections, or by a "mind," because the mental affections were perceptible, introspectively, while the affections of the nervous system were hidden from observation; and because the perceptible mental affections closely and constantly preceded the bodily effects of the imperceptible excitements of the nervous system. But, as we have seen, the knowledge of the nervous system and of its functions, which has been acquired since the commencement of substantial progress in this department of science, has completely revolutionised the views of most of the modern practical students of mental science, with respect to the connection between mental facts and bodily organs and affections. It is true there are still some, even among physiologists, who retain, or who have not entirely abandoned, the old metaphysical notions upon this point; but these relics of the "philosophy" of ancient times are, as we have seen, fast disappearing from among those students of mental science who combine with the observation of mental facts, not only a knowledge of the structure of the organism, but also the attentive observation of the

modifications which occur in our powers and susceptibilities of thought and feeling in connection with the changes of state which the organism undergoes. When we attentively observe, in ourselves and others, how different the mental powers and susceptibilities are at different times—in health, and in illness; while fatigued, or after repose; when fasting, or after taking food; under the effects of stimulants, or of various medicinal substances, or when not so affected; in childhood, and during the different periods of life, from youth to more advanced age; and in other variations which occur in the condition of the organism; and when to these facts we add the knowledge which has been acquired of the structure and functions of the different parts of the nervous system, the evidence that it is the living organised being who thinks and feels is overwhelming.

It is evident, then, that whenever there is a sensation, a thought, an emotion, or a volition, there is also, as its cause, what may be called a sensational-excitement, a thought-excitement, an emotional-excitement, or a volitional-excitement. And when one mental affection is said to excite another, it is to be understood that what really occurs is, that the peculiar nervous or organic excitements or combinations of excitements, by means of which the first mental affection is produced, produce also the nervous or organic excitements by means of which the second mental affection is produced—and so on. And when it is said that sensations, thoughts, emotions, or volitions, produce bodily movements, it is to be understood that the bodily movements are produced by the sensational-excitements, &c., giving rise to

the motor excitements; and not by the actual sensation, &c.

There are some central excitements, produced by afferent nervous excitements, which give rise to responsive movements without producing any distinct or perceptive consciousness; as, for instance, those which produce breathing and various other movements which take place without our actual knowledge. There are other nervous excitements which produce mental affections without producing bodily movements. And there are others which produce sensations, thoughts, emotions, and which also produce bodily movements. And there are combinations of nervous excitements by means of which bodily movements are produced, and at the same time a strong desire to prevent the bodily movements; as frequently happens when we gape, or laugh, or are tickled. In these last cases it is evident that there must be two different combinations of nervous excitements occurring simultaneously—one which produces the bodily movements, and another which produces the desire to prevent the bodily movements. And it is also evident that in these cases the combinations of nervous excitements by means of which the bodily movements are produced, are more powerful than those by means of which the desire to check them is caused. In some of these cases, when a very powerful new nervous excitement is produced, the involuntary motor excitement is suddenly subdued; as occurs when an exciting event of any kind puts a stop to laughter which was uncontrollable a moment before this new excitement was produced.

Sometimes we perform very complicated bodily

movements unconsciously, or nearly so, while we are in deep thought upon some subject quite apart from the bodily operations. In walking in the streets we often direct our steps so as to avoid obstacles, &c., for a considerable time without being conscious that we are doing so. In these cases two different combinations of nervous excitements must take place simultaneously. There must be, for the movements, the excitements of the eyes—the optic nerves—the optic centres—the motor centres—the motor nerves; and with these there must be excitements of the afferent nerves of the lower extremities, and of the spinal centres, and of the motor nerves. And for the thoughts there must be excitements of the cerebral hemispheres, accompanied, when the thoughts are attended by emotion, by the excitements which are requisite for the production of the emotion.

The capability of the optic centres to regulate our movements in relation to external objects without our being conscious of the presence of external objects—(that is, without those excitements of the cerebral hemispheres which are the antecedents of perception and of intentional bodily movements,) is the result of a course of experimental education, during which similar operations have taken place more or less frequently in conjunction with thought-excitements and distinct consciousness. In very early childhood we are quite unable to discriminate external objects. We gradually acquire the ability to discriminate them. But at first we are obliged to *attend* in order to regulate our movements appropriately in relation to them. At length the requisite movements are produced by means of the optic centres, while the cerebral hemispheres are occu-

pied with excitements unconnected with those of the optic centres.

In a similar manner we acquire the capability to play upon a musical instrument while thinking of other subjects; and those who have had much practice in calculating can even add up long columns of figures correctly while thinking of some subject which is quite foreign to their reckonings.

In some cases the aptitude of the sensational centres to acquire the property of producing motor excitements responsive to the influences of particular external objects, is truly wonderful. A young tame rabbit will run against a wall when it is first let out of its hutch. But it will not do so a second time. A very young child will put its fingers into a lighted candle if it is allowed to do so. But it will not often repeat the experiment. And, on the other hand, motor excitements by means of which agreeable results are produced, will very soon become associated with the excitements of the sensational centres through which those motor excitements have previously been produced. From such facts we may gain valuable intimations as to the means through which early habits are formed, and those through which bad habits may be prevented and good ones may be produced at an early age. Thus it is evident that there are various kinds and combinations of nervous or organic excitements, and that these are the causes of our mental affections and of our bodily movements; and that these different excitements may be combined with each other and varied in endless ways.

The fact that we have no means of knowing the precise nature of the central and other nervous ex-

citements by means of which our mental affections are produced, does not in the least degree interfere with the certainty that those affections are dependent upon peculiar combinations of organic excitements. A more precise knowledge than has yet been obtained of the particular functions of some of the encephalic centres would be extremely interesting, and no doubt useful; but the general knowledge which has been acquired is sufficient to establish the fundamental proposition that all our mental affections are dependent upon our organism and upon peculiar modifications of particular parts of that organism. And this knowledge, though it does not solve the mysteries of consciousness, takes them out of the region of the transcendental and metaphysical, and places psychology upon a scientific basis.

It was stated that there seems to be much ground for considering that the Sympathetic nervous system is to a considerable extent the means through which the combinations of nervous excitement are generated through which emotions are produced.

The evidences of this are, the agitated feelings about the stomach and chest which are experienced in strong emotion, and the palpitation of the heart, the faintings, the loss of appetite, the disturbance of digestion, the secretion of tears, saliva, &c., the blushing, the paleness, which accompany various emotions, especially when these feelings are strong.

These are no doubt in part owing to excitements of Cerebro-spinal nerves also; but it appears very reasonable to conclude that nervous excitement, communicated to the Sympathetic system from the Centres of sensation and thought, and back from

this system to the emotional Centres, are very much, if not chiefly, the means through which emotion is produced; and that emotion is not felt until the Sympathetic system has been excited, and until the excitement has been communicated or reflected from this system to the emotional Centres and to the Cerebral Hemispheres.

The effects of wholesome and agreeably stimulating meats and drinks, in moderate quantities, in producing pleasant emotion, and of unwholesome and disagreeable meats and drinks, or of excess in eating and drinking, in producing unpleasant emotion, may very reasonably be considered as to a great extent owing to the influence of the substances taken into the stomach upon the Sympathetic nervous system. There is a mixture of sensation and emotion in these feelings, which may reasonably be attributed to combined excitements of Cerebro-spinal and Sympathetic nerves in the organs first affected.

There are many other feelings of an emotional kind which appear to be attributable, to a considerable extent, to the effects of states of the viscera upon the Sympathetic nervous system. For instance, the feelings of hunger, of thirst, of repletion, of nausea; the feelings of alarm which accompany some states of the heart and lungs.

Metaphysical psychologists have considered that the organic disturbances which have been mentioned are *effects* of the emotions. This idea seems to be equivalent to supposing that the stomach-ache, the tooth-ache, or the pains of external injuries of any kind, produce the states of the organs which are commonly considered to be the external causes of the pains.

There appears to be in some respects a similar relation between these organic disturbances, and emotion, to that which exists between the affections of our external organs of sense, and sensation. The organic excitements upon which emotion is dependent must not be confounded with the bodily movements which attend emotion, and which are consequent upon excitements of motor centres. At the commencement of emotion, the excitements of the sympathetic system appear to precede the feeling of emotion; the motor excitement to be subsequent to this feeling. But when these different affections are continued, they become so intermingled as to form a very complex combination of mental and bodily facts.

Thus, we see how indispensable a knowledge of the structure of the nervous system is, to enable us to have satisfactory conceptions of the processes by which our mental affections are produced, and to account for the manner in which they succeed each other, and in which they are followed by bodily movements. We cannot acquire any primary knowledge of mental facts from the structure of our nervous system; but when we observe those facts in connection with that structure, we are enabled to understand them as we never could understand them while we studied them apart from the means by which they were produced.

But we must not fall into the materialistic error of supposing that mental facts are modifications of our organs,—as Dr. Darwin, author of the “*Zoonomia*,” and others, have supposed. We must not imagine that an idea is “a contraction, a motion, a configuration, “of the fibres which constitute the immediate organ “of sense,” as Dr. Darwin defines it to be, in the


eighth chapter of his "Zoonomia," and as many others have supposed. We have no knowledge either of Matter or of Spirit; and it does not appear that such knowledge would be of any practical utility to us. On the contrary, as has already been remarked, it seems that metaphysical speculations upon the subject have a powerful tendency to lead us away from the strict observation of facts, and to produce perplexity and mystification. No facts can be plainer, when we carefully observe them, than those which make it evident that mental affections are totally different from states and affections of substances of any kind. They are undeniably *immaterial* facts, whatever the substance may be of which the being who experiences them is formed. And, as stated in a previous chapter, they must be *consequent* upon modifications of the substance of which the percipient being is formed, whether that substance is immaterial or material.

Thus, if to know the mechanism by means of which effects are produced were to know *how* the effects are produced, we might say that we know *how* mental affections are produced, and how bodily movements in connection with mental affections are produced. But it is not so. Although we know the organs by means of which, during our present life, these wondrous effects are produced, we know not *how* they are produced through these means, any more than we know how we live and move and are sustained from day to day, and from hour to hour, through the multiplicity of means which are instrumental in producing these results. We know that what we call Causes are followed by what we call Effects; and we have every reason to conclude that the production

of Effects through Causes takes place according to unchanging Laws. But *how* Causes produce Effects, or are the means through which Effects are produced, is a question respecting which the more we know the more we must be aware of our ignorance.

The varieties in the combinations of organic excitements through which movements are produced are illustrated in a very interesting manner in cases of partial paralysis. A case is related of a person in whom the muscles of one side of the face were palsied in such a manner, that he could not close his eye on the paralysed side, nor draw his mouth to that side, when he had a *volition* to do so. But if he was caused to laugh, the muscles of that side of his face were caused to contract. In this case it is evident that the nervous fibres within the brain, by means of which the volitional excitement in the cerebral hemispheres was communicated in health to the motor centres, and through these to the motor nerves, so as to produce voluntary movements of the eyelids and cheek, were diseased, and consequently this communication of excitement was cut off. But the nervous fibres by means of which excitement was communicated from the centres of sensation and emotion, continued to be capable of communicating that excitement so as to produce the motor effects.

In another case the muscles were contracted when there was a volition to contract them, but there were no contractions consequent to emotional excitement, namely, when the patient was caused to laugh or to cry. In this case it appears that the connecting nervous fibres between the cerebral hemispheres and the motor centres were capable of performing their func-



tions ; but those by means of which motor effects were produced by emotional excitements, were not so.

In another case the right arm was paralysed in such a manner, that the sufferer could not move his arm when he had a volition to do so ; but the limb was violently agitated when he met a friend and wished to greet him. In this case the parts of the brain by means of which motor excitements are produced by volitional excitements, were disabled ; while those by means of which motor excitements are produced by sensational and emotional excitements, were still capable of performing their functions to some extent.

A multitude of cases of various kinds illustrative of the dependence of mental facts and bodily movements upon different portions of the Encephalon, have been recorded by medical men who have had opportunities of observing the symptoms of mental disease and of morbid states of the organs of feeling and movement, during life, and of examining the states of the organs after death. And a multitude of most instructive experiments have been made by physiologists, by operating upon different parts of the nervous system of animals. But sufficient for our present purpose has now been said upon this division of our subject.

CHAPTER IX.

Correction of the Fourth Fundamental Error.—Attention.—Mental Affections and Mental Acts.—The Keeping up of External Perceptions and of Thoughts.—Power to Perform Mental Acts and Processes, and to Produce Mental Results.

HAVING considered mental *affections* and their dependence upon the organism as far as is requisite for our purpose, we now come to the question—What are mental *acts*? the reply to which will enable us to correct the fourth fundamental error of psychological views and language—that of confounding mental affections with mental acts, and will also put us in the right course for ascertaining the nature of the process and of the power of Self-determination.

Now, if volition is not a mental act—if sensations, thoughts, emotions, are not mental acts—what is there in our mental operations which *is* a mental act?

Many of our English psychologists have considered that attention is a mental act; (Reid, Stewart, Sir William Hamilton, and their disciples,) but as they have thought that perceptions, volitions, and other mental affections are mental acts, also, we cannot expect to obtain correct information from them as to the peculiar nature of mental action.

Others have said that “to attend is to have a “desire of knowing that to which we attend” that “the mental part of attention involves nothing

"more, in addition to the primary perception which "is its object, than desire with expectation."—*Dr. T. Brown's "Lectures,"* Lect. 31 and 32 and 42. Or that "attending to an interesting sensation and having "the sensation, are but two names for the same "thing" . . . That "attention is but another name "for the interesting character of the idea."—*Mr. James Mill's "Analysis,"* vol. ii., pp. 295 and 297.

According to these last definitions there is no mental *action* in attention. Having an interesting sensation or an interesting idea, is only having a peculiar mental affection. And a combination of a primary perception with desire and expectation is only a combination of mental affections.

A distinguished medical psychologist says that attention is "the direction of the consciousness." But in this statement there is no explanation of mental action; and what is meant by "the consciousness" in this statement, is by no means clear.

Among the French psychologists, M. Maine de Biran, who was characterised by M. Cousin as "the greatest metaphysician who had honoured France since Malebranche," particularly investigated what is called by "metaphysicians" "the activity of the mind." But he, and the French psychologists of the same school, (MM. Laromiguière, Royer-Collard, Cousin, Jouffroy, &c.) did no more in this direction than was done by Reid and others of similar views. M. de Biran perceived, in opposition to Condillac and his disciples, that there are other mental facts besides mental *affections*; but he lost himself in "speculations" about a "concrete *ego*," which was "the man himself," and was identical with "the will" (!) and which

manifested itself as a primary cause (!)—speculations in which the facts upon this particular point were but dimly seen in the mist of unrealities in which they were enveloped.

The metaphysical psychologists of Germany have attached great importance to the distinction between mental affections and mental acts; but as their views upon this point, as upon every other part of mental science, have been much falsified by the three first fundamental errors, they have been very wide of the truth, and very far from its simplicity and plainness.

By no one, so far as I am aware, has the distinction between mental affections and mental acts been clearly pointed out; and consequently the peculiar nature of attention has of necessity remained unelucidated.

But if we examine attention in a matter-of-fact manner, we shall find what we are in search of. We shall find that it is a mental process compounded of mental affections and mental acts. There are two kinds of attention—spontaneous, and voluntary. In both of these, there is, first, either an external perception or a thought. Then, in spontaneous attention there is *desire*, more or less distinct, combined with the perception or the thought. In voluntary attention there is *volition* combined with it. And, as we have before seen, in desire and in volition there are two elements—thought and emotion. The desire must be the *wish* for some object of thought; the volition, the *will* to do some act. Now, that which is immediately desired or willed in attention is, to detain or to keep up the external perception or the thought. And that which occurs is, that the perception or the thought is kept up. This *keeping up* of the external

perception or the thought is the mental *act* which occurs in attention. We desire or will to keep up the perception or the thought, and it is kept up. But how is this mental act produced? We have seen that mental affections are effects of organic states and affections. In like manner, mental *acts*—the keeping up of external perceptions or of thoughts—are effects of bodily movements and acts, by means of which the organic affections are kept up. The bodily movements and acts, as we have before seen, are the effects (not of the desire or the volition, but) of the organic excitements which produce the desire or the volition. Consequently what takes place when we keep up an external perception or a thought is, that the emotional or volitional excitements which produce the desire or the volition, produce also bodily or organic movements or acts, by means of which the organic modifications which produce the perception or the thought are kept up, and by keeping up these, other perceptual-excitements or thought-excitements which would interfere with them, are as far as possible prevented. This is the process which constitutes the difference between *looking* and seeing, between *listening* and hearing, &c., and between *attending* to a thought, and merely having a thought.

When we *look* at an object, we contrive, by placing ourselves in a suitable position, by directing our eyes, and perhaps by fixing the object with our hands or otherwise, to prolong, or to repeat, the organic excitement of sight produced by means of that particular object, and to exclude other optical excitements as far as we are able. When we *listen* to a sound, if, for instance, it is a vocal or instrumental

sound, which we ourselves produce, we prolong the sound, or we repeat it, and by so doing we keep up the sensational excitement of hearing. We are able also to listen or attend to sounds over which we have no control. And we can attend to one sound or series of sounds out of several which occur simultaneously. When we listen intently, we prevent as far as we are able all other noises or sounds except that to which we listen, and all other external stimulations by which other sensational excitements would be produced, or by which thought-excitements would be produced which would disturb the oneness of the mental affection to which we wish or will to attend. We thus adopt every means in our power to keep up the sensational excitement by means of which the sensation is produced which is the object of our attention, and to prevent the production of other organic affections, so that the particular mental affection to which we are attending may not be obscured, or may be as little as possible obscured, by other mental affections.

When we attend to a thought, we keep up the thought-excitement by repeating the words by which it is produced, and by avoiding or preventing, as far as we are able, external stimulations by which other thought-excitements would be produced, or by which sensational excitements would be produced, which would interfere with the oneness of the thought-excitement by means of which the thought which we desire or will to detain or attend to is produced. We thus excite the thought again and again by repeating the words, as we re-excite external perceptions of sight and hearing by adopting

suitable means for that purpose. If we observe attentively what takes place when we are considering any subject, we perceive that we repeat the words which represent the thoughts of the subject. Sometimes we repeat the words more or less audibly. We are then said to think aloud. Sometimes we do not actually speak the words, but if we carefully observe what takes place, we perceive that we form the words inwardly in a manner which is perceptible to ourselves. Indeed, the association of thoughts with words is so intimate, that in order to have distinct thoughts, it is requisite to have the words which represent the thoughts. And it seems to be as impossible for us to have distinct thoughts without words, as to speak without them. The deaf and dumb have substitutes for words; and objects are often used to represent and to excite thoughts. But in the general proceedings of ordinary life, it is words which are most commonly made use of when we wish to excite thoughts in others, and when we wish to excite or to detain them in ourselves. Sometimes we wish certain thoughts to be excited in us at a future moment—we wish to remember, or not to forget, some object of thought. In these cases we accomplish our end by means of written or printed memoranda, &c., or by placing some object which will be the means of exciting the thought, in some place where we shall see it, &c. In like manner persons adopt means to excite thoughts in others, by speech, by cries, by letters, by books, by advertisements, &c. &c.

On the other hand, when we wish that certain external perceptions or thoughts may *not* be excited

in us, we remove from our presence objects which would excite them, or we remove ourselves from the objects.

When we wish to prolong pleasurable *emotion*, we do so, as far as we can, by keeping up the sensation or the thought by means of which the emotion is excited. And when we wish to prevent painful emotions, or to rid ourselves of them, we endeavour to do so by preventing the excitement of the sensation or the thought, through the means which have been described, and by adopting means by which other sensations and thoughts will be excited.

Thus the mental fact by which attending to an external perception or a thought is distinguished from merely having an external perception or a thought, is the keeping up of the mental affection. And this keeping up of the mental affection is the mental *act* which occurs in attention.

Sometimes an external perception or a thought is kept up by organic means without any *action* being exerted. In such cases the result is similar to that which is produced by actual attention ; but, as there is no bodily or mental *action*, in the true sense of the term, there cannot properly be said to be *attention*. In these cases the organic excitements by means of which the external perception or the thought is kept up, are sustained without any wish or will of the individual ; and in some cases this occurs even in opposition to a very strong desire. And he is thus made unable at the time to attend to other thoughts or external perceptions, and sometimes unable even to have them, except momentarily. Such is the effect of great bodily pain, of loud and repeated noises, &c., to

which we are unaccustomed. In these cases the mental facts are (not attention, but) only a continuous mental affection or succession of mental affections.

Bouillaud, the physiologist, relates that a fowl from whose brain he had removed the whole of the cerebrum, "was not absolutely deprived of the power "of attention, for, if much irritated its attention was "awakened." But in such a case there was no *power* of attention exerted—no mental *action*. The organic excitement being kept up by "much irritation," the appearances consequent upon it were kept up; so that the poor animal seemed to attend. But in reality it no more *attended*, than *we attend* when the persistent clanging of a bell, or grinding of a bad organ, compels us to experience auditory excitements which are excessively tormenting to us.

Thus, by tracing minutely what occurs in attending, either to external perceptions or to thoughts, we are enabled to discriminate between mental affections and mental acts, and to ascertain the process by means of which the mental act of keeping up external perceptions or thoughts is effected. And we are thus enabled to perceive that attention is not simply a mental act, but is a complex mental and bodily operation, the mental part of which consists of mental affections and mental acts in conjunction with each other.

Thus the power to attend is the power to keep up thoughts or external perceptions by means of bodily acts suited to the accomplishment of this result. This operation we perform instinctively, without knowing *how* we do it. But by knowing

how it is done, we are enabled to do it intelligently; and we thus acquire a very valuable addition to our mental capabilities. For it is by the exercise of this power that we perform our more complex mental operations. It is by means of detaining thoughts and external perceptions, that we compare, reason, judge, &c. In these mental operations there are only thoughts and external perceptions and the detaining of these, alternately and successively, as they occur in close connection with each other. The decision, conclusion, or judgment, at which we arrive, is still a thought. And we shall find that it is by detaining thoughts and external perceptions that we perform the mental operation of self-determination.

It may be objected that the detaining of mental affections by the means which have been described is not *mental* action, but that it is a result or effect which is produced, at least to a great extent, by bodily action. This objection would be merely raising the question,—What is *action*? If *results* or *effects* cannot be acts, then walking, speaking, writing, &c., are not acts; for they are results. If this is so, then neither are the movements of our organs by means of which these results are produced, acts, for they are *effects* which are produced through contractions of muscles. And neither are these muscular contractions, acts; for they are *effects* which are produced through excitements of motor nerves. Neither are the excitements of the motor nerves, acts; for they are *effects* which are produced through excitements of motor centres. Neither are the excitements of the motor centres,

acts ; for they are *effects* also. Sometimes, when bodily acts are preceded by volitions which are preceded by sensations, the excitements of the motor centres are produced through excitements of the outer organs of sense ; the excitement being communicated from these to the afferent nerves, and by means of these nerves to the centres of sensation, and being then communicated to the motor centres. Sometimes the excitements of the motor centres are produced by means of conditions which are within the organism, without external influence. This occurs when bodily acts are preceded by volitions which are preceded by thoughts which are not immediately connected with external perceptions. And thus we may search backwards as far as we are able to do so, and we shall still find that each Cause is itself an Effect of some preceding Cause. So that if *effects* cannot be acts, there are no acts at all in natural processes. But if bodily results which can be traced back to volitions as their proximate mental antecedents, (as walking, speaking, writing, &c.,) are bodily acts ; then it is right to consider that mental results which can be traced back to volitions as their proximate mental antecedents, (as the voluntary keeping up of thoughts and external perceptions,) are mental acts. Consequently we are justified in considering that the keeping up of thoughts and external perceptions is a mental act, as much as we are justified in considering that walking, &c., are bodily acts. And the power to produce mental results by detaining thoughts and external perceptions, (as in comparing, reasoning, and determining our volitions,) is a mental power, as much as the power to produce the results

which we produce by means of bodily movements, is a bodily power.

Thus, by analysing the complex process which constitutes attention, we are enabled to perceive what mental action is; and to distinguish definitely between mental affections and mental acts. And we are thus enabled to analyse other active mental processes which could not be analysed while mental affections were not definitely distinguished from mental acts. And we thus obtain the clue which will enable us to ascertain in a satisfactory manner the process by means of which self-determination is effected.

CHAPTER X.

Effects of the Mental Act of Detaining Thoughts, in reference to Self-determination.—Voluntary and Instinctive Self-determination.—Instinctive Consciousness of Mental Operations.—Analyses of Locke, Brown, and others.

LET us now examine the effects which are produced by the detaining of thoughts, and how the formation of volitions is affected by this operation.

The effects which are produced by the detaining of thoughts have been observed by many psychologists ; but owing to the fundamental errors in their modes of viewing and describing mental facts, the import of these effects in reference to self-determination could not be appreciated.

(It will be understood in the following descriptions, in order to avoid inconvenient repetitions, that when mental affections of any kind are spoken of as causes of mental or bodily effects, it is the organic excitements by means of which the mental affections are produced, which are to be considered as the causes of the effects which are spoken of as produced by the mental affections. In fact, it would be well at all times, in the description of mental facts, to consider that when thoughts, emotions, &c., are spoken of, the organic affections by means of which they are produced are to be understood as inseparable from them:—

not, of course, as parts of the mental affections ; but as their invariable accompaniments and causes, and as the causes of the effects which seem to be produced by the mental affections.)

The effects which follow when we detain or keep up a thought, are—

1st. The thought which is detained becomes more distinct (a natural consequence of the keeping up of the thought-excitement).

2nd. In consequence of the continuance and increased distinctness of the thought, the emotion which accompanies it becomes increased in force. Consequently, when the thought and the emotion together constitute an inclination, or a motive, this motive thus acquires increased strength.

3rd. By thus keeping up a particular motive, and strengthening it, when another motive is opposed to it, the other motive is repressed, because we cannot have two different combinations of thought and emotion at the same moment ; and consequently this other motive becomes diminished in force. And thus the relative strength of the motive which is kept up, as compared with the strength of the motive which is opposed to it, is augmented, not only by means of its own increase of strength, but also by means of the diminution of the force of its opponent.

4th. Another effect of detaining the thought is, that other thoughts are excited which had previously become associated with that which is detained, and which are the thought-elements of other motives, favourable to the motive detained ; and thus the relative strength of this motive becomes still more augmented, by the addition of corroborative motives to it.

It is obvious that by this process an actual operation of self-determination is performed;—that is to say, a decided preponderance is given, through our own agency, to a particular motive, in opposition to another; and thus a volition is produced in favour of the motive which is detained.

And by being enabled to trace the process which has just been described, we are enabled to perceive that the “*nisus*,” or effort, which has been supposed to be in the volition, is really in the bodily or organic efforts by means of which the thought is detained during the process of self-determination, and which bodily efforts are intimately intermixed with the successive volitions which occur in that process. When we keep up a *volition*, as we do, for instance, when we have occasion to submit to some painful operation, or to take a nauseous medicine, the acts which are requisite for keeping up the thought-element of the volition are so intimately mingled with the volition which is kept up, that to confound these acts with the volition, and to suppose that the volition itself was a mental act, was most natural, so long as the distinction between mental affections and mental acts was not clearly perceived. And the confusion was irremediable while not only the fourth, but the three other fundamental errors also, continued to falsify the introspective perceptions of those who observed, or endeavoured to observe, mental processes.

The operation of self-determination, when it is performed voluntarily is, of course, a voluntary operation. But while we are ignorant of the means or process through which it is performed, it can only be a kind of blind or instinctive voluntary operation.

It takes place even in those who do not believe that there is any such mental process. But even those who feel convinced that there is a mental operation of self-determination, so long as they do not know what the mental process is by means of which it is performed, cannot perform it in an intelligent and thoroughly voluntary manner. They may "struggle," as it is said, against wrong motives, and may overcome them by so doing; but they can only do so instinctively, so far as the actual mental process is concerned.

Thus, through the knowledge of the nature of mental acts, as distinguished from mental affections, including the knowledge of the process by means of which those acts are performed, the nature of self-determination is made evident; and this operation, which is of such immense practical importance, becomes changed to us, from being a merely instinctive mental process, into an intelligent voluntary operation. And by this a great increase of capability is gained, to promote the exercise and development of our power of self-determination, and to assist and enable others to do the same for themselves. The immense value of this in the development of character, both *for* and *by* the individual, is very obvious.

Thus, also, the error of supposing that man has no power of self-determination is made so plain, that it can never more mislead the student of mental science, or be a source of controversy, and an obstacle to the attainment of unity of opinion among men, or in other ways a source of evil to mankind.

If any one, having acquired a knowledge of the process of self-determination, will recollect past cases in which he has performed this mental operation, he

will be enabled to perceive how he performed it, although at the time he was not at all aware of the nature of the process. But one would not expect to find an individual who firmly believed that man had no power over the formation of his feelings and volitions, actually pointing out the process by means of which we exercise that power. Yet this occurs in the writings of Robert Owen, who most strenuously denied that man has any such power. That most devoted and untiring philanthropist delivered a lecture at New Lanark when he opened his original infant school, and at the conclusion of it exhorted his audience to "dismiss from their minds every unpleasant feeling which they might entertain towards each other or towards any of their fellow-men." And he added, "When you feel these injurious dispositions beginning to arise, (for, as you have been trained and are now circumstanced, they will arise again and again,) instantly call to your recollection how the minds of such individuals have been formed, whence have originated all their habits and sentiments. Your anger will then be appeased; you will calmly investigate the causes of your differences, and you will learn to love them and to do them good. A little perseverance in this simple and easily-acquired practice will rapidly prepare the way for you and every one around you to be truly happy."

This was most excellent advice; but it was quite contradictory to the well-known views of the lecturer respecting man's mental nature. And, although he could thus describe the mental process by means of which we are enabled to control to some extent our feelings, our thoughts, our volitions, and the forma-

tion of our character, he continued to the end of his life, more than forty years after, to inculcate by every means in his power the doctrine that all these are determined independently of ourselves. It is true that we cannot change liking, respect, and love, into dislike, disrespect, and hatred, nor belief into disbelief, and *vice versá*, at will ; and that terrible injustice and cruelty have been practised owing to the supposition that man has unlimited power over his feelings and convictions, his volitions, and the formation of his character. But to suppose that we have no power at all in relation to these, is, as we have seen, to go from one extreme of error to the opposite.

This quotation contains an interesting illustration of the fact, that we may not only exercise our mental powers, but may actually describe the process by which we exercise them, while we even deny that we possess them ; and that we may have what may be called an instinctive consciousness of mental facts, while, intellectually, we are totally ignorant of them. And we may here obtain an impressive illustration of the immense importance of obtaining correct views, if possible, before we undertake to give instruction to others. For, if our views are erroneous, our best intentions and most strenuous and persevering exertions must be comparatively useless, and more or less mischievous. But in the case before us, although good in the form in which it was looked for did not and could not result, much good has been produced. Through the persevering advocacy of doctrines which excited the most vehement opposition, but which, though vitiated by much error, involved many truths of the highest importance to mankind, a very strong

impulse was given to the investigation of questions of social science. And this impulse has been productive of much good, which is but the commencement of much more which will follow. One bad result which has been produced—the wide popular dissemination of the necessitarian views, these pages, it may be hoped, will be instrumental in rectifying, by enabling libertarians to combat those views successfully whenever an opportunity for doing so occurs.

As before remarked, the immediate effects of the detaining of thoughts have been noticed and described by many psychologists. Thus Locke, in his admirable work on “The Human Understanding” (b. ii., c. xxi., s. xlvi.), observes, that “by a due consideration “and examining of any good proposed, it is in our “power to raise our desires in due proportion to the “value of that good ; whereby in its turn and place “it may come to work upon the will and be pursued.” Here the facts upon which self-determination depends were plainly pointed out. But while “a good proposed” was supposed to “work upon *the will*”—while the manner in which mental facts were viewed and described was falsified by the four fundamental errors, it was not possible that the process of self-determination should be successfully analysed, and the compatibility of moral freedom with causation could not be ascertained.

Dr. Brown, in accordance with his idea that attention is merely a combination of feelings, or, as he called them, “states of mind,” considered that the effects which are produced by the detaining of external perceptions and thoughts, are the immediate effects of the emotion which, in attention, is conjoined with

the perceptions and the thoughts. He says, in his 31st Lecture, that it is a mental law "that the influence of every emotion renders more vivid the perception or conception of the object." With his views of the nature of attention a nearer approach to the analysis of the mental process could not be made.

Those more modern psychologists who have not the idea of a distinct percipient entity within the living organism to impede and mislead them in their investigations of mental operations, have only required a correct view of mental *acts*, combined in some cases with correct phraseology, to complete their analysis of volition and of the mental processes connected with it. Their analysis of these mental facts has been as nearly complete as it could possibly be in the absence of these indispensable pre-requisites. But while "the will" was regarded either as a distinct entity, or as a peculiar power of an entity distinct from the organised being, no near approach could be made to the satisfactory elucidation of the subject.

CHAPTER XI.

Indefinite Ideas respecting Motives.—Self-determination Illustrated.
—The Excluding of Thoughts.—Commencement of Mental Action.—Differences of Character.—Reformation of Character.
—Development of the Power of Self-determination.—Fully-developed Characters.—Arguments.

WE have now explained sufficiently for our present purpose, the four fundamental errors of psychological views and language, the plain realities with respect to mental facts, and the process of self-determination. But before quitting this process, it will be useful to consider some points with respect to it more particularly, and to add some remarks upon the arguments of our predecessors on the subject.

It has commonly been asserted by Necessitarians, as has already been stated, that volition is produced by the strongest *Motive*, and that we have no direct power to determine which motive shall be the strongest. And the Libertarians have asserted that we are able by the exercise of our power of self-determination to decide which of two or more opposing motives shall be the strongest. But, of course, in the absence of correct fundamental ideas respecting mental facts, we look in vain for a clear and precise account of motives, as of all other complex mental facts. Indeed, the ideas of psychologists respecting the nature of motives have generally been extremely indefinite.

As an instance of the consciousness of this, I remember that, some years ago, Mr. Kingsley, in a letter in the *Leader*, in which he opposed the necessitarian opinion, said—"F. G. will reply that 'a great idea' is a motive. To this assertion I will answer when he has defined what 'a motive' means."

It has very often been supposed that a motive is a thought. Thus Dr. Priestley says, "The *view* of things presented to the mind is generally called the motive; though some writers include the *state of mind* also in the term."—*On Philosophical Necessity*, p. 12, 13. By "the view of things" must be meant a thought. "Presented to the mind" is an old form of expression, which, as we now know, can never be used consistently with clear and correct ideas of mental facts. The "state of mind" is another indefinite and inappropriate expression. But of course this distinguished writer could only use the language of his day.

In another page of the same work, Dr. Priestley says "a reason is a motive"—meaning by "a reason," it is to be supposed, a *thought* of a particular kind.

In another page the same author compares "the view of things" to the impeller. But we know that when there is only a "view of things," that is, a *thought*, there is no *impulse*.

In another place Dr. Priestley says, "Men do in fact act according to their affections and desires, that is, in one word, according to motives." Here affections and desires, which cannot be supposed to be the same as "the views of things," or as "reasons," are called motives.

Mr. James Mill says, "The idea of every pleasure, "associated with that of an action of ours as the "cause, is a motive." — *Analysis*, c. xxii., s. i. According to this definition, a motive is only a *thought* associated with another thought.

Mr. J. S. Mill, in his "Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy," speaks of external and internal motives, and says that our *knowledge* is an external motive, and that our *desires* or *dislikes* are internal motives, (p. 505.) He also says *punishment* is a motive, (p. 510.) And he speaks of motives being "applied," or being "presented to us," (p. 516). And again he says, "When what was at first a direct impulse towards pleasure, or recoil from pain, has "passed into a habit or a fixed purpose, then the "strength of the motive means the completeness and "promptitude of the association which has been "formed between an *idea* and an outward act." (p. 519.) These statements, taken together, give but a very vague and unsatisfactory account of the nature of motives. But such vagueness is inseparable from the universally-prevailing, false fundamental views respecting mental facts.

A motive, as we have seen, is simply an inclination to do, or to refrain from doing, an act—a mental affection compounded of a thought and emotion.

Let us now, in order to illustrate the process of self-determination, suppose a case, such as all of us may recollect, in which we are inclined to do some act which we are aware it is not right for us to do. Let us suppose that we are in a garden in which there is an abundance of delicious fruit, the sight of which excites in us, (owing to our constitutional

qualities and our constitutional state at the time,) a strong desire, inclination, *motive*, to take some of the fruit. (If we had recently partaken plentifully of such fruit, or in other constitutional states which may be easily imagined, we should not have this desire.) But let us suppose that while we have this strong desire—this motive (compounded of the idea of eating the fruit, and the emotional feeling which accompanies this idea,) we also have an opposing motive, excited in us by the thought that the proprietor of the fruit has forbidden us to take any of it, or has requested that we would not do so ; and that therefore it would be dishonest, dishonourable, unjust, unkind, to take any. This thought excites in us the idea, “I ought not to do it”—and this idea excites a corresponding emotion, which, in conjunction with the idea, produces a motive to refrain from taking any of the fruit. Now in childhood, before we are old enough to have acquired any power of self-determination, (for time is requisite for the development of this power, as well as of other powers, bodily and mental), or if, although we are old enough to have acquired this power, we have not acquired it, because we have been under the influence of persons who were not competent to guide and instruct us efficiently ; or if we have not yet acquired *sufficient* of this power to be able to resist the temptation, (for the development of this power is gradual, as the development of our other powers is,) we shall take the fruit, as ill-taught boys do when they rob orchards, and the like. At the opposite extreme of development we may feel and think that we should very much like to take some of the fruit, (that is, we may have at first a strong inclination,

desire, motive, to take some of it,) but, owing to the advanced development of our own character, the opposite motive will at once, and without any mental effort at all, arise in us and subdue and extinguish this first and very natural motive. But in the intermediate stage of the formation of our character, before we have yet attained a sufficiently decided development to render all effort of self-determination superfluous, we shall require to make what is commonly called a "struggle" to resist the temptation; that is, we shall have to exert our power of self-determination. Now in this case, what takes place? As we have already seen, we detain the thought-element of the better motive, and by so doing we cause the thought itself to become more distinct, and the strength of the emotion which accompanies it to be increased. And at the same time, by this mental act and operation, as we persist in detaining the higher motive, the thought-element of the other motive is more and more completely excluded, and its emotional element is more and more weakened, until at length the predominance of the better motive becomes so decided that the worse motive is completely subdued.

It has often been supposed that we can directly exclude thoughts and control feelings. But the excluding of thoughts and the controlling of feelings are only to be effected indirectly. When the thought which we wish to exclude, or the feeling which we wish to control, is excited by an external object, we promote the exclusion of this thought, and the subduing of the feeling, by putting away the object, or by removing ourselves from it. When it is a

thought, with its accompanying feeling, which arises persistently within us independently of the actual presence of an external object, we endeavour to effect our purpose by attending to other subjects, by occupation, &c. To try to exclude a thought directly, would be to detain the thought—which, of course, would be to produce the opposite effect to that which was desired.

The process of the formation of Self-determinate volitions may be described as the transformation of a motive into a volition, by means of a mental operation dependent very much, though by no means entirely, upon our own agency ;—the conversion of a compound mental affection which urges us to act, but which is not yet sufficiently powerful or predominant to be the immediate mental antecedent of the act, (a motive,) into a compound mental affection which is sufficiently powerful or is predominant—(a volition ;) and the subduing of an opposite motive by the same mental operation, which operation, while imparting increased strength is one motive, lessens the force of the motive or motives opposed to it.

It may be asked where, in the process of self-determination, mental *action* begins. Mental action in self-determination begins when an inclination to do an act has been excited within us, and when the thought that it would be wrong or unwise to do the act has excited within us a motive to refrain from doing the act. Up to this point there has not been any mental *action*. But now the better motive causes us to pause ; and at this point the process of self-determination commences, in those cases in which it occurs.

There are three degrees of preparation or development of character, including knowledge, which may have been attained by those in whom this combination of mental affections takes place.

1st. It may occur in a person who supposes that he has a power of self-determination, and who believes that it is his duty to exercise that power to resist the wrong inclination ; but who has no distinct knowledge of the process of self-determination. In such a case the mental affection which is the immediate mental antecedent of the detaining of the thought, arises instinctively—that is, it arises without any distinct idea of the mental operation which takes place, and this mental operation is performed instinctively. Instinctive mental affections of this kind cannot in strict propriety be called *Volitions*. But they are the immediate mental antecedents of effects, which, although they are not intelligent *acts*, are intermediate between acts which are intelligent and voluntary, and movements which are purely reflex. Thus, although the distinction between instinct and intelligence is sufficiently plain, the point at which a line of demarcation between them may be drawn, cannot be precisely determined ; just as, in the transition from the vegetable to the animal world, the boundary line between vegetable and animal organism cannot be clearly defined.

2nd. The motive may arise in a person who believes that he has no power of self-determination. In such a case, notwithstanding this opposing idea, a mental affection, which is the immediate mental antecedent of the detaining of the thought-element of the motive to refrain from doing the act at first desired,

arises instinctively, and often, as has already been remarked, the thought is detained and the process of self-determination is performed, while the individual is convinced that he has no power or agency in the formation of his volitions. But it is evident that the idea that we "cannot help ourselves" must be unfavourable to the mental operation; although in many cases we do "help ourselves" in spite of it. I can well remember cases of this kind occurring in myself while I held the necessitarian opinion.

3rd. The motive may arise in a person who knows that he has a power of self-determination, and that it is his duty to exert it; and who also knows the mental process of self-determination. In such cases the exercise of the power of self-determination is an intelligent voluntary process. And it is plain that those who have this knowledge will have a much more definite and influential power of self-determination than they could possess if they were included in either of the two previous classes of persons; and that they will be much more competent to promote the exercise and development of this power in themselves, and in others, than they could possibly be in the absence of that knowledge.

As characters are now formed, there are in different persons, according to the relative strength of their different dispositions and propensities, great differences in the amount of difficulty which is experienced in controlling improper inclinations; but all sane persons have sufficient power to control their wrong inclinations, if they exert it to the utmost. And it may be anticipated that a really good education, including the acquirement of the knowledge of the process of self-

determination, will produce in all a favourable proportion of the elements of character. And even while human beings continue to be badly educated and placed, the knowledge of the process of self-determination will have a very favourable influence—at least in very many cases. It would indicate very little acquaintance with the world to suppose that now, and as things now are, there are not very many persons upon whom such knowledge would have very little effect. But malformations of character which are not to be remedied by any of the ordinary means which have hitherto been employed for the purpose, may still be capable of much improvement, when the individuals are not too far advanced in life, if means which are really appropriate for the purpose were ascertained and employed.

It has already been remarked that the power of self-determination is not an unlimited power; and that it is not the same in amount in all persons. Nor has the same person at all times the same amount of this power. It resembles our bodily powers in these respects. In early childhood it is quite rudimentary. As we advance in life it is developed progressively, and more or less effectually according to constitutional and educational circumstances. Some young persons have more of it, and more aptitude for acquiring it, than others have, as some have more bodily strength than others.

It is chiefly, as has before been noticed, during the progress of the development of our character, so long as a mental effort is requisite to enable us to resist temptations, that the exercise of the power of self-determination is required. When we have at-

tained a moderately good development of the attributes which constitute the intellectual and moral and religious character, the exercise of this power is never, or very rarely called for. Then, what were temptations to us in our less developed state—what are still temptations to those whose educational circumstances have been more unfavourable, are no longer temptations to us. No mental effort is then requisite to determine most decidedly in favour of right motives, and to subdue instantly every wrong motive. And when the development of the character has been sufficiently completed, wrong motives cease to occur. For if the idea of a wrong act should arise, the emotion which is requisite to constitute a wrong motive is not produced. The thought of a wrong act excites an emotion of repulsion, instead of any favouring emotion. Then, a proper development of the moral character has been attained. And such will be the case with *all* (except those who are constitutionally malformed in a very great degree, if such there be,) in really enlightened generations,—when all adults have been really well-educated, and when all are placed from birth as all will be placed when society is truly intelligent. To be untruthful in any way, to steal, to cheat, to be unjust, to do evil of any kind to our fellow-beings, or, without a very sufficient cause, to injure sentient beings of any species, or to have unkind or unamiable feelings towards others, will be an impossibility to those who have had the privilege to be educated and to live in the midst of really enlightened persons, and of the circumstances which such persons will form around themselves. They will be the slaves of Goodness—whose “Service is most perfect Freedom”—when it

is an intelligent and a willing and cheerful and reverential Service.

It is curious, after having ascertained what the process of self-determination really is, to observe in the course of the controversy which there has been upon the subject, how each party have often had under observation the very facts which they were trying to explain, and yet, owing to erroneous fundamental conceptions, have been unable to trace them correctly ;—how the Necessitarians have not been able to perceive that there is any mental action in the determination of volitions ; and the Libertarians, though they have had an instinctive perception that in these cases there is some mental action in close connection with volition, have been quite unable to give a correct account of this mental action. The Libertarians, while they imagined that volition itself was a mental act, could never extricate themselves from their entanglement. And the Necessitarians while they knew not the distinction between mental affections and mental acts, and while their ideas of mental facts in general were in many respects so vague and inaccurate as to be expressed in the ordinary language of psychology, could never analyse mental processes successfully.

Thus Dr. Priestley says—“ A man, when he reproaches himself for any *particular* action in his past conduct, may fancy that if he was in the same situation again, he would have acted differently. But this is a mere *deception* ; and if he examines himself strictly, and takes in all circumstances, he may be satisfied that with the same inward disposition of the mind, and with precisely the same views

"of things, that he had then, and exclusive of all others that he has acquired by reflection since, he could not have acted otherwise than he did."

Dr. Priestley is quite right in considering that if *all* the antecedents of the *act* could be again the same, the same *act* would inevitably follow. But it is a mistake to suppose that all the antecedents of the action are included in the constitutional and external circumstances which he names. The Volition is the immediate mental antecedent of the Act. The strongest Motive at the time is the immediate antecedent of the volition. The constitutional and external circumstances, which it is to be supposed are here intended to be stated, are the antecedents of the motive. We must translate the "inward disposition of the mind," into "the mental *qualities* and the *predispositions* of the person at the moment, and his bodily state at the time;" and the "views of things," into his "perception of present objects and circumstances." From these together would arise a motive—a compound mental *affection*—"I should like to do" so and so. (In the sentence under consideration the motive and its antecedents are confounded together, and evidently they were not discriminated from each other in the writer's thoughts.)

In addition to this first motive, the idea would arise, that to do the act contemplated would be wrong, imprudent, &c.; and a counter-motive—a motive to refrain from doing the act, would arise. Dr. Priestley supposed, with necessitarians in general, that in such a case we have no power—that the result in such cases depends entirely upon causes "over which we have no control." And this supposition is so far

correct, that it is owing to *past* causes that the *present* conditions of every kind, within us and around us, are as they are; and we cannot now control the past; and that whatever may *now* occur is dependent upon the present conditions. But while the volition is pending, there is room for the exercise of our power of self-determination before the volition is formed. And, as we have seen, to suppose that we cannot have any power in the case, is an error. And when we have power, a result still pending, which is dependent upon our agency, is dependent upon us,—is not “beyond our control.”

The course of causation in such cases will be traced in the next chapter.

Let us now see how Mr. Stewart argues this point upon the opposite side. Commenting upon these statements of Dr. Priestley's, he says (in the sixth Section of the Appendix to his “Active and Moral Powers”)—“If these statements be accurately examined, they will be found to resolve entirely into “this identical proposition, that the *will* of the criminal “being supposed to remain in the same state as when “the crime was committed, he could not have *willea* “and acted otherwise. This proposition, it is obvious, “does not at all touch the cardinal point in question, “which is simply this; whether, all OTHER circumstances remaining the same, the criminal had it not “in his power to abstain from willing the commission “of the crime. The vagueness of Priestley's language “upon this occasion must not be overlooked. The “words *inward disposition of mind* admitting of a variety “of different meanings, and in this instance being “plainly intended to include the act of the will, as

"well as everything else connected with the criminal action."

What does Mr. Stewart here understand by "the will" remaining in the same "state?" Does he mean "the volition being the same?" Or has he in imagination some entity, in a particular "state," upon the point of doing an act, which act he calls "an act of the will"—meaning a volition? And if it is supposed that it is "the will" which wills, why does Mr. Stewart say "*he* could not have willed?" Mr. Stewart thinks that the words "inward disposition of the mind" are evidently intended to include the "act of the will"—meaning the volition. They may be supposed to include the volition, if we judge of Dr. Priestley's meaning according to his words; for he says "the criminal could not have *acted* otherwise." But his meaning appears to be, that, all previous conditions being the same, the criminal could not have *willed* otherwise. And it is quite true that if all the conditions which precede the *volition* could be again precisely similar, the volition must again be precisely similar. But this includes, in cases of self-determined volitions, the process of self-determination, of which Dr. Priestley had no knowledge, and respecting which Mr. Stewart could not give any clear or accurate information—for reasons to which we have often referred. All the account of this which Mr. Stewart could give was, that "the criminal, in the very act of transgressing an acknowledged duty, is *impressed with a conviction*, as complete as that of his own existence, that his will is free, and that he is abusing, contrary to the suggestions of reason and conscience, his moral liberty." But we may have a

very strong conviction, and yet be quite mistaken. Dr. Priestley's conviction upon this point was the very opposite to that which Mr. Stewart supposes the criminal to have. And the convictions of criminals who are necessitarians are the very opposite to it. And which of the two opposite convictions is right? The "conviction" of both parties is a confused mixture of error and truth. It is not "the will" which is free—it is the man, the woman, the child. And there are cases in which the person is "free" in relation to his *Acts*, but not in relation to the formation of his *Volitions*; and there are other cases in which he is "free" in relation to his Volitions, but not in relation to his Acts. These cases it is not necessary to specify here after the explanations which have already been given.

In these arguments we see on one side the Necessitarian denying the libertarian truth, and asserting the contrary, while maintaining his own truth: and on the other side we see the Libertarian denying the necessitarian truth, and asserting the contrary, while maintaining *his* truth. And we see both parties having under actual examination the very facts which contain the exemplification of both truths; but both, owing to their inability to view and analyse mental facts correctly, and owing to the consequent mystification of their ideas upon the subject, unable to discover the true solution of the question at issue between them, and involved in confusion and contradictions out of which there appeared to be no escape.

Well might Sir William Hamilton say ("Discussions," p. 629), "How the will can be free must remain to us, under the present limitation of our

“faculties, wholly incomprehensible.” Quite true—
 “how *the Will* can be free!” And quite true—“under
 the (then) present limitation of our faculties”—while
 we are in mental confusion in our views respecting
 mental facts. But we have seen that this is not an
 incurable “limitation of our faculties;” and that, with
 the assistance of a little more of the light of know-
 ledge, the limits of our mental sight may be extended
 sufficiently for the clearing up of the ancient mystery.

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CHAPTER XII.

The Presence of Causation throughout the Process of Self-determination.

WE have now ascertained that man has a power of Self-determination, and consequently that the negative fundamental part of the Necessitarian doctrine is erroneous. But we have also to ascertain that the Laws of Causation extend to every part of the process of Self-determination, and to all that man is and does, and consequently that the negative fundamental part of the Libertarian doctrine is likewise erroneous.

If we carefully examine each step of the process of Self-determination, we shall find that in every part of it there is always a sufficient Cause for that which occurs; that there is always a sufficient Cause for every mental affection and for every mental act of the series which constitutes that process.

In the first place it is obvious that when the inclination or motive which is to be conquered arises in the individual, there must have been a sufficient cause for its arising. This cause is to be found in the constitution of the person, (including his character, physical, intellectual, and moral, and his bodily state at the time,) and in the external circumstances by which he is influenced at the moment.

Then, this inclination having arisen, there is in this, and in the constitution of the individual, in the wide sense just stated, a sufficient cause for the occurrence of the thought-element of the second or higher motive.

The reader will remember that when thoughts, &c., are spoken of as causes or parts of causes, it is really the organic affections upon which the thoughts, &c., are dependent, which are the causes of the effects which are said to be produced by the thoughts, &c.

Then, this thought-element of the higher motive having arisen, there is in this a sufficient cause for the emotion which in conjunction with the thought constitutes the higher motive.

Then, this higher motive having arisen, there is in it and in the constitution of the individual, (including, of course, all the elements of his previously acquired character, and also his bodily state at the moment,) a sufficient cause for the first spontaneous mental act of detaining the thought. We have seen that in those who do not understand the mental process, what may be called an instinctive detaining of the thought occurs in self-determination, but that by knowing the nature of the process we are enabled to act voluntarily in keeping up the thought; and that thus the process, which while we were ignorant of its nature could only take place instinctively and blindly, becomes a voluntary and intelligent mental operation.

It is not requisite to specify the series of causes and effects further, in this place. The occurrence of each step of the process which precedes and which follows the first mental act of the operation of self-

determination may be considered as showing that there was a sufficient cause for its occurrence.

The differences which occur in that which actually takes place in different individuals, and in the same individuals upon different occasions, is always owing to differences in the constitution or in the external circumstances of the different individuals, or of the same individual upon the different occasions. When persons suppose, after they have done any act which they regret, that if they could be again in precisely the same circumstances which existed before they did the act, they would do very differently, and that, consequently, two or more different volitions might occur in precisely similar circumstances, they do not perceive the real nature of the case. They do not perceive that, through the new experience which they have acquired by having done the act which they regret, a modification of character has been produced in them, (which must include a corresponding change of constitution,) sufficient to be the means through which, though all *other* conditions were similar, the different volition and act would be produced. Similar *external* circumstances might occur again; but the individuals themselves would be so much changed through their new experience,—the constitutional antecedents of the new volition would be so different from those of the former volition—that the entire cause would no longer be the same; and the new effect would be the natural consequence of the new cause. In this new cause, one mental element would be the thought of the regret which the individual had felt on the previous occasion, after having acted as he is now again

tempted to act,—a thought which could not possibly have occurred in the first instance. For this thought to be excited in him, a new mental susceptibility, (that of having this thought excited in such circumstances,) must have been produced in him, owing to his previous experience—including, of course, some corresponding constitutional change.

Mr. Mill, when speaking of causes and effects in relation to the formation of character, &c., (“Logic,” b. vi., c. ii., s. 3.) includes among the “circumstances” by which character is formed, the organisation of the individual; and he also says that “his own *desire* to mould his character in a particular way is one of these *circumstances*.” But it is very desirable that in speaking upon this subject we should be more precise in the use of terms. When we use the word “circumstance” alone, we are understood to mean what is external to the organism. If we apply the term to the peculiarities of the organism, we should call these constitutional or *internal* circumstances. And we should not class desires, which are effects produced by the internal and external circumstances of the time, among the circumstances. Our desire to acquire particular qualifications is no doubt a very important part-cause of our endeavours to form or to modify our character; but when we speak of the internal and external *circumstances* which constitute the cause or causes of our endeavours to form our character, it is desirable that our statements should be more definite than they can be if we say that our desires are among the “circumstances” by which our character is formed. Mr. Mill goes on to say that “the wish which induces us to attempt

“ to form our character is formed for us, not in general
“ by our organisation, nor wholly by our education,
“ but by our experience.” It is quite true that,
speaking in a general manner, our education and our
experience are very important part-causes of our wish
to modify our character ; and it is only in a general
manner that Mr. Mill is here describing the causation
of our wishes. But if we were speaking of the internal
and external causes which immediately produce this
wish, we could not properly include our education
and our experience among them. Our experience has
produced some changes in us, that is, in the constitu-
tional circumstances ; and the changed constitutional
circumstances are the internal part of the immediate
cause of our wish. The immediate cause of our wish,
(that is of the organic excitements of which our wish
is the effect,) is the external and the internal circum-
stances which exist at the time when our wish is
produced. Of course I do not suppose that Mr. Mill
is not quite aware of this ; I only wish to point out
that the statement that our wishes are formed by
our experience will not explain the causation of
our wishes to those who are not already acquainted
with the facts of the process, and who are in
search of a definite account of cause and effect in
reference to it. It is only by describing the processes
of causation which take place in the formation of our
character, our wishes, &c., as distinctly and as accu-
rately as we are able to describe them, that we can
reasonably expect to succeed in explaining these
important operations, and the presence of causation
in every part of them, in a satisfactory manner to
those who require such explanations.

Thus, in tracing effects to their causes in man's mental affections and mental and bodily acts, and in the formation of character, we have, say,

4. *Voluntary acts*; the immediate antecedents of which are volitions—including the organic affections of which the volitions are the effects.

3. *Volitions*; the immediate antecedents of which are desires, convictions, (or thoughts,) &c., with or without self-determination—voluntary self-determination being a series of volitions and acts, and their effects.

2. *Desires, convictions, (or thoughts,) &c.*, including the organic affections upon which they are dependent; the immediate antecedents of which are the internal and external circumstances of the moment.

1. *The internal circumstances*, that is to say, the constitutional peculiarities, or, in other words, the organism, with its peculiar characteristics and states at the time; the antecedents of which are the previous experiences of the individual, arising, at each stage of his or her development, from the constitutional and external circumstances of the time.

The organism, (or, in other words, the constitutional peculiarities, or character, or internal circumstances,) is modified by means of experiences.

The desires, convictions, &c., are modified by means of changes in the organism.

The volitions are modified through changes in the desires, convictions, &c.

The acts are modified through changes in the volitions.

The acquisition of new and important knowledge (experience) produces in the organism, as has already

been remarked, new susceptibilities. The difference between a person who knows what to do and how to do it in particular circumstances, and a person who does not know, is, that the former has susceptibilities and capabilities which the latter has not. Owing to these capabilities, that is, to the organic peculiarities upon which they are dependent, the feelings and thoughts, (including the organic affections upon which they are dependent), by means of which the person who has knowledge is enabled and incited to do what is right to be done upon a given occasion, are excited when appropriate external circumstances are presented to him or her:—while the ignorant person, not having these capabilities, is helpless. To possess knowledge, when it is not being manifested, is to possess susceptibilities of having certain ideas, &c., excited in us in circumstances which are of a nature to excite them. For instance, a person who has a knowledge of surgery has a susceptibility of having the ideas of all that it is right to do excited in him when he sees a wound, &c. While a person who has no such knowledge, has no such susceptibilities, and is helpless in circumstances in which the other would be able at once to know and to do what was requisite.

The constitutional peculiarities of each of us at birth are effects of those of our parents, and of their previous external circumstances, &c. And the development of our organs and of our bodily and mental qualities and powers is dependent upon these internal conditions and upon the external circumstances by which we are influenced from our birth. The results, as they exist at each successive period of our lives, are very materially dependent upon the original *internal*

conditions ; but they are also dependent to an immense extent upon the *external* circumstances by which we have been influenced. Bad food and air, &c., will cause an originally healthy organism to become diseased. Ignorance and vice and bad examples in those who influence it from its birth, unless their influences are counteracted by some other external causes, as well as by constitutional conditions, will cause it to grow up ignorant and inferior. If it hears no language, it will never acquire the power of speech. If it hears only the language of the vulgar, it will acquire that language ; if only the language of the refined and intelligent, it will acquire that language. If it hears only the English language, it will learn only English ; if only French, it will learn only French, &c. &c. But when the Owenite, observant of these and similar facts, asserts that "man's character is formed for him and not by him," he overlooks the fact that it is to a very great extent by means of mental and bodily *action* that man's mental and bodily susceptibilities and powers are developed. Still it is an extremely important truth that the development of man's character is to an immense extent dependent upon external circumstances. And among these external circumstances the intellectual and moral and practical character of those persons by whom the individual is influenced from his or her birth is of such immense importance, that under the influence of the ignorant alone, and without books and other counteracting external circumstances, a child can only grow up ignorant, and that before a really good intellectual and moral and practical education can be given to any, or acquired by any, there must be persons to

instruct and to guide the young, who themselves possess a really good intellectual and moral and practical character. The chief causes of the failures of what is now called education, are the injurious influences of defective characters, and of the erroneous ideas which are prevalent in society. These ideas are, to all, from their birth, powerful external causes of evil, as parts of the mental influences which operate upon them from without, and as causes of innumerable highly injurious physical external circumstances; and they become also powerful internal causes of evil to all who acquire them, as has previously been frequently stated. Thus, for all that each human being is and does, and for all his thoughts, feelings, and volitions, there is always a sufficient Cause, notwithstanding the fact that man has a Power of Self-determination.

CHAPTER XIII.

The Difficulties of Reconciling Moral Freedom with Universal Causation removed by the Knowledge of the Process of Self-determination.

HAVING now ascertained that the two great fundamental principles—the universality of causation, and the moral liberty of man, are compatible with each other, and that practical results which are immensely beneficial are produced by the recognition and comprehension of these two principles in connection with each other, it will be well, before concluding, to consider briefly some apparent contradictions between moral liberty and causation which we have not yet particularly noticed, and which are reconciled by the union of the two principles through the knowledge of the process of self-determination.

By the admission of the universality of causation we are compelled to admit—

1. That the entire course of events, in the most minute as well as in the most momentous particulars—including every feeling, conviction, volition, and act, of every human being, and every consequence of these feelings, convictions, volitions, and acts, is Supremely ordered.
2. That there is always a sufficient Cause for every event which occurs.

3. That every event for which there is a sufficient Cause always does occur.

4. That, consequently, the entire course of events is, and has been, and always will be, a series of Causes and Effects occurring in accordance with Supreme unchanging Laws.

And to these may be added two corresponding propositions, the truth of which cannot reasonably be denied even by those who deny the universality of Causation—namely—

5. That every event which occurs must have been *in the future* during all the time which preceded its occurrence.

6. That events which are in the future cannot be prevented by human agency; and events which are not in the future cannot be made to occur by human agency.

Upon the fifth point Dr. Samuel Clarke, in his "Discourse on the Being and Attributes of God," is extremely explicit. He says, at page 107, 8th edition,

"Suppose the man by an internal principle of motion and an absolute freedom of will, without any external cause or impulse at all, does some particular action to-day; and suppose it was not possible that this action should have been foreseen yesterday; was there not, nevertheless, the same certainty of the event as if it had been foreseen?—That is, would it not, notwithstanding the supposed freedom, have been as certain a truth yesterday and from eternity that this action was in event to be performed to-day, (though supposed never so impossible to have been foreknown,) as 'tis now a certain and infallible truth that it is performed?"

Dr. Reid, too, in his "Essays on the Powers of the Human Mind," essay iii., chap. ii., says,

"It is true that what is past did certainly exist. "It is no less true that what is future will certainly "exist."

It has hitherto appeared to be quite impossible to reconcile these conclusions with the true moral liberty and the true moral responsibility of man—that is, with man's possession of a power of Self-determination. And consequently, as we have seen, there have been on one side Fatalists and Necessitarians of various shades, all of whom have denied that man possesses a power of Self-determination—the foundation of moral liberty and moral responsibility; and on the other side there have been ultra-Libertarians, all of whom have denied the Universality of Causation, and many of whom have denied that there is and has been an unalterable futurity of events. But by the knowledge of the nature of man's power of Self-determination, the difficulty of reconciling the two principles and all that is logically connected with them is removed.

1. By this knowledge the compatibility of man's moral agency in the production of events with the conclusion that the entire course of events is Supremely ordered, is made evident.

2. By this knowledge is made evident the compatibility of man's moral agency in the production of events, with the conclusion that "for every event "which occurs there must be (or always is) a sufficient "Cause, and that every event for which there is a "sufficient Cause must (or always does) occur."

3. By this knowledge is made evident the compatibility of man's moral agency in the production of

events, with the conclusion "that the entire course of " events is, and has been, and always will be, a series " of Causes and Effects, &c."

4. By this knowledge is made evident the compatibility of man's moral agency in the production of events, with the fact "that every event which occurs " must have been in the future during all the time " which preceded its occurrence; and that events " which are in the future cannot be prevented, and " that events which are not in the future cannot be " made to occur."

But upon this last point more particularly a few explanatory remarks may be useful to some readers.

It may still be objected by some persons, that if it were true that every event which occurs was in the future during all the time which preceded its occurrence, human agency would be superfluous and inefficacious; for it could not be needed either to cause an event to occur which *is* to occur, or to cause an event not to occur which *is not* to occur; and it could not be effective to prevent an event which *is* in the future, or to produce an event which *is not* in the future; and therefore, if we admit those propositions, and if we admit the universality of Causation, we must, if we are consistent, accept the fatalist creed.

But the fallacy of this mode of reasoning is so transparent that it is strange that any considerate person should ever have been deceived by it. All that can rightly be inferred from the premises that every event which occurs is subject to causation and must have been in the future, &c., is, that those events which *are* in the future cannot be prevented, and that those events which are *not* in the future cannot be made to

occur. But the objector infers, not merely this, but that if the propositions were true, no imaginable future events could be prevented or could be caused to occur through human instrumentality. He thus extends to *all* events, propositions which have reference to *one* only out of *two* opposite classes of events—either to events which *are* in the future, or to events which are *not* in the future. And he also reasons respecting what is unknown, as if it were already known.

Although the utmost exertions which man can make must be unavailing to produce an event which is *not* in the future, or to prevent an event which *is* in the future, it by no means follows that our exertions are not required for the production of events which *are* in the future, or for the prevention of events which *are to be* prevented, and which therefore are *not* in the future. It is one of the most common matters of experience that our agency is very frequently an indispensable part of the means through which events are produced or are prevented ; and this is in no way incompatible with the facts that the occurrence of the events which are thus caused to occur was in the future, and that the prevention of the events which are thus prevented was in the future. When an event is in the future, all the means through which it will be caused to occur are also in the future, except those which are already in the past or present, but which also were in the future before they were produced.

So long as we do not know what event is in the future, the mere knowledge that *the event which is to happen* is in the future, cannot reasonably be allowed to influence our proceedings when it is plain that our

agency is needed to produce or to prevent a contemplated event, if that event is to be produced or is to be prevented, and when we desire to produce or to prevent it. Before we can know the futurity of an event, either the event must have occurred, or its occurrence must have become obviously inevitable—that is, we must be enabled to conclude with confidence in which we cannot be mistaken, that no human agency, nor any other means, can avail to prevent it. And it is mere childish folly to reason respecting a contemplated future event, of which we do not know whether it is in the future or not, as if we did know either that it is or that it is not in the future.

It is entirely a fallacy to suppose that any one who takes a right view of the universality of causation in conjunction with the truth that man has a power of self-determination and is an agent in the production of events, will find his disposition to exert himself to bring about what he desires to occur, or to prevent what he desires to be prevented, diminished, or interfered with, by the idea of the futurity of all the events which are to occur. It is wrong, one-sided, views upon the subject which alone are injurious. So long as we have power and liberty to do the act or acts which is or are a part of the requisite means for the production of the event which we desire, while the other requisites are in existence already, we know that the result is within our power, and that we are morally free in relation to its production. All that consistency requires of us in such cases is, that we shall perceive and acknowledge that whatever we do we always are and always must be secondary

agents, and can never escape from our subordination to and dependence upon Universal Causation.

Thus the truth of the propositions under consideration is quite compatible with the efficacy of human agency in the production of events, and consequently with the common experience of mankind that events are very frequently caused to occur, or prevented, by human instrumentality, and that human agency is very frequently indispensable for the production of events. The only idea upon this point with which these propositions are incompatible is the idea that man can be a *First Cause*, or that there is *no* Supremely Ordered course of events; and this idea it is needless here to combat.

It may be argued that the consequences to morality must be extremely prejudicial, if, after a crime or a misdeed has been committed, the wrong-doer is to be allowed to plead, that in doing what he did, he only fulfilled his destiny, and that therefore he could not possibly have acted otherwise than he did act. But here, again, the view of the subject is dangerous, only because it is erroneous. Its error consists, again, in confounding the fact of being subject to causation, &c., with that of the non-possession of power in relation to the act under consideration. The wrong-doer is *not* to be allowed to plead in the manner supposed. Now that the crime or misdeed has been committed, it cannot rightly be denied that there was a sufficient *cause* for the doing of the deed, and that the deed was to be done, and that in that sense,—that is, in the sphere of Supreme Causation, it was inevitable. But in order to judge of the culpability of the wrong-doer, his misdeed must be considered in the *human* sphere,

and in this, the question to be determined is, whether, previously to the commission of the act, while the act was not yet completely caused, and while its futurity was unknown, the wrong-doer was destitute of all *power* and *freedom* in relation to the act. In estimating his culpability we have to consider, not what is known *now*, after the act has been done, but what was known before the act was done, and while it was still pending—not what has now been caused, but what at that time had not yet been caused; and whether the agent at that time had or had not any human power in relation to the act. If he really had no power, or if he was under coercion, we exculpate him from all blame; but if he *had* power and was not under coercion, we must judge of his culpability according to the knowledge and the other circumstances of the time which preceded the act, and not according to those which are subsequent to its commission. The only proper effect of our knowledge of Causation, in estimating criminality, is to cause us to be considerate and just, and not unkind, to the criminal; to consider all the circumstances of his case; and to investigate intelligently the causes of Good and Evil, so as to ascertain the means by which crimes and misdeeds may be *prevented*, and punishments may be superseded. By our knowledge of the nature and of the extent and limits of man's *power* in relation to his volitions and acts, we are prevented from unduly exaggerating the considerations which are attached to our knowledge of *causation*; and, in like manner, by our knowledge of *causation* we are prevented from unduly exaggerating the considerations which are

attached to our knowledge of man's powers. And as the *human* sphere must always be subordinate to Supreme Causation, we cannot expect that in any case whatever there can be an absence of Causation and of all the considerations which are attached to it. Thus we see that this argument is only a repetition of the old fallacious supposition that where there is Causation there cannot be Power, and where there is Power there cannot be Causation.

The confusion of ideas which has been so general relative to the causation of events, has arisen in a great degree from the supposition that in many cases *one* circumstance is the cause of an event, when in reality this circumstance is only one out of several or many which combine to constitute the entire cause. It has been in this manner that the idea has arisen that man is a sole and independent cause of events; while, in reality, man's agency can never be more than a part, and a subordinate part, of the cause of an event, and must itself be an effect of antecedent causes or conditions.

The supposition that events are often dependent upon ourselves alone, arises solely from similar erroneous habits of thought with respect to the Causation of events, in which, owing to the ignorance of our teachers upon this subject, we are allowed and caused to grow up from our childhood. Brought up as we are with most indefinite ideas respecting the Causation of events and results, the thought that they are very frequently dependent entirely upon ourselves, as the primary, sole, and independent means by which the events which occur are produced, becomes habitual to us. Seeing, as we constantly see, that, accordingly

as we perform or do not perform certain acts, sometimes one event occurs and sometimes another, and not perceiving that there is a concatenation of causes and effects in the entire course of events, which extends even to the production of our own volitions and acts, and to our own agency in their production, we learn to imagine habitually that there is no regularity in the manner in which events are determined—no established order of things; but that a very large, and to us a very important, part of the course of events, is under no government but that which *we* determine as primary originating causes. We do not consider that, although events may be dependent upon our volitions, our volitions themselves must be dependent upon antecedent conditions; and that even our agency in the production of our volitions must be dependent upon antecedent conditions. And, having none but the most confused and erroneous notions of the nature of our volitions, and of the manner in which they are produced, and of Causation in general, we are lost in a maze of error when we come to consider the Causes of those occurrences which we see that we ourselves are immediately instrumental in producing. We fail to trace the causes of those events further back than to our own agency; and we do not perceive the other circumstances which concur with our own agency in producing these events. We consequently suppose that we have an *independent* power of willing and of producing events. And hence, when by some view which is new to us, (but with which if we had been well taught we should have been familiar from an early age,) the idea is suggested to us, as a scientific truth, that “all events are produced by

"Causation, according to unchanging Laws," with the consequent conclusions, that idea and those conclusions are so much at variance with our previously formed habits of thinking upon the subject, that we either rashly reject the idea and the conclusions, as totally irreconcilable with man's moral liberty and with his agency in the production of events, or we adopt some form of the necessitarian doctrine, and suppose that man has no power in the formation of his volitions, and that he cannot have such power consistently with the Universality of Causation.

But the knowledge of the compatibility of all the considerations which are really attached to the universality of causation with the fact that man has a power of self-determination, places our knowledge of man's moral liberty upon a securely established basis. The following instance of the excessively limited views upon which the supposition of man's independent power has been based, will appropriately conclude this chapter.

Father Buffier in his "Treatise on First Truths," p. 285, endeavours to disprove the Universality of Causation and the unalterable futurity of all events which occur, by the test of a wager. He says, that if those principles were true, it must now be in the future either that he shall raise his hand three times within a quarter of an hour, or that he shall not do so. And he offers to wager a thousand guineas to one, that he will do the opposite to that which any one who will bet with him shall assert to be in the future. And he supposes that, as it is obvious that he could win such a wager any number of times, it follows that the volition by means of which he

would win would be of his own independent formation or determination, and could not have been unalterably in the future. He imagines that he thus triumphantly refutes the views which he opposes.

But the fact is, that it is his own idea of his independence in willing which would be proved to be erroneous by his winning of this wager. For if he always did the opposite to that which it was asserted that he would do, it is evident that his volitions would be *dependent* to a very great extent upon the assertion which was made. So that a looker-on would be able to predict how he would will upon every occasion, as soon as he, the looker-on, knew what the assertion was which was to be proved to be erroneous. How would it be with M. Buffier and his wager if his opponent's guess were kept secret from him until the quarter of an hour had elapsed?

But still, in the proposed proceeding, the winning of the wager would be dependent in part upon the agency of the winner. For he must be mentally active in attending to the assertion which was made, and this mental agency would be an important part of the means through which his volition would be produced; and he must be physically active to do what was requisite to be done in order to win.

The error which M. Buffier had to refute was the supposition that he had *no* power whatever in relation to his volitions and the course of events—the Necessitarian fundamental negation; but in endeavouring to refute this error, he identified it with the assertion of the universality of causation, and he thus placed himself in opposition to this great and important truth. It is, as we have seen, the same error, reversed

which is embraced by the Necessitarian, when he supposes that if Causation is universal, man cannot have a power of Self-determination, and all his volitions must be formed "for him and not by him;" and this error is only carried out to its legitimate logical extent when other Necessitarians add that man cannot have any power or agency in the formation of his character; and when Fatalists add to this, that man cannot have any power in relation to the production of any other results. But these last inferences are so palpably inconsistent with facts, that comparatively few Necessitarians are so consistent in their logic as to admit them. While with respect to the process of self-determination, the *facts* having been imperfectly known, the necessitarians have allowed the logic to prevail. A knowledge of the facts of the process of self-determination makes the fact of man's power and agency in that process as plain as the facts of the other cases have been, and thus the false logic is entirely swept away, and with it the last relic of *Necessitarianism*.

It thus becomes evident that Universal Causation does not involve *Necessitation*, and that the possession of a Power of Self-determination does not involve *independence*.

And by the reconciling of the two truths a point of view is obtained, from which we are enabled to discern the solution of all the difficulties which have arisen from the supposition that they were logically irreconcilable.

And by the same means, *one* wholly correct and purely beneficial doctrine, is substituted for *two* opposite doctrines, both partly true and partly false, partly beneficial and partly injurious.

CHAPTER XIV.

Moral Responsibility as Affected by the Reconciling of Moral Liberty and Causation.

ALTHOUGH in what has already been said, the effects of understanding man's moral freedom and his subjection to causation in combination with each other, in modifying our views of moral responsibility, have perhaps been sufficiently pointed out, it may be useful, before concluding, to add a few remarks with reference especially to that subject.

In order to determine the moral responsibility of an individual upon any occasion, we must first ascertain whether he had any power in the case—whether he had power to do that which we consider he ought to have done but which he neglected to do—assuming that he had the knowledge of right and wrong upon the subject, without which he could not justly be held to be morally responsible. If he had no power in the case, we at once absolve him from all blame. If he had power, but was prevented by some overwhelming obstacle from exerting that power effectually, we again consider him blameless. But if he had power, and was not prevented from exerting it by any obstacle which he could not have overcome if he had tried his best, we then regard him as culpable—

as morally responsible. The fact that there was a sufficient cause for his doing as he did, does not take off his demerits; because the possessing of power, and not the being independent of causation, is the foundation of Moral Responsibility, as it is of Moral Freedom.

The question how far man has merit or demerit for his opinions and feelings has been much disputed. In former times the extreme Libertarian view of the subject—the idea that opinions and feelings were independent mental *acts*—prevailed to a very great extent. And this view has been the cause of an awful extent of injustice, cruelty, and bloodshed—of bigotry, intolerance, and persecution; and has often converted even well-meaning men into pests and scourges of their fellow-creatures. The Necessitarian opinion, that man has no power in the formation of his opinions and feelings, was a natural reaction against this extreme libertarian view, and has had a very powerful influence to mitigate its effects. It has compelled the libertarians to qualify to some extent their views upon this subject. Men do not now hate and persecute others so bitterly on account of differences of opinions and feelings as formerly,—though there is still room for improvement in this respect, and this very often among those who have the highest opinion of their own *merits*.

The true view of man's power in relation to his opinions and feelings is that which considers them as mental *affections*, and as results in the production of which the individual is not entirely passive, and over which in some cases he has some power. In many cases the person who has acquired erroneous

opinions may correct them by investigation ; and the person who has bad feelings may control them and modify them to some extent—as has previously been explained. But so far as we have power over our opinions and feelings, it is by indirect and not by direct means that we exert it ; and a just estimate of what can and of what cannot be done by individuals in forming or altering their opinions and feelings, and of what has and what has not been dependent upon their own agency in the forming of those which they have, is requisite for duly estimating their merit or their demerit on account of their opinions and feelings. There are feelings and opinions which we cannot make ourselves have ; and there are feelings and opinions which we cannot make ourselves not have. Thus, for instance, there are persons for whom we cannot make ourselves feel respect ; and there are persons for whom we cannot make ourselves feel disrespect. What we believe upon many points depends very much upon education ; and it often happens that persons have been caused to acquire opinions which are extremely erroneous, and that the opinions which they have been taught or caused to acquire have become so fixed that they cannot be altered by any endeavours of the individuals or by any external influences which can be brought to act upon them. Whenever beliefs are erroneous, we may be certain that those who have them have been caused to acquire them by some deceptive means which they had not power to control. There are few persons who would willingly retain an erroneous opinion—who would not wish to be undeceived upon any point upon which they are in error, if it were

possible for them to be undeceived. A knowledge of the fundamental principles of mental science will complete the correction of the mistakes of past ages upon these points.

With respect to man's moral responsibility for his acts, it may be asked, how can we know the extent and the limits of the power of Self-determination possessed by an individual upon a particular occasion, or whether upon that occasion he had sufficient moral power to enable him to overcome the temptations to which he was subjected? May we not consider that the fact of the commission of a misdeed or a crime, is proof that the wrong-doer or the criminal did not possess sufficient moral power, in the circumstances of the time, to enable him to resist and overcome his temptations, especially when we are aware that there must have been a sufficient cause for his doing as he did?

In reference to causation, it has been remarked before, that the neglect or omission to exert our physical powers is no proof that we have not the powers which we do not exert, notwithstanding the fact that there must have been a sufficient cause for our not exerting them; and that the case must be the same with respect to our moral power. As to our knowledge of the amount of moral power possessed by an individual, cases will occur, as the different classes of society are now educated and placed, in which it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to determine whether the wrong-doer really had sufficient moral power to resist successfully the temptations or incitements to which he was subjected. This is only the difficulty, which not uncommonly arises,

of determining the strength of the incitement, or the moral sanity of the wrong-doer. So long as an individual is not morally insane, or is not subjected to temptations or incitements which may fairly be considered to be so strong as to overcome his powers of self-control if those powers were exerted to their utmost extent, he is to be considered as morally responsible for his misdeeds. It must be in some cases very difficult, or impossible, to determine how far, owing to constitutional peculiarities or to external circumstances, there is excuse or extenuation for his misconduct. If we trace the causes of it, we shall always find that there is much extenuation. For if the organisation was naturally defective, that was his misfortune and not his fault. And if he was not born among a truly enlightened generation, and consequently was subjected from his birth to many unfavourable influences, as all now are, that also was his misfortune and not his fault. But, on the other hand, if he had moral power, that is, if he was not morally insane, and if, knowing that he had this power and that it was his duty to exert it to the utmost whenever he was tempted to do wrong, he neglected so to exert it, there is still room for moral responsibility, and for as much of it as is really beneficial.

It may be said, as was previously noticed, that the person who is tempted to do wrong will be induced to yield to his inclinations by the idea that if he does wrong there is always a sufficient cause for his doing so. But while persons are so defective in character as to be so influenced, this effect will be counteracted by the knowledge that they have a power of Self-deter-

mination, and that it is their duty to exert it to the utmost to conquer all temptations. And the influence of this knowledge will be strengthened by their knowing also the natural and unavoidable evil consequences of wrong-doing, and the punishments of society to which they are liable.

But all these difficulties and embarrassments are only temporary ; and society must scramble and fight through them as well as it can, so long as it is so unwise as to allow them to continue. And they have their beneficial effects, in stimulating society to endeavour to ascertain the means of *preventing* them. When every one shall be rightly educated and placed, there will not be any whose characters will be so defective that they will seek for excuses for misconduct. The children of such a generation will seek for reasons to encourage their exertion of self-control, when it is requisite, and not for reasons to excuse its non-exertion. And until all are so educated and placed, society must suffer the consequences of its want of wisdom—whether it is morally responsible for those consequences or not. While society does not know how to remedy the evils, it is not morally responsible for them ; for without the knowledge of what is right to be done, neither societies nor individuals can be morally responsible for not doing it. But the natural eagerness of man for the acquirement of useful knowledge continually impels him to endeavour to increase his moral responsibility ; and the increased capabilities which he acquires by so doing, far more than compensate for the change from irresponsible want of knowledge, to the responsible possession of it.

CHAPTER XV.

Conclusion.—Postscript on Co-operation.

IF now, after having examined the various divisions of our subject, we take a general review of them, we shall perceive that when they are considered singly and unitedly in a matter-of-fact manner, there is no difficulty in understanding them. In fact, as was stated at the commencement, the entire subject is so simple, when so considered, that any ordinarily intelligent person may easily be enabled to understand it by lucid explanations, and that it may easily be explained to children so as to be understood by them. Consequently, Mental Science may now become a part of general education, and may be taught with as much facility as any of the simplest material sciences. And in some respects it may be taught with even greater facility than they,—because it is continually illustrated by the daily and hourly experience of every individual. I allude here chiefly to those parts of the science which have been explained in these pages. But it will be found that other parts of this science will also be greatly simplified by the matter-of-fact views of mental operations which have been here explained. Hitherto, as has been before remarked, this most important part of education could not use-

fully be introduced into the general course of popular instruction, not only on account of the mystification in which the subject was involved, and of the fundamentally erroneous views and phraseology by which it was so much falsified, but also because of the danger which existed that those who studied it would become converts to the Necessitarian views—a danger to which all must be peculiarly alive who perceive the importance of the belief that man has a power of Self-determination and is a morally responsible being. And the reality of this danger is shown by the fact that very many, if not the greater number, of the most eminent psychologists of the present day, are Necessitarians, and by the immense extent to which the Necessitarian ideas have been popularly disseminated, as questions of Mental Science have been more generally considered than they formerly were.

But so long as the negative fundamental part of the Necessitarian views could not be corrected without the denial of their affirmative fundamental part, those views with the influences of their erroneous parts qualified more or less as they always are instinctively, were much preferable to a doctrine which involved the denial of man's subjection in all things to Causation. And when the evils which have arisen from this old Libertarian doctrine are considered, it cannot be doubted that they have been far greater than any which have been produced by the opposite views. But now that both doctrines can be rectified, and that a correct combination of views upon the momentous subjects to which they have reference can be substituted for them, it is most desirable that these views

should be made known with the least possible delay to all who are able to appreciate them. And the defects of education through which any part of the population has been allowed to be incapable of appreciating these views, will in due time be corrected, and then none will be caused to grow up in ignorance of subjects which it is so important that all should clearly understand.

The improvement which the knowledge of these subjects will produce, through the increase of considerate and just and kindly feelings in every class, will add very much to the general happiness. And in the treatment of the young, by parents, nurses, teachers, companions, and friends, very great benefits will arise from the correction of the spirit of harshness in which their wrong-doings are checked when these are supposed to be attributable solely to an independent free will of the children themselves. And a knowledge of the fact that there is always a sufficient Cause for whatever is wrong in the child, and that this cause is always to a very great extent to be found in mismanagement, past and present—that is, in injurious external influences which operate and which have operated upon the young, will stimulate and guide those who have the care of children to observe the effects of external influences upon them, and by so doing to ascertain the causes of good and evil in education, as they never could be ascertained while the confused ideas were retained which have hitherto universally prevailed.

In like manner when causes and effects in the production of vices and crimes are intelligently observed, the Causes will become evident which have hitherto

counteracted all the endeavours which have been made to exterminate vice and crime; and in due time the only means by which wrong inclinations and conduct can be effectually prevented, will be ascertained.

POSTSCRIPT ON CO-OPERATION.

When men and women, for whom such a change is desirable, are sufficiently informed upon the subject of Moral Freedom and Causation, and, with that information, are sufficiently well disposed, to enter upon a truly just and honest state of society, Associations for its realisation may be formed, for all who are capable of taking a useful part in them, and who are wishful to do so, either as general members only, or as assistants also in the management of the affairs of their society, according to their capabilities. And in such associations all poverty or painful deficiency of the means which are requisite for a comfortable and happy subsistence, will be permanently *prevented*. This will be accomplished by an organised system of Co-operation, for the well-ordered production of all those things which are requisite, and for their equitable distribution among the producers. Men and women will be morally elevated, and fitted for membership of such associations, by means of the knowledge of the first principles of Mental Science. But without this knowledge they never could have been so fitted. It will not be requisite in the commencement, for the general members of such associations, that they should know more than the simplest rudiments of this knowledge. Willingness to conform to wise and just regulations, having the happiness of all the members of the associations for their object, will be for

them the chief moral pre-requisite, together with a general idea of Causation and Self-determination. This last will be necessary to enable them to control the consequences of defects of disposition and temper which may have been produced in them by the injurious influences of their past lives. By degrees, under favourable external circumstances, and with right ideas for their internal guidance, these effects of the evil influences of the past will be corrected, in all who have not been incurably deteriorated. But there will be very few upon whom a system of enlightened and considerate and impartial justice and kindness, in the proceedings in which they take a part, will not have a very powerful influence for good. For those who take a leading part in forming and directing these societies, more precise knowledge of the principles of mental and moral science will be requisite, in addition to other special qualifications. And they must be capable of advising and guiding those with whom they are associated, in a really friendly, and, it may be said, in a brotherly, or sisterly, or fatherly, or motherly spirit, and at the same time judiciously and firmly. But the fundamental intellectual pre-requisite for considerate and wise kindness and justice having been obtained, all else which is necessary will follow in due course.

The powers of Co-operation, for the attainment of great results, have already been shown in a most gratifying manner, even in the very imperfect applications of it which have as yet been made. It is evidently the destined means, when wisely ordered, for the realisation in practice of the Great Principle of Christ's teaching—that we should “do to others in

all things as we would have others to do to us." The general idea of self-sustaining societies has long been familiar to those who take an interest in Co-operative proceedings. Much of the details of such associations will have to be decided upon, and no doubt to be improved from time to time, by those who become directors in forming the Co-operative establishments. When men of business turn their attention seriously to the subject, the forming of these establishments will no doubt become a new and very desirable means for the investment of capital, as well as for the providing of employments of various kinds for those who need them.

How such societies may be established and conducted in the most advantageous manner, is a question of deep interest. One great object will be to combine the separate and independent individuality of families, with the co-operative performance of the various occupations which will be required to provide for the wants of all the members of each association. For this purpose, new villages will require to be formed, composed, say, of cottages and other useful buildings, so that each family may have a healthy and well-arranged furnished dwelling, with a small garden. Very inexpensive buildings and furnishings will suffice for a beginning ; and by good management much comfort may be provided at a comparatively small cost. To each village will be attached a farm, or farms, and general gardens, of suitable extent ; and there will also be stores, schools, clubs, &c. Regular employment will be provided for the members ; and those who are employed will receive individually a stipulated income, which will enable them to obtain

at the stores and the clubs of the society, such provisions, clothes, &c., as they may require for themselves and their families. And at stated intervals, the general surplus profits will be allotted among them. Each association will produce as far as possible all that is requisite for the support of its members, and also various productions for external sale; and will thus be enabled to support itself in comfort, and gradually to improve its arrangements and increase its possessions. These establishments may be formed by joint-stock companies,—the interest of the money expended upon them being paid in the form of rent for the use of the land, buildings, &c. &c. Either the directors of the joint-stock companies may retain the general control of the proceedings of the societies, or the establishments may be let to co-operative associations.

It cannot reasonably be doubted that all this may be realised when it is initiated in a business-like manner. If society as it is now is maintained by those who are usefully employed, under all the disadvantages arising from waste and misapplication of their powers, it is evident that societies of limited numbers may easily maintain themselves well, when all who are employed are *usefully* employed, and when their various operations are wisely regulated, and when all are made as effective as possible for accomplishing the objects in view.

One interesting and extremely useful feature of such establishments might be, a number of cottage residences in their immediate vicinity, in which persons independent of the co-operators might reside, who would benefit by the clubs, &c., of the association, and would be purchasers of its productions, with much

advantage to themselves and to the association. Credit transactions might be avoided; and the tenancies might be made terminable at will by either of the parties—the tenants of the cottages and the directors of the association—in order to stop at once any dissatisfaction or other unpleasantness which might arise, and which could not be otherwise satisfactorily settled. While defective characters remain, unpleasantness may occur, and it is requisite to provide against such a contingency.


These very general statements the writer has thought it useful to add as a postscript, in order to indicate the course of one very important process of social improvement, which will be powerfully aided, and indeed made practicable, by the reconciling of Moral Freedom with Causation. Co-operation in a limited and rudimentary form is very widely extending among the working classes, and a journal, called *The Co-operator*, devoted to the subject, is published every fortnight. But the present co-operative stores and manufactories, though extremely useful and important, are only the precursors of much more complete and extensive co-operative proceedings, in which others, as well as those who are called the “working classes,” will participate. These proceedings being so organised at first as to be suitable for those of the working classes who are unable to obtain remunerative employment otherwise, and for those who are unable to provide the requisite capital for themselves, their advantages and their capabilities of extension and improvement will, no doubt, soon be found to be so great, that many members of other classes who have capital of their own will be induced to imitate them upon a superior scale. These persons

will thus obtain much greater advantages than they could procure by the expenditure of a much larger amount of money in establishing themselves in trades and professions in the usual manner. The problem to be solved in these co-operative villages will be, to exclude as far as possible the Causes of moral and material Evil, and to combine together, as far as practicable, in the best possible manner, the Causes of moral and material Good. And this problem there will not now be much difficulty in solving, when men and women of ability can be induced to set about its investigation in a right spirit, and with the earnestness which an object so momentous must produce in those who appreciate its importance. And when a starting point suitable to present circumstances has been attained, no limits can be assigned to the improvements of every desirable kind which will be developed in the progress of time.

That such co-operation will be very extensively adopted when once it has been proved to be practicable, may be considered as certain ; for it would be contrary to all experience to suppose that the means of obtaining most desirable results should be known and should not be applied. Until the practicability of such proceedings has been shown by those who believe in it, there will, no doubt, be very many who will consider that they cannot be carried out,—as was the case with respect to railways and in many similar instances ; but a comparatively small number of persons will be sufficient to establish a successful commencement, and none will be able to resist the evidence of practical results when it can be placed before them.

THE END.







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